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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to analyse the political role of Thailand’s military in relation to the 
country’s democratic backsliding in the twenty-first century. It has long been well 
known that the military is a key actor in Thai politics. The two most recent military 
coups, in September 2006 and May 2014, added to the long list of military coups 
that Thailand has seen since the end of the absolute monarchy era in 1932. Before 
2006, however, there was a 15-year period during which the military was virtually 
absent from politics and electoral democracy appeared to take hold. As successive 
civilian governments won and lost power in parliamentary elections rather than 
through non-electoral means, Thailand at the time was evidently heading towards 
democratic consolidation, cementing its place as part of the global ‘Third Wave’ of 
countries adopting democracy and rejecting authoritarian rule. The 2006 coup was 
thus a sudden and largely unexpected event, putting a stop to the previous 
democratic trajectory while marking a return of the military to forefront of the 
domestic political scene. 
 Drawing on first-hand empirical data, the thesis looks at how the military has 
manipulated politics and contributed to the weakening of Thailand’s democratic 
prospects. The thesis provides a detailed analysis of the role of the military that 
focuses on the period from 2006 to the present, a period spanning five elected 
governments and two military-appointed ones. 
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A note on convention 
Throughout this thesis, Thai names are cited and alphabetised by given name (the 
first name) because Thai people are commonly known by their first name. For 
example, Prajak Kongkirati will be referred to as Prajak in the main text, and his full 
name will be listed in the bibliography. 
 
A note on transliteration 
All Thai words are transcribed into English using Leeds University Romanisation 
system, except Thai proper names which I adopt the form the person or 
organisation used. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
“For democracy, civilian control—that is, control of the military 
by civilian officials elected by the people—is fundamental. 
Civilian control allows a nation to base its values, institutions, 
and practices on the popular will rather than on the choices of 
military leaders, whose outlook by definition focuses on the need 
for internal order and external security. The military is, by 
necessity, among the least democratic institutions in human 
experience; martial customs and procedures clash by nature with 
individual freedom and civil liberty, the highest values in 
democratic societies.” 
- Richard H. Kohn (1997: 141) 
 
“Pro-democracy activists frequently, and rightly, remind us of the 
political problems that result when the military interferes in 
politics. Often overlooked is the damage that interference can do 
to the military itself.” 
- James Ockey (2014: 71) 
 
This thesis aims to analyse the political role of the military in Thailand, focusing 
particularly on how it has been involved in the country’s ‘democratic backsliding’ 
throughout much of last two decades. It has long been well known that the military 
is a key actor in Thai politics. The two most recent military coups, in September 
2006 and May 2014, added to the long list of military coups that Thailand has seen 
since the end of the absolute monarchy era in 1932. Before 2006, however, there 
was a 15-year period during which the military was virtually absent from politics 
and electoral democracy appeared to take hold. As successive civilian governments 
won and lost power in parliamentary elections rather than through non-electoral 
means, Thailand at the time was evidently heading towards democratic 
consolidation, cementing its place as part of the global ‘Third Wave’ of countries 
adopting democracy and rejecting authoritarian rule (Huntington 1991). The 2006 
coup was thus a sudden and largely unexpected event, putting a stop to the previous 
democratic trajectory while marking a return of the military to forefront of the 
 
 
9 
domestic political scene. Though electoral politics resumed at the end of 2007, 
another coup in 2014 again reversed the course, this time putting the country under 
a repressive military government that has remained in power for nearly five years at 
the time of writing. Instead of realising its earlier democratic promises, Thailand 
now finds itself as part of another global trend: the rise of authoritarianism and the 
decline of democracy throughout many regions of the world (Diamond 2016). 
 
Background: Thailand’s Military and Democratic Backsliding 
A major turning point in Thailand’s political development took place in 2001. A 
general election in January of that year resulted in the emergence of a strong elected 
government led by telecommunications tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra (International 
Crisis Group 2014: 4; Ferrara 2015b: 225). Thanks in part to the widely admired 
1997 constitution which favoured large parties and a strong executive, Thaksin 
achieved landslide electoral victories not only in 2001 but also in 2005, both times 
on a scale unprecedented in Thailand. His period in power was marked by an 
emphasis on decisive leadership, a heavy use of marketing principles borrowed 
from the business world, a general disdain for oppositional voices or the notion of 
checks and balances (McCargo and Ukrist 2005: 5), and—especially after the 2005 
election—an electoral strategy geared towards voters in the mostly rural and poor 
regions in the north and northeast of Thailand. Though he came under growing 
criticisms for his authoritarian tendencies (Kasian 2006: 10), Thaksin’s political 
dominance in the first half of the 2000s created a sense of stability in sharp contrast 
to the weak, short-lived civilian governments of the 1990s (McCargo and Ukrist 
2005: 11-12).  
In the end, Thaksin’s large parliamentary majority was unable to prevent his 
eventual downfall. After several months of anti-government mass protests by a 
movement known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), the military 
launched a coup to topple him in September 2006, driving Thaksin into self-
imposed exile with the exception of a five-month period in 2008 when he returned 
to Thailand. The fact that the Thai military re-emerged as a major political actor 
during the time of a strong civilian government, rather than a weak one, contradicts 
pre-existing assumptions which suggest that weak civilian governments are more 
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susceptible to military intervention (Alagappa 2001: 47-48). After the 2006 coup, 
the military remained involved in politics in various ways. It was responsible for 
abolishing the 1997 constitution and replacing it with one that considerably 
restricted the authority of the elected government. While Thaksin continued to fight 
elections and govern the country from afar—his party won further elections in 2007 
and 2011—the military made efforts to cripple and obstruct him. At the end of 2008 
it even played a key role in assembling a parliamentary majority to create an anti-
Thaksin civilian government led by Abhisit Vejjajiva. Seeing that Thaksin remained 
a powerful electoral force, the military staged another coup in May 2014 against the 
elected government of Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra and has suspended 
elections since then. Thus far, the ruling military regime has repeatedly broken its 
promise of holding a new general election; even elections for municipalities and 
local governments have not been permitted. 
Though closely related, the military’s meddling in politics is not the only 
cause of democratic backsliding in a given country. Democratic backsliding, defined 
by Bermeo (2016: 5) as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the 
political institutions that sustain an existing democracy”, can take many forms. In 
recent years, many elected civilian leaders who have been responsible for the 
decline of democracy in their respective countries. Hungary’s Victor Orban is an 
elected leader who has weakened the judiciary and packed state institutions with 
loyalists (Kyle and Gultchin 2018: 40). Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan has 
dominated Turkey’s elections since 2002 while steadily increasing his power and 
suppressing dissent along the way (Bermeo 2016: 11). Indeed, Erdogan even came 
into conflict with Turkey’s traditionally powerful military, remarkably surviving a 
coup attempt against him in July 2016 (Runciman 2018: 51-52). Many of Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s actions during his time in power also violated liberal democratic 
principles, such as his attempts to dominate other state institutions that were 
supposed to provide checks and balances against the government or otherwise 
operate in a non-partisan manner (Baker and Pasuk 2014: 263). In short, 
democratic backsliding can often occur when civilian leaders overstep their 
boundaries and undermine existing democratic mechanisms. The military does not 
need to be involved. Throughout this thesis, democratic backsliding and other 
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similar terms, such as democratic rollback and democratic recession, will be used 
interchangeably. 
In this regard, Thailand represents an interesting case of democratic 
backsliding because although Thaksin undermined democratic principles in various 
ways, it is the military that has played a central role in reversing the country’s 
earlier trajectory towards democratic consolidation, not least by overthrowing two 
elected governments in 2006 and 2014. Moreover, the Thai military’s political 
resurgence occurred after a relatively long period out of the spotlight. Although Thai 
politics has had a long history of military dominance, before the 2006 coup the 
issue of the military’s political role had largely fallen off the agenda. The 
assumption, widely held and rarely challenged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
was that the Thai military had ‘gone back to the barracks’ (Connors 2002: 41). This 
prevalent view arose after army troops had clashed with and violently suppressed 
pro-democracy civilian protesters in Bangkok in May 1992. The event, known as 
‘Black May’ or phrusapha thamin, was a crucial turning point in Thailand’s political 
development. The military’s reputation suffered a dramatic collapse, its 
involvement in the socio-political sphere was strongly questioned, and the Black 
May incident paved the way for a significant wave of broad-based, civilian-led 
democratic reform that eventually produced a widely admired constitution in 1997. 
Some observers, writing before the 2006 coup, considered the age of military 
intervention in Thailand to be over (Surachart 2001: 77). 
It should be stressed that this thesis will by no means regard the two coups in 
2006 and 2014 as the only instances of military meddling in Thai politics. Scholars 
have long made clear that there are many more ways for the armed forces to exert 
political influence other than directly staging a coup (Feaver 1999; Croissant et al. 
2010; Serra 2010: 44-45). The military’s involvement in politics is a matter of 
degree and should not be treated as a dichotomous coup-or-no-coup variable. In 
fact, a truly powerful military arguably has no need to stage a coup; the military may 
sometimes find it more beneficial to exert political influence from behind the 
scenes. By stepping into the limelight, the military risks putting itself under 
pressure both from the public, who generally tend to grow more and more 
frustrated with their rulers over time, and from democratic-minded actors in the 
international community who usually have a low opinion of military dictatorships. 
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In the words of Croissant et al. (2010: 954), “the absence of coups might just as well 
be understood as an indicator for the military enjoying a high degree of political 
influence vis-à-vis civilians.” The case of Indonesia is a good example that can 
illustrate this point. As Aspinall (2010: 22-25) argues, the Indonesian military lost 
its position at the top of the country’s power structure following the overthrow of 
the authoritarian former president Suharto in 1998. However, it has retained 
considerable influence over public affairs thanks to the fact that civilian leaders 
have been reluctant to reform it and in some instances they even rely on it for 
political support. The Indonesian military thus occupies a privileged spot, being one 
of the most politically powerful actors in the country without having to be 
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the government. 
 
Thailand’s Political History and the Military’s Enduring Role 
Thailand, formerly known as Siam until 1939, is a country in Southeast Asia, located 
at the centre of the region’s mainland portion not far from the southern border of 
China. Unlike its contemporaries in the region, the ruling Chakri dynasty managed 
to prevent the country from falling under direct colonial rule during the age of 
Western imperialism. Although some scholars subsequently questioned whether the 
country’s various concessions to the Western powers effectively constituted a form 
of indirect colonisation (Harrison and Jackson 2010), the idea that Thailand was 
never colonised has come to occupy a central part of the Thai mindset. The 
education system and mass media relentlessly glorify the preservation of 
independence, portraying it as a key achievement of the wise, absolutist kings 
(Thongchai 2014: 82-84). 
The country remained an absolute monarchy under the Chakri dynasty until 
June 1932, when a group known as khana ratsadon or People’s Party—comprising 
members drawn from civilian, military and bureaucratic elites (McCargo 1998: 
137)—seized power from King Rama VII, also known as King Prajadiphok. The 
incident is commonly known as the Siamese Revolution of 1932 (Nakarin 1992; 
Reynolds 1998: 479-480; Baker and Pasuk 2014: 115), though there have been long-
running scholarly debates regarding the extent to which it really was revolutionary 
in terms of bringing about a transformation of the Thai social order (Kengkij 2012). 
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Absolute monarchy was abolished, supposedly to be replaced by a new democratic 
regime modelled after European constitutional monarchies. It turned out, however, 
that liberal democracy never properly found its footing in the country over the 
following decades. The People’s Party itself suffered from internal division, its ideals 
later eclipsed by a revival of monarchism less than 30 years after the revolution 
(Thongchai 2008: 19-21). Traditional elites, bureaucrats and army men 
subsequently came to dominate politics, compounding the deeply hierarchical 
character of the Thai society and ensuring that periods of electoral democracy were 
brief and sporadic up until the 1980s (Hewison 2015: 52-57). The monarchy, 
stripped of power and prestige by the revolutionaries, made a grand return to the 
apex of the Thai power structure during the late 1950s military dictatorship, thanks 
not least to robust support from the United States at the height of the Cold War 
(Nattapoll 2013: 329-333). On the ideological front, conservative Thai thinkers, 
some of whom had spent many years in Europe for education, attempted to justify 
the illiberal, hierarchical structure of the country by arguing that a full application 
of Western-style democratic values would never be suitable for Thailand (Hewison 
and Kengkij 2010: 180-192; Ferrara 2015a: 356-360).   
The history of Thailand’s highly political military is deeply intertwined with 
that of its monarchy. As early Chakri kings began their consolidation of powers, 
there was a growing need for the palace to establish a permanent standing army 
whose major reason for existence would be to ensure the monarchy’s dominance 
over all areas of the country. King Chulalongkorn, who ruled from 1868 to 1910, 
carried out wide-ranging reforms aimed at modernising the regime and centralising 
authority (Baker and Pasuk 2014: 60). As part of the reform package, the kingdom’s 
first standing army was created around the end of the nineteenth century, realising 
the king’s belief that a permanent military force represented an important step 
towards modernity. Nationalism, patriotism and loyalty to the throne were among 
the core values promoted within the new military (Chambers 2013a: 116). 
However, the post-Chulalongkorn Chakri monarchs were never completely 
assured of success in their efforts to maintain an unchallenged absolutist regime. In 
1912, junior army officers staged a rebellion against King Vajiravudh, calling for an 
end to old-fashioned monarchical rule and putting forward liberal ideas inspired by 
reformists elsewhere, including the revolutionaries who had earlier overthrown the 
 
 
14 
Qing dynasty in China (Chambers 2013a: 116). While the rebellion ultimately failed, 
it nonetheless gave birth to Thailand’s long tradition of military intervention in 
politics (Ockey 2001: 191). When absolute monarchy met its demise in 1932, many 
prominent members of the People’s Party were military officers irritated by the 
regime’s mishandling of the increasingly complex and evolving country (Alagappa 
2013: 100). The monarchy was allowed to exist but in a much less powerful form, 
partly to give some public legitimacy to the revolution whose leaders were drawn 
from extremely small cliques within society (Chambers 2013a: 120) although it 
should be noted that there was considerable support for the revolution among the 
public as well (Hewison 2015: 53). Over the following two decades, the military 
began to solidify its status as a political actor capable of determining societal 
outcomes, using coups d’état to instigate change of political leadership and 
government (Suchit 2004: 48). Coups, countercoups, and rule by strongmen 
became recurring features of Thai politics. 
The army’s political dominance, whether by ruling directly or supporting 
nominally civilian governments, continued mostly uninterrupted into the second 
half of the twentieth century. Economic development, rather than political 
liberalisation, became a central aim of the Thai state (Suchit 2004: 49). The 
monarchy’s prestige had mostly been restored by the 1960s as the palace, along with 
royalist political factions, began forging a close bond with top military leaders 
(Hewison 2015: 55; Ferrara 2015b: 275). However, it is impossible to ignore the 
watershed event of 14 October 1973 when an anti-military mass uprising in 
Bangkok, led mainly by student activists with inspirations from left-wing doctrines, 
democratic ideas and the Buddhist notion of justice (Baker and Pasuk 2014: 186) 
ended in a violent crackdown that subsequently forced the country’s military rulers 
out of power. From 1973 to 1976 there was a remarkable atmosphere of liberal 
democracy in Thailand as previously suppressed groups such as labourers, farmers 
and leftists began to make their voices heard (Chai-Anan 2002: 94). The armed 
forces were weakened during this time, though a large number of important 
political offices continued to be filled by men in uniform (Chambers 2013a: 180-
192).  
Meanwhile, an insurgency campaign of the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT) was gaining ground in the impoverished countryside. The communist threat 
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was growing particularly acute in the context of the Cold War and communist 
penetration in Indochina, elevating the suppression of the insurgency to be one of 
the Thai military’s primary missions  (Suchit 2004: 51-54). Right-wingers, who by 
then had formed grassroots groups and paramilitary task forces of their own, 
regarded social activism and liberal ideals with contempt, associating them with an 
alleged communist-inspired plot to bring down the existing royalist political order 
(Prajak 2006: 20; Krittian 2010: 210). A sustained campaign by the right to 
demonise student activists and their sympathisers culminated in a massacre of anti-
military student protesters in October 1976, triggering the military’s full return in 
the form of another coup (Anderson 1977: 19-20). For the next decade, the Thai 
polity was never allowed to revert to the open atmosphere brought about by the 
1973 uprising as royalist, bureaucratic and military elites maintained a high degree 
of control over politics. Popularly known in Thailand as the ‘semi-democracy’ 
period (Chai-Anan 2002: 130; Suchit 2013: 170), the political landscape during this 
time exhibited some democratic features such as elections and parliamentary 
politics but key decisions continued to be made by the non-majoritarian elites. This 
trend only showed signs of receding when Prem Tinsulanonda, Thailand’s unelected 
prime minister during much of the 1980s who had strong backing by the palace and 
the military (McCargo 2005: 506-507; Suchit 2013: 170), stepped down in the wake 
of the 1988 election. 
In 1991, the military staged what was thought to be the country’s last ever 
coup. The elected civilian government was thrown out over allegations of 
widespread corruption, abuse of power, ‘parliamentary dictatorship’, undermining 
the military institution, and mishandling of anti-monarchy threats (official 
announcement by the coup group, reprinted in Thamrongsak 2007: 177-180). The 
army then bungled its attempt to prolong its grip on power, badly misjudging the 
popular sentiment against a return to undemocratic rule. In May 1992, an anti-
military mass uprising in Bangkok ended in a bloody crackdown that greatly 
tarnished the military’s standing in the eyes of the public. King Bhumibol, by then a 
long-reigning, highly revered monarch (Thongchai 2008: 21-22), made a widely 
publicised intervention in which he summoned both the junta chief and the leader 
of the protesters for a televised dressing-down, demonstrating his immense royal 
authority in the process (Suchit 2013: 171). Anti-military sentiment in the aftermath 
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of the violence was so strong that some military officers resorted to wearing civilian 
clothes instead of their uniforms during their commute to and from work (Wassana 
2002: 85). The army’s subsequent retreat from frontline politics then enabled 
Thailand to experience its longest period of uninterrupted democratic rule. The 
1997 constitution, widely known as ‘The People’s Constitution’ thanks to a 
combination of an extensive process of popular consultation and the inclusion of 
elected representatives during its drafting process (McCargo 2002: 9), was meant to 
put a definitive end to the pre-1992 undemocratic practices. In comparison to 
authoritarian governments elsewhere in Southeast Asia at the time, Thailand’s 
apparent democratic transition won international acclaim and was often cited as an 
example for other developing countries. Coups d’état were assumed to be a thing of 
the past, though the military continued to insist that it still had a right to intervene 
in politics if it felt national security was threatened (Suchit 2004: 56). 
 Given these trends, the coup of 19 September 2006 was an unforeseen 
development for many observers. The coup was a “dramatic twist” in the words of 
Thitinan (2008: 140), a “largely unexpected” occurrence for Beeson (2008: 474), 
and a “surprise” for Chairat (2009: 49). The military’s resurgence this time was 
especially controversial because it ended the rule of then-Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra, whose party, Thai Rak Thai, had won 377 out of 500 seats in the 
previous year’s general election, by far the largest electoral mandate in the country’s 
history. Thaksin had also proven to be a highly divisive figure throughout his time 
in office, however. Detractors of Thaksin tended to applaud the putsch, but the 
army’s undemocratic removal of the popularly elected leader also attracted heavy 
criticisms from both Thaksin supporters and democratic-minded neutrals. 
Chulalongkorn University academic Thitinan Pongsudhirak remarked that the 2006 
coup represented “a giant step backward” for Thailand (2008: 140). Instead of 
resolving the ‘Thaksin crisis’ as the military had hoped, the coup helped to prolong 
it, setting into motion a chain of events including more election victories by pro-
Thaksin forces, several rounds of massive street protests by both his supporters and 
opponents, a military-supported backroom deal that put together an anti-Thaksin 
civilian government in 2008, and the emergence of the courts as a highly visible and 
allegedly partisan political actor (Dressel 2010a; Dressel 2014; McCargo 2014a). 
The latest period of high tension began in November 2013 when a massive anti-
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Thaksin movement, helped by a series of favourable court rulings, held long-
running street rallies that eventually managed to destabilise and paralyse the 
government of Thaksin’s youngest sister Yingluck Shinawatra (Ferrara 2015b: 286-
289). On the pretext of restoring order, the military stepped in and announced its 
power grab on 22 May 2014 (McCargo 2014b). 
 Since the May 2014 military takeover, Thailand has been run by a junta-
installed government seeking to amend the ‘mistakes’ of the 2006 coup. Elements 
within the conservative elite as well as detractors of Thaksin among the public have 
long felt that the previous coup was too soft on him and his associates (McCargo 
2014b). The junta, calling itself the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), 
has adopted a policy of zero-tolerance towards dissent, cracking down on peaceful 
pro-democracy protesters, academics, journalists, activists, and uncooperative 
politicians (Haberkorn 2014). The coup was belatedly blessed by Prem 
Tinsulanonda, now the long-serving president of the Privy Council (Khaosod 
English, 29 December 2014). Military tactics from the Cold War era have been 
revived, including an emphasis on information operations, surveillance of 
individuals who could cause trouble, and the enforcement of martial law against 
civilians (Puangthong 2015). 
 
Military Factionalism in Thailand 
A number of scholarly works such as Pye (1961: 82-88) and Varol (2013: 584-585) 
have implicitly or explicitly identified the modern military’s centralised 
organisational structure, along with its related characteristics such as its strict 
adherence to discipline, hierarchy and order, as reasons why the military is 
theoretically unlikely to suffer from disunity and internal division, especially when 
compared to other human institutions. Despite this, it is possible for splits and 
factionalism to occur within a country’s armed forces. The Thai military is a good 
example. As Suchit (2004: 48-49) points out, the first time the Thai armed forces 
notably split into factions was in 1947. Among the three military services of 
Thailand, the army has long enjoyed a clear dominance over the navy and the air 
force. The root of this dominance can be traced back to the failure of the navy-led 
putsch against the army in 1951, an event known as the Manhattan Rebellion 
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(Chambers 2013a: 146-147). As a result, the hitherto powerful navy was forced to 
live with a drastic budget cut, a total internal reorganisation, and an inability to 
impose its political will on the country. Since then, the issue of military factionalism 
with real political relevance has always been centred on the army because the army 
alone retains the ability to instigate a coup. Personal rivalry, class loyalty and 
factional struggles within the army came to be part of the reasons behind the 
country’s various coups and coup attempts (Alagappa 2013: 100). It should be noted 
that army factions can be based both on horizontal connections (such as members 
of the same military academy class year) and vertical connections (such as officers 
of different ranks in the same army unit). Often, both kinds of connections combine 
to determine an officer’s membership of a faction. 
 From the early 1970s until the early 1990s, three important army factions 
came to the forefront of Thai politics, namely the Democratic Soldiers, the Young 
Turks, and the Class 5 (Hewison 1993: 165-166; Baker and Pasuk 2014: 247). 
Against the backdrop of the Cold War and communist activities in rural Thailand, 
these factions came to be in conflict with one another over issues such as how to 
combat the communist insurgency, how much democracy was appropriate for 
Thailand and the future of the military’s role in the country (Chai-Anan 1982: 47-51; 
Suchit 1987: 11-31; Ockey 2007: 100-107). Apart from these ideological and policy 
disputes, however, the conflicts between them also revolved around much less 
altruistic issues such as patronage ties, personal business interests and competition 
for promotions (McCargo 1997: 31-33; Ockey 2007: 107-109). A 1981 coup attempt 
against Prem Tinsulanond was carried out by the Young Turks who back then were 
still mid-ranking army colonels (McCargo 1997: 44-50). The failure of the Young 
Turks’ scheme to topple Prem marked one of the last occasions in which mid-
ranking army officers rebelled against their superiors in Thailand. Even the 1992 
Black May incident, typically portrayed as a straightforward clash between pro-
democracy civilian protesters and military dictators, arguably occurred in part 
because the Class 5, having dominated the armed forces leadership, had become 
isolated from other army factions and thus were unable to mobilise full support 
from the rest of the army to help preserve the military’s grip on political power 
(Chai-Anan 2002: 172). 
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In the twenty-first century, factionalism within the Thai army remains a 
salient issue. It plays a strong role in promotions and transfers of officers during 
annual reshuffles (for example see Chambers 2013a: 318-324) although important 
military positions have been determined by network monarchy as well (McCargo 
2005: 501). A significant shift in the balance of factional power within the army has 
occurred at least since the early 2000s. Previously, the First Army Division of the 
Royal Guards, an elite army unit based in Bangkok, had long been regarded as one 
of the most powerful factions because its members had tended to rise to the most 
important positions, including the Commander-in-Chief of the army. Since General 
Prawit Wongsuwan’s promotion to army chief in 2004, however, the Second Army 
Division of the Royal Guards, also known as the Eastern Tigers because of its 
location in eastern Thailand, has started to challenge the dominance of the First 
Army Division of the Royal Guards. General Prawit was the first member of the 
Second Army Division of the Royal Guards ever to become army chief, and he used 
his power and influence to help promote other Eastern Tigers to powerful positions 
(Tamada 2014: 216-228). The Eastern Tigers’ ascendancy has continued up to the 
present. Current junta leader Prayuth Chan-Ocha is from this faction, while Prawit 
now serves concurrently as Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister in 
Prayuth’s cabinet. The topic of military factionalism will be explored in more detail 
in Chapter 2. 
 
Research Questions 
This thesis seeks to answer one primary question and four secondary questions 
designed to elaborate on different aspects of the primary question. 
The primary question is: How has the Thai military contributed to Thailand’s 
democratic backsliding in the twenty-first century? 
The secondary questions are: 
1) Why did the 2006 military coup happen? 
2) How did the military attempt to undermine democracy and entrench its 
political role following the 2006 coup? 
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3) How did the military manipulate politics during the period of electoral 
democracy from the end of 2007 to the 2011 election? 
4) How has the current military government, in power since May 2014, sought 
to undermine democracy and further entrench the military’s political role? 
 
Methodology  
This research is a qualitative analysis seeking to explain the role of the Thai military 
in the country’s democratic backsliding in the twenty-first century. A qualitative 
approach is chosen over a quantitative one because qualitative methods provide a 
researcher with a tool to develop a more nuanced understanding of social 
phenomena and to uncover meanings that individuals or groups have ascribed to 
such phenomena (Creswell 2013: 4).  Because this study deals with several concepts 
that are likely to be interpreted differently by different people (such as democracy, 
human rights, national security, national interest, and Thai identity), it is advisable 
to employ research methods that enable a deep exploration of meanings and 
interpretations. In other words, this study will be based more on interpretative 
rather than positivist epistemology (Checkel 2005: 5).  
The case of Thailand is the sole focus of this research. While single-case 
studies, in comparison to small-n and large-n studies, have been criticised for their 
limited generalisability, I agree with Rueschemeyer (2003: 305-318) in arguing that 
this line of criticism overlooks in-depth, single-case studies that have come to be 
highly regarded for making immense contributions to their respective fields. For 
example, Scott’s (1985) ethnographic study on a Malaysian village provided 
influential findings that, by highlighting the importance of small-scale activities that 
people carried out in defiance of the regime, challenged the assumption of political 
scientists previously fixated on large-scale social revolutions. This example 
illustrates how it is possible for a single-case study to make a meaningful 
contribution to the wider literature instead of being confined to one particular case. 
To understand and explain the political role of the military in Thailand, I 
utilise two main research methods, namely documentary research and in-depth 
interviews. The documentary research component is necessary for obtaining a wide 
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range of information that lies beyond a researcher’s ability to collect first-hand. I 
also conducted in-depth interviews with a wide range of participants during a 
fieldwork in Thailand from July 2015 to January 2016. As a qualitative study that 
places an emphasis on people’s beliefs, perceptions and opinions, this research 
makes use of interviews to gain an insight into the interviewees’ interpretations of 
contested concepts such as democracy, Thai identity and the role of the military. 
Interviews, in addition, allow participants to tell their own accounts of how certain 
events happened. As Paruedee (2014: 130) puts it, “[i]n-depth interviews with 
political actors, such as politicians, parliamentarians, activists as well as journalists, 
allow the researcher to explore stories of past events, as well as acquire 
crosschecked necessary information about the events that are not available from 
newspaper reports.” The interview technique used was the semi-standardised 
interview, which involved the researcher asking each interviewee a list of 
predetermined questions while giving the interviewer some freedom to digress and 
probe further (Berg 2001: 70). Only the interviewees who are cited in this thesis are 
listed here. Interviewees included military officers, politicians, academics, political 
activists, and a member of the junta-appointed Constitution Drafting Committee: 
see Table 1.1. All interviews were anonymous in order to allow interviewees to talk 
about sensitive topics with as much freedom as possible under Thailand’s 
authoritarian climate. 
 
Table 1.1: List of Interviewees 
Category Number of Person(s) 
Military officers 
(both serving and retired) 
8 
‘Elite’ figures 2 
Civilian politicians 5 
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University academics 2 
Political activists and protest 
leaders 
4 
Member of the NCPO-
appointed Constitution Drafting 
Committee 
1 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
The thesis consists of seven chapters.  
 
1. Introduction 
This introductory chapter provides preliminary details on the research, states the 
research questions and outlines the research methodology. 
  
2. Concepts and Context 
The chapter provides a discussion of concepts relevant to understanding the role of 
the military in a democratic regime as well as its role in democratic backsliding. The 
chapter also aims to contextualise the political role of the Thai military. Specifically, 
the chapter discusses the topics of the Thai monarchy and its relevance to the 
military. Afterwards, the chapter provides an in-depth exploration of the 
phenomenon of military factionalism, a distinctive characteristic of the Thai 
military. 
 
3. The 2006 Military Coup: Democratic Backsliding, Elitism and Royalism 
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The chapter discusses long-term political developments beginning from October 
1973 that opened up a brief period of democratic transition, the 1997 constitution, 
the rise of Thaksin, the attempts by Thaksin to subdue the military, and the 
eventual 2006 coup. 
 
4. The Military after the 2006 Coup: Encountering Democratic Resilience, Part One 
The chapter covers events from the 2006 coup to the dismissal of the pro-Thaksin 
PPP-led government in December 2008 by the Constitutional Court. The chapter 
argues that the democratic resilience concept can helpfully be applied to the 
analysis of key events during this period. It argues that the military tried to be an 
assertive political actor though its successes were generally limited.  
 
5. The Military during the Abhisit Government: Encountering Democratic 
Resilience, Part Two 
The chapter covers events under the Abhisit Vejjajiva government from 2009 to 
July 2011. There is a large focus on actors, particularly the Red Shirt movement, 
who adopted democratic practices and rhetoric in their opposition to the 
government, the military and palace figures. 
  
6. The 2014 Coup and Anti-Democratic Politics 
This chapter discusses the political conditions which led to the 2014 coup. It 
analyses the role of the PDRC and the relative lack of resistance by the Red Shirts. It 
also examines the behaviour of the Prayuth government using the ‘legitimation, 
repression and co-optation’ framework by Gerschewski (2013). 
 
7. Conclusion 
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This chapter provides a summary of the thesis’s main arguments and answers to the 
research questions. It also outlines the contributions of the thesis to the wider body 
of knowledge. 
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Chapter 2 
Concepts and Context  
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a broad outline of important factors and elements necessary 
for understanding the role of the Thai military in politics. The chapter begins by 
briefly exploring the position of the revered monarchy in Thai society as well as its 
relationship with the military. The next section provides a conceptual overview of 
military factionalism, arguing that the knowledge of this issue is helpful in analysing 
the Thai military. Afterwards, the chapter explores several distinctive aspects of 
power relations in the Thai military and notes how they can inform the discussions 
throughout this thesis. The chapter then moves on to discuss key concepts relevant 
to the analysis of the political role of the Thai military, namely the notions of civilian 
control, the legitimacy of the military’s political involvement and the relationship 
between the military and the wider society. 
 
The Monarchy 
Unlike European constitutional monarchies, Thailand’s monarchy remains 
massively influential in public life. Monarchist ideology pervades virtually every 
aspect of life in Thailand, including the education system, public policy, and 
morality discourses. As Jackson (2010: 30) puts it, the late King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej, who reigned from 1946 until his death in October 2016, enjoyed the 
status of a semi-divine figure who symbolised and personified the so-called 
traditional Thai values and identity. There is also the issue of the Thai lèse majesté 
law which, with heavy penalties including a prison sentence of between 3 and 15 
years, criminalises insults, defamation and threats against the king, the queen, the 
heir apparent and the regent (Streckfuss 2011: 420-421), making it virtually 
impossible for any public opposition to emerge against the king’s views and actions. 
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The monarchy and the military are deeply connected. The armed forces 
officially profess their absolute loyalty to the crown, elite military units have been 
established formally to protect senior members of the royal family, and royalist 
ideology is strongly emphasised in military activities (Krittian 2010; Chambers 
2013a). Current junta leader and former army chief of Thailand Prayuth Chan-Ocha 
has repeatedly stated that one of the most important missions of the armed forces is 
to protect the monarchy (Suchit 2013: 179). Official military publications highlight 
protection of the monarchy as the armed forces’ highest priority (for example see 
Royal Thai Army n.d.: 22-24). The armed forces’ close association with the 
monarchy has been beneficial for their popularity among the public. In the early 
2000s, only a decade after the May 1992 violence, opinion polls revealed that Thai 
citizens held the military in higher regard than politicians and the police (Baker and 
Pasuk 2014: 252). 
The legitimacy of military interventions in Thailand has also been heavily 
linked to, or arguably even conditional on, the monarch’s endorsement or 
recognition. In 1981, an attempted coup against the incumbent Prem Tinsulanond 
government ended in failure largely because Prem had the backing of the royal 
family (Chai-Anan 1982: 25-26; Baker and Pasuk 2014: 238). In May 1992 the king 
helped put an end to the military’s attempt to prolong its rule, while in the 
immediate aftermath of the September 2006 coup the ousted Thaksin Shinawatra 
presumably shelved his plan to retaliate against the coupmakers after the king had 
granted them an audience, essentially legitimising the putsch (Ferrara 2015b: 1-2). 
In effect, the Thai political system reserves a special place for the monarchy. 
Although the notion of constitutional supremacy has been one constant element in 
all of Thailand’s constitutions since 1932, the Thai monarchy, at least since the late 
1950s, has been an institution located de facto above the constitution (Ferrara 
2015b: 2). 
 The political role of the monarchy in contemporary Thailand is neatly 
conceptualised by McCargo (2005). Using the term ‘network monarchy’, McCargo 
(2005: 501) warns against focusing solely on King Bhumibol when analysing the 
monarchy’s political manoeuvring over the last three decades. Instead, the 
monarchy should be understood as being the central component of a highly 
influential political network comprising the king and his allies, the most prominent 
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of whom is Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanond. Senior military figures are 
also included in this network. In the words of McCargo (2005: 501): 
The main features of Thailand’s network monarchy from 1980 to 2001 were 
as follows: the monarch was the ultimate arbiter of political decisions in 
times of crisis; the monarchy was the primary source of national legitimacy; 
the King acted as a didactic commentator on national issues, helping to set 
the national agenda, especially through his annual birthday speeches; the 
monarch intervened actively in political developments, largely by working 
through proxies such as privy councillors and trusted military figures; and 
the lead proxy, former army commander and prime minister Prem 
Tinsulanond, helped determine the nature of coalition governments, and 
monitored the process of military and other promotions. At heart, network 
governance of this kind relied on placing the right people (mainly the right 
men) in the right jobs. Allocation of key posts was the primary role of the 
lead proxy, Prem. 
Meanwhile, Thongchai (2014) points to another contemporary yet under-
theorised phenomenon in Thai society, which is the growing anti-monarchy 
sentiment among certain sections of the population from roughly late 2008 onward. 
Expressions of this sentiment, in defiance of the lèse-majesté law, could be detected 
in internet postings, street graffiti (Ünaldi 2014), and underground radio 
broadcasts, among others. The existence of these subversive views is not entirely 
new for Thailand—considering the fact a rural-based armed communist movement 
was fighting to overthrow the monarchy just a few decades ago—but Thongchai 
(2014) argues that today’s anti-monarchy sentiments are different in many ways. 
For instance, whereas anti-monarchy activities during the 1960s and 1970s mainly 
revolved around intellectuals and were rooted ideologically in communism, today 
such activities are carried out by ordinary people with broadly democratic 
aspirations (Thongchai 2014: 94-99). The existence of the internet is undoubtedly 
also a significant factor (Thitinan 2012: 58-59), for it enables anti-monarchy 
discourse to be disseminated much more widely and easily than two or three 
decades ago. For the Thai military, these kinds of activities are certainly 
unacceptable. 
 
Military Factionalism: A Conceptual Overview 
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The modern military has often been described in the literature as an organisation 
with an exceptionally high degree of unity and cohesion. Proponents of such a view 
put forward two key arguments: internal cohesion is a central characteristic of the 
modern military; and the military has certain distinctive features that both create 
and sustain this cohesion to a degree unmatched by other groups in society. The 
features usually associated with this narrative include the military’s rigid hierarchy, 
the absolute need for subordinates to obey orders and the sanctity of the formal 
chain of command. Unlike civilians, military officers are compelled to operate under 
a clear hierarchical structure, bound by rules, regulations and codes of conduct that 
carry heavy penalties for those who fail to comply. Such a strong emphasis on rules 
and order is believed to play a key part in maintaining the military’s cohesion as 
well as limiting the scope of conflict among the officer corps. The result, it is 
believed, is that the military is consistently far more structured, organised and 
united than other institutions in society. In one of the key texts espousing this view, 
Finer (1988: 5-6) describes the modern military as cohesive, hierarchical, 
centralised and tightly structured. Janowitz (1988: 143) similarly argues that 
cohesion, which he defines as “the feeling of group solidarity and the capacity for 
collective action”, is an essential part of the military profession. A more recent 
account by Varol (2017: 29) also notes that the military “tends to display a higher 
degree of coherence than many other institutions because of its hierarchical 
command structure.”  
Although civilian organisations can also be hierarchical and centralised, 
civilians tend not to emphasise hierarchy as much as soldiers do. This is perhaps 
because civilians are aware of the possible downsides of hierarchy; for example, an 
over-centralised, over-hierarchical organisation may create an excessively 
restrictive environment that alienates lower-ranked members (Aiken and Hage 
1966: 498). In contrast, hierarchy is crucial for the military because it is by nature 
an institution that needs to be prepared for life-and-death situations. As Kohn 
points out (1997: 141), the primary function of the modern military is to wage armed 
conflict, and a strict hierarchy is required to ensure that “individuals and units act 
according to the intentions of commanders, and can succeed under the very worst of 
physical circumstances and mental stresses.” In the words of Finer (1988: 7), 
“[c]entralization of command, the hierarchical arrangement of authority and the 
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rule of obedience — all are necessary to make the army respond as a unity to the 
word of command.” 
These characteristics of the military have important political implications. 
The modern military is supposed to utilise its organisational strength to carry out 
military affairs, but the reality is that, particularly in the developing world, such 
strength has often been used for domestic political purposes. While military 
intervention in politics is predominantly related to the fact that the military is 
armed, another important factor is the military’s superior organisational strength 
relative to civilian governments. The high level of cohesion enables the military to 
become either a powerful actor in politics or a potentially powerful one should it 
decide to enter politics. For Finer (1988: 5-11), the “marked superiority in 
organisation” of many armed forces around the world has been a crucial part of 
their political influence. Pye (1961: 83-84) similarly regards the army’s hierarchical 
structure as a vital element of its incursion into politics. Janowitz (1988: 144) also 
notes that “armies with high internal cohesion will have greater capacity to 
intervene in domestic politics.” 
Logic would suggest, then, that the modern military should be highly 
resistant, or even immune, to problems of factional splits and internal conflict. If 
Finer is right in claiming that “armies are much more highly organised than any 
civilian bodies” (1988: 8), the likelihood of factionalism within an officer corps 
should be very low. This view is based on the assumption that factional splits occur 
in civilian groups due to their relative lack of hierarchy and discipline. While 
disagreements are bound to happen among any group of people, the modern 
military imposes strict discipline upon its members and constantly strives to 
maintain cohesion. For the military, “[u]nity is a matter of pride; hierarchy is 
normatively exalted” (Nordlinger 1977: 145). Leaders of civilian political parties 
often have a hard time trying to suppress dissent from below, but it is virtually 
impossible for military subordinates to openly rebuke their superiors. In theory, any 
attempt to create a faction in an army would be akin to violating the chain of 
command and likely to incur heavy penalties. 
However, the claim that modern armed forces are consistently united and 
cohesive is undermined by the widely known fact that many armed forces 
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throughout the world have suffered from fragmentation and factionalism (Ting 
1975; Bacchus 1986; Hendrix and Salehyan 2017). The portrayal of the military as a 
steadfastly united institution appears to be based on an idealised, Western-centric 
image rather than global empirical findings. Despite Finer’s claim that the military 
is organisationally superior to civilian entities (1988: 5-11), some of the causes of 
military factionalism turn out to be similar to what can be found in civilian settings. 
Possible causes of military factionalism include ethnic and social differences 
(Gregory 1970: 342-343), educational and familial ties (Gregory 1970: 344-345) and 
clashing political interests between groups of officers (Perlmutter 1969: 391; 
Nordlinger 1977: 145-147). In other words, the same social and political conditions 
that typically shape the behaviour of civilians also apply to soldiers. What this 
means, as Varol rightly points out (2017: 51), is the military should not be treated as 
“a single, monolithic beast” because “each military is composed of thousands of 
individuals… with divergent interests.” To assume that human beings can somehow 
become immune to all kinds of outside influence just because they have a military 
career would simply be inaccurate. Throughout this thesis, the discussions of 
Thailand’s military will be informed by this rejection of the view that the military is 
a naturally cohesive institution. Stepan (1974: 54) provides a neat summary of this 
line of thought: 
I think it is apparent that the ideal type of military institution—a 
highly unified organization with a private code and values, isolated 
from the general pressures of the political system at large—often 
simply does not exist. Consequently, political deductions drawn 
from the ideal type can be basically misleading. 
 
Power Relations and Institutional Norms in the Thai Military 
In simplest terms, factionalism in the Thai military is closely related to the 
competition for power and influence. Explaining this relationship, however, is far 
from straightforward, requiring an exploration of the country’s political history as 
well as a recognition that not all seemingly universal concepts can be neatly applied 
to the Thai case. On the one hand, Thailand is not too different from other countries 
in terms of how the hierarchical structure of the armed forces puts a limit on the 
number of officers who will ever have a chance to occupy the most influential 
positions during the course of their careers. On the other hand, certain notable 
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characteristics of the Thai military, such as the dominance of the army relative to 
the other armed services, can best be understood not by applying ‘universal’ 
concepts but also by engaging with distinctive aspects of Thai politics. Thai military 
officers who earn favourable promotions can expect rewards not only in terms of 
higher salaries but also a wide range of other economic, social and political 
advantages. With this in mind, a helpful starting point for understanding Thai 
military factionalism is to examine the phenomenon of Thai military coups. 
 
Coups 
As the most direct and visible method of acquiring and expressing political power, 
military coups need to be an important part of any explanation of power relations 
within Thailand’s armed forces. Among the three main armed services in the 
country—namely the Royal Thai Army (RTA), the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) and the 
Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF)—the RTA receives the highest share of manpower and 
budget (Raymond 2018: 79-80). The dominance of the RTA is rooted in history and 
tradition, but one of the most important causes of this discrepancy is the role played 
by RTA officers during coups. Though there are other, less direct ways in which the 
Thai military has been involved in politics, military coups have been such a 
persistent feature of the political scene that an informal notion of political power 
has developed around the perennial possibility of a coup. For observers of Thai 
politics, informal aspects of power tend to be especially illuminating because formal 
rules and institutions often do not totally reveal the true nature of politics. Thus, 
focusing excessively on formal rules can be “a distraction from understanding what 
really happens on the ground” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 55), and there is much 
to be gained from analysing the informal side of politics. 
In the Thai case, military coups have largely followed some informal but 
discernible patterns. For a start, Thai military coups rarely involve actual fighting; a 
coup’s success can be ensured simply by projecting an image of being in control of 
the country. The coup instigators can accomplish this by deploying troops and tanks 
at key government buildings and major television and radio stations in Bangkok. By 
the time the incumbent government learns of the ongoing putsch, it is usually too 
late to organise any effective resistance. Taking control of broadcasting stations 
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allows the instigators to virtually monopolise the means of public communication 
and keep pro-government messages off air. When martial music plays on all the 
main television channels, people take it as a sign that the government has been 
overthrown. The reigning monarch would then be asked to officially confirm the 
coup leaders as the new rulers of the country (Tamada 2014: 202-209). Afterwards, 
Thai coup leaders tend to say that their period in power will be temporary and a 
new election will be held as soon as possible, but not until they promulgate a new 
constitution or concoct other ways of safeguarding the military’s longer-term goals 
(Mérieau 2017: 140). In this sense, a typical Thai coup resembles what Bermeo 
(2016: 8-9) calls a ‘promissory coup’, in which the coup leaders “frame the ouster of 
an elected government as a [defence] of democratic legality and make a public 
promise to hold elections and restore democracy as soon as possible”. 
 These patterns are hardly unique to Thailand. Military coups in other 
countries often unfolded in a similar manner, relying on a combination of swift 
action and secrecy in order to avoid unnecessary violence (Singh 2014: 111; 
Runciman 2018: 26-29). Nonetheless, there is still much to be learned from 
analysing Thai coup patterns, especially in terms of how they shed light on the 
distribution of power in the Thai armed forces. Considering that the most crucial 
part of a coup is taking control of the government, the chance of a coup’s success in 
Thailand is largely determined by whether or not the instigators can ensure a rapid 
deployment of troops in Bangkok, the country’s administrative capital and seat of 
government. As such, due to their proximity to the physical nexus of political power, 
high-ranking military officers who command combat units in or close to Bangkok 
are widely acknowledged as the most powerful (Surachart 2015: 142). These officers 
are not only best placed to launch or threaten a coup, but they also deter other parts 
of the army from doing the same.  Evidently, Thai coup plotters do not take into 
account the idea that civilians may pose a challenge to an ongoing coup effort. This 
is because ordinary Thais have never turned out in large numbers to physically 
oppose a coup. Unlike in the case of Turkey in July 2016 when a coup attempt was 
famously defeated by a popular uprising (Runciman 2018: 51-52), there is no reason 
to believe that Thai citizens will be anything more than passive bystanders 
whenever a coup is underway. As such, Thai coup plotters would only need to worry 
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about potential resistance from other parts of the armed forces. The general public 
would not feature in their calculation.  
The prominence of coups in Thai politics can help explain the dominance of 
the RTA in terms of size, budget, weaponry and political influence relative to the 
other armed services. Because ground-based combat units play the largest role in 
the event of a coup (Surachart 2015: 142), the branch of the Thai military that is 
associated most closely with coups is the RTA. Since the chief of the RTA is in 
charge of ground forces throughout Thailand, his political significance far exceeds 
that of other commanders in the Thai military. In comparison, the navy and the air 
force have no means of taking control of Bangkok, while the nominally powerful 
supreme commander—who technically oversees the whole of the military—in fact 
has little power because there are no combat units directly under his control 
(McCargo 2002: 61). The position of the supreme commander is a relic from the 
Cold War era. Originally an enormously powerful role, it was meant to exist only in 
exceptional circumstances such as during a large military campaign. It became a 
permanent but weak position in 1960 (Napisa and Chambers 2013: 17-18). Today, 
the purely symbolic status of the supreme commander is such that any RTA chief 
who receives a ‘promotion’ to become supreme commander is universally 
recognised as being demoted in reality (Chambers 2013: 260; Chambers and Napisa 
2016: 431). For these reasons, the Royal Thai Army is clearly the most powerful and 
important force in the country. Although the Thai navy used to have its own history 
of political involvement, its political role has been non-existent for more than half a 
century after a failed plot by former Prime Minister Pridi Banomyong to get the 
navy to help revive his political fortunes in the late 1940s (Tamada 2014: 192). 
 
Geography 
While it is clear that the RTA is the most powerful armed service, another 
distinctive aspect is that within the RTA there are also significant variations in 
terms of political importance. As previously stated, there is an implicit recognition 
that commanders of combat units in the vicinity of Bangkok are more powerful than 
commanders of provincial units, which means that the geographic locations of 
military units within the RTA have a role in determining the relative importance of 
 
 
34 
the army’s various components. This geographical aspect of power in the army is 
evident in the structure of the RTA. The highest level of the RTA is dominated by 
the army chief and four other officers, collectively nicknamed the ‘Five Tigers of the 
Army’. The Five Tigers include the army chief, the deputy army chief, two assistant 
army chiefs, and the chief of staff of the army (Tamada 2014: 194).  At the level 
immediately below the Five Tigers is the commanders of the four ‘Army Regions’, 
each representing one of Thailand’s four traditional regions of Central Thailand, the 
Northeast, the North, and the South. The First Army Region oversees Bangkok, 
central and eastern Thailand and is headquartered in Bangkok. The Second Army 
Region, headquartered in Nakhon Ratchasrima, oversees the populous northeastern 
Thailand. The Third Army Region is headquartered in Phitsanulok and is in charge 
of northern Thailand, while the Fourth Army Region, headquartered in Nakhon Sri 
Thammarat, is responsible for the country’s southern part. In addition, there is a 
unit called the Special Force, located in Lop Buri around 200 kilometres from 
Bangkok, which has equal importance to the four Army Regions (Tamada 2014: 
193). Along with the commanders and deputy commanders of the four Army 
Regions, leaders of the Special Force have a highly favourable chance of advancing 
towards the Five Tigers positions (Ukrist 2008: 126). 
The First Army Region has three important combat units: the First Division 
King’s Guard headquartered in Bangkok, the Second Infantry Division Queen’s 
Guard headquartered in Prachin Buri in eastern Thailand, and the Ninth Infantry 
Division headquartered in Kanchana Buri (Montornkit 2010: 57). Traditionally, the 
route towards powerful posts in the RTA’s upper echelons involves becoming 
commanders of important combat units in the First Army Region. It has also been 
possible, however, for army officers not in line of active combat duty, such as those 
in the staff branch who work on strategic and intellectual aspects of the army, to rise 
to key posts in the Five Tigers (Tamada 2014: 194) In the view of one former army 
general, the fact that officers in the First Army have the best career prospects is 
detrimental to the overall prospects of the Thai military. An officer who spends his 
whole career in the First Army, he argues, is unsuitable for a job at the army’s 
highest level because he tends to be unfamiliar with rural areas and border issues.1 
                                                             
1 Interview, Anonymous Thaksin-aligned retired army general, Bangkok, 15 January 
2016 
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Though it is clear that combat units in and around Bangkok are politically the 
most important, this does not mean that officers in other parts of the RTA are 
totally powerless. In fact, senior army officers can usually find their own ways of 
turning their positions into political and economic advantages by embedding 
themselves into local patronage networks (Hutchcroft 2014: 183-188). High-
ranking military officers in provincial Thailand, for example, can gain political and 
economic influence by developing ties with local politicians and business people 
(McCargo 1997: 20). Officers in the Third Army Region, with their responsibility 
over Thailand’s borders with Myanmar and Laos, are also in a prime position to 
extract illicit profits from the lucrative cross-border trade (Montornkit 2010: 65). In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the “growing flows of illegal migrants, trafficked 
people, drugs, contraband, international terrorists, and arms” through the borders 
(Baker and Pasuk 2014: 252) provided ample opportunities for unscrupulous army 
officers to enrich themselves. As noted by McCargo (2002: 51), being based outside 
Bangkok does not necessarily impair an officer’s ability to seek extra income from 
Thailand’s resource-rich rural areas. Moreover, financial rewards are also found in 
the non-combat part of the army. Certain non-combat positions in the RTA can be 
especially desirable because they are associated with particularly large amounts of 
money. Thailand’s army-owned Channel 5 television station, for example, is known 
as a lucrative source of income (Montornkit 2010: 72) thanks to its oversight of 
television contracts and other commercial opportunities. For this reason, the 
station’s director is always an active duty officer and tends to be a close associate of 
the RTA chief (Montornkit 2010: 72). 
On the other hand, certain army posts are so devoid of power and influence 
that they are disparagingly called ‘cemetery posts’ (Montornkit 2010: 78). The 
existence of these posts is another factor behind the competition among officers 
because they are keen to avoid the humiliation of ending up in one of these posts. 
Officers in cemetery posts hold titles such as ‘army experts’ and ‘advisors’, 
grandiose titles that only serve to mask their lack of direct responsibility or control 
over any significant groups of subordinates. Although cemetery posts can come with 
good salaries and high ranks, such benefits are mere consolations for the fact that 
these officers have missed out on more powerful and prestigious jobs (Montornkit 
2010: 78). According to former national police chief Seripisut Temiyawes, these 
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officers have so little to do that they practically treat their army posts as part-time 
jobs. Many of these officers instead spend most of their time on private business 
ventures, and some even engage in mafia-like activities such as running protection 
rackets for brothels and gambling dens (The Standard 30 March 2018). Cemetery 
posts are a reminder that not every position in the army is financially, socially or 
politically rewarding. As McCargo observes (2002: 52), the Thai military “has a very 
large number of senior officers, many of whom have almost literally nothing to do.” 
 
Military Reshuffles, Meritocracy and Institutional Norms 
The discussion so far has focused on the idea that military factionalism in Thailand 
is driven by the desire of officers to occupy influential and rewarding positions. 
What is implied in this idea is that, instead of promotions and transfers being 
decided on merits, Thai military leaders tend to promote members of their own 
factions, prioritising personal connections and loyalty rather than objective 
assessing each officer’s capabilities. The knowledge that their career advancement 
can often depend more on who they know—rather than what they are capable of—
provides an important motivation for Thai officers to enter into one of the networks 
of patron-client relationships that form the backbone of factions in the Thai 
military. In this sense, there appears to be a clash between the reality of military 
promotions in Thailand—which is affected by favouritism and preferential 
treatments—and the ideal of ‘the professional military’—which emphasises 
meritocracy in determining military promotions. 
 The ideal of the ‘professional military’ states that promotions and transfers 
should be conducted in a way that encourages a culture of meritocracy among the 
officer corps. As Perlmutter points out (1969: 391), “[t]he code of the professional 
army dictates that promotions be determined by ability, expertise, and education.” 
Meritocracy is a desirable quality for the military itself because it is likely to help 
improve competence and efficiency, but the wider society can benefit from a 
meritocratic military as well. In a highly unequal society, for instance, a meritocratic 
military can help promote social mobility and a sense of fairness among the public. 
Such a military “may provide a rare opportunity for advancement to people from 
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humble backgrounds who may join the military to escape the frustrations of elitism 
in civilian institutions” (Varol 2017: 85). 
On the one hand, Thai military reshuffles are typically vulnerable to 
cronyism, nepotism and patronage. Even when meritocracy plays a role in 
reshuffles, it can often be unclear how an officer’s merit is assessed because the Thai 
army tends to resist pressure and ‘interference’ from the outside. Sometimes an 
officer without an influential patron can be ‘stuck’ in the same position for an 
abnormally long period (Montornkit 2010: 75). With the limited number of 
powerful and lucrative posts in the army, competition for promotion can be fierce 
because officers are keen to avoid cemetery posts. Even outside promotion seasons, 
personal connections are still important. One observer believes that given the 
pervasive climate of distrust in the military, high-ranking commanders often need 
to rely on personal connections rather than the formal chain of command.2 The role 
of familial connections in the military’s patronage system is described in detail by 
Montornkit (2010: 79): 
With respect to family background, those officers who are the children 
of generals may automatically use their parents as their first patrons. 
Their parents’ connection provides them with opportunities to be 
introduced to other officers, one of whom may turn out to be their 
commander in the future. In addition, their parents can advise them 
and help them plan their future career from the outset. In this sense, 
being the son of a general is an advantage, and the strength of this 
advantage depends on both how influential their parents were (or are) 
as well as their own abilities and merit. […] On the other hand, being 
the child of a high commander could pose a difficulty if one’s father’s 
rival rose to power. 
 
Informants for this research have offered a variety of justifications for the 
way in which military reshuffles are conducted. One military officer insists that 
meritocracy still has an important place in the Thai military. According to this 
interviewee, an army officer who is clearly lacking in ability and intelligence can 
never earn the respect of his peers and will never rightfully make it to the top.3 
Another retired general remarks that Thai army officers tend to have a broad 
                                                             
2 Interview, Anonymous politics lecturer 1, Bangkok, 10 November 2015 
3 Interview, Anonymous serving army officer with links to the NCPO, Bangkok, 22 
October 2015 
 
 
38 
consensus on who they see as the most capable officers and thus should be 
contenders for leadership positions.4 Yet another former general sees personal 
connections as an inevitable part of the Thai military because once an officer rises to 
a powerful position, he will naturally prefer to surround himself with trusted 
people.5 In fact, there are ways for a high-ranking officer to push for the promotion 
of a favoured subordinate without appearing to brazenly disregard the merit system. 
For example, a senior officer can continually assign important tasks to his favoured 
subordinate so that when the promotion season arrives, the subordinate will appear 
to have made achievements and thus deserve a transfer to a better position.6 
Regardless of how some officers accept the necessity of the patronage system in the 
military, officers who miss out on good promotions may still become aggrieved 
when they feel that they have been treated unfairly.7 
On the other hand, it is possible to identify the role of meritocracy in the Thai 
military. It is important to note, however, that the way meritocracy works in the 
Thai army is more complicated than simply promoting the most capable or best 
educated officers to the best positions. For a Thai soldier, expertise and educational 
background can be less important that the perceived ability to lead. Leadership in 
the Thai army is primarily associated with being the commander of a combat unit. 
With some exceptions, an officer who spends his career outside combat units is 
often seen as lacking a proven ability to lead.8 This belief is part of the norms and 
traditions that shape the thinking of Thai officers and influence how promotions are 
decided. In an institution as old, powerful and prestige-obsessed as the Thai 
military, norms and traditions are far from meaningless waffles. Aside from the 
notion of leadership, certain other features of the military, such as the tendency of 
First Army leaders to rise to the RTA’s top brass as mentioned earlier, can be partly 
attributed to the military’s institutional norms.  
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018: 100-101) compare the role of institutional norms 
to the unspoken rules in a basketball pick-up game. Unlike professional basketball, 
                                                             
4 Interview, Anonymous retired army general 1, Bangkok, 6 November 2015 
5 Interview, Anonymous retired army general 2, Bangkok, 9 November 2015 
6 Interview, Anonymous retired army general 2, Bangkok, 9 November 2015 
7 Interview, Anonymous retired army general now serving in Prayuth Chan-ocha’s 
cabinet, Bangkok, 25 December 2015 
8 Interview, Anonymous serving army officer with links to the NCPO, Bangkok, 22 
October 2015 
 
 
39 
this informal style of basketball is not governed by any official body, yet the rules 
are implicitly understood and mostly adhered to. From this analogy, norm-breaking 
does not necessarily incur formal penalties but it can worsen relations, undermine 
mutual trust and trigger strong challenges from opponents and even former allies. 
In US politics, the constitution does not specify concrete limits on many aspects of 
governmental powers but there have been well-developed norms regarding how 
such powers are used. Examples of institutional norms that have a comparable 
status to written rules can be found in important parts of the American political 
system, including the number of justices on the Supreme Court, the use of 
presidential pardon and the application of the filibuster in the Senate (Levitsky and 
Ziblatt 2018: 127). When President Franklin D. Roosevelt infamously attempted to 
increase the number of Supreme Court justices in 1937 in the hope that he would be 
able to pack it with allies, he faced extreme resistance not just from his opponents 
but also from many of his fellow Democrats in Congress. Although the president 
was not constitutionally forbidden from trying to expand the Supreme Court, the 
attempt was widely seen as a norm-violating, blatantly partisan scheme that would 
destroy the credibility of the country’s most significant judicial institution. In the 
end, the institutional norms proved durable enough to thwart Roosevelt’s ambition 
(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018: 118-119). 
In a similar vein, any high-level appointment that breaks dramatically from 
the Thai army’s norms, such as the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra’s cousin Chaiyasit 
Shinawatra to army commander in 2003, is likely to be met with disapproval or 
even anger from within the ranks.9 Not only was Chaiyasit seen as unqualified for 
the job, but his appointment was a nakedly political move by a civilian prime 
minister with the same last name. As Varol notes (2017: 85-88), nepotism is a 
common issue that armed forces in many countries encounter when trying to 
establish meritocracy. Chaiyasit’s appointment was clearly part of Thaksin’s effort at 
the time to assert control over the army and undermine the network of senior 
officers connected to Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanond (Chambers and 
Napisa 2016: 431-432), but it could have gone more smoothly had Thaksin been 
able to stave off the accusation of nepotism. The army might have reacted more 
warmly to the appointment if Chaiyasit had possessed at least some merit for the 
                                                             
9 Interview, Anonymous retired army general 2, Bangkok, 9 November 2015 
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job. On the contrary, Chaiyasit had spent much of his unremarkable career in the 
traditionally insignificant signals corps and developmental offices. This means that 
even without the nepotism issue, he would not have been a widely respected army 
chief. Chaiyasit lasted only a year as army chief before being ‘promoted’ to supreme 
commander.  
Chaiyasit’s case stands in contrast to the case of Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, a 
former Prime Minister who had previously served as army chief in the 1980s. As 
McCargo points out (2002: 61-62), Chavalit’s career background was also in the 
signals corps, but he earned a glowing reputation from apparently having a key role 
in defeating the militant Communist Party of Thailand during the 1970s and was 
then rewarded with the army chief job. The case of Chavalit suggests that his 
perceived achievements played at least some part in his elevation to the top job. In 
other words, his merit helped him overcome the army’s institutional norms that had 
typically hindered the career prospects of signals officers, though it still took an 
extraordinary kind of merit—the once-in-a-generation triumph over the 
communists—to do so.  
 
Military Education and Its Influence on Factionalism 
Another longstanding element of the Thai military is the formative experiences that 
officers gained from their military education during their cadet and pre-cadet years. 
Military education has long played a role in creating military factions in Thailand 
because “shared peerage and experiences in military educational institutions have 
contributed to the cohering of different cliques” in the armed forces (Napisa and 
Chambers 2013: 85). In the words of Raymond (2018: 82), “the assumption that 
military officers will belong to a faction, often based on the class in which they 
passed through preparatory school and officer training, is a powerful, distinctive 
and enduring aspect” of the Thai military. Ties and loyalty among military 
classmates have affected promotions, reshuffles, distributions of top jobs in the 
army as well as major events in the Thai political scene. This section provides a 
background on the role of Thai military education in the emergence of factionalism 
among military officers. 
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 The central part of Thailand’s military education system is the military 
academies. The Chulachomkloa Royal Military Academy (CRMA) provides 
undergraduate-level education and training for cadets who, upon graduation, will 
go on to serve in the RTA. The Royal Thai Naval Academy carries out the same 
function for the navy, and likewise the Navaminda Kasatriyadhiraj Royal Thai Air 
Force Academy produces graduates for the air force. All three military academies 
confer bachelor’s degrees upon their graduates. In terms of political influence, 
however, CRMA plays the most prominent role compared to the other two 
academies because of its association with the army. Although it is possible to have a 
career in the Royal Thai Army without having passed through CRMA education,10 
the most prestigious and powerful army posts are given only to CRMA graduates. As 
Montornkit points out (2010: 65), “only graduates from CRMA are allowed to 
command combat units and main staff positions.” In fact, given the bloated size of 
the Thai army, CRMA graduates are virtually guaranteed to at least reach the rank 
of major general before they retire (McCargo 2002: 52). Army officers without 
CRMA education do not have this privilege (Montornkit 2010: 77). Montornkit 
further argues that cadets “are not trained to serve their national citizens” but are 
“groomed for high status positions as commanders of the conscripts who are 
recruited from ordinary people” (2010: 68). 
The role of CRMA as an institution that fosters deep bonds among army 
classmates began in 1949, when the Thai government adopted the West Point model 
of military education as part of the country’s efforts to gain favour from Washington 
(Napisa and Chambers 2013: 88-89). The first group of students under the new 
education system were known as CRMA Class 1, and the practice of ascribing a 
number to a class year continued for all subsequent graduates. High-profile 
members of CRMA Class 1 included Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, a former Prime 
Minister, and Sunthorn Kongsompong, the nominal leader of the 1991 coup. Other 
politically important classes are CRMA Class 5, whose members dominated the 
military’s leadership in the late 1980s and then staged the 1991 coup, and CRMA 
Class 7, which included most of the Young Turks. Suchinda Kraprayoon, the army 
chief who orchestrated the 1991 coup and became Prime Minister under 
                                                             
10 For example, many lecturers in CRMA have a civilian background but they all 
became army officers and received army ranks upon joining the school. 
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controversial circumstances in 1992, was the valedictorian of Class 5 (Napisa and 
Chambers 2013: 89). 
Originally, cadets studied at CRMA for five years but in 2007 this was cut to 
four (Napisa and Chambers 2013: 89-90). In 2017, however, the length of study was 
changed back to five years (Now26 15 May 2015). After decades in Bangkok, CRMA 
was relocated in 1986 to a vast rural site in Nakhon Nayok, around 200 kilometres 
north of Bangkok, in order to relieve congestion (Chulachomkloa Royal Military 
Academy n.d.). Life as a CRMA cadet is shaped by a heavy emphasis on camaraderie 
between classmates in the same year as well as strict respect for cadets in higher 
years. One well-known axiom in CRMA is “even the best person in your year is 
never better than the worst person among your seniors.”11 The school’s tradition 
dictates that cadets are not only expected to know other cadets in the same year but 
also those in higher years.12 This means that a CRMA cadet has an opportunity to 
develop long-lasting ties with people who may become their superiors, subordinates 
and co-workers in their future army careers. Upon graduation, CRMA cadets are 
commissioned as sub-lieutenants in the army and will also receive a ceremonial 
sword from the king (Montornkit 2010: 66). 
On the academic side, there is little evidence of a culture of critical thinking 
in CRMA. While social science courses are available, only a minority of cadets take 
them. Of the approximately 220 cadets in a class year, around 20 to 40 choose 
social science and related subjects such as development and history as their major 
subjects. By far the more popular subject for the cadets is engineering.13 Even in 
social science and history classes where one would expect to find a climate of 
productive discussions and debates, Thai cadets tend to avoid expressing an 
opinion.14 Their social science knowledge is also mostly not up to date. For example, 
the most widely known academic concept regarding Thai politics among CRMA 
cadets is the ‘vicious cycle of Thai politics’, a four-decade-old concept popularised 
by Chai-Anan (1982: 1-5) that depicts Thai politics as being mired in an endless 
                                                             
11 Interview, Anonymous retired army general 2, Bangkok, 9 November 2015 
12 Interview, Anonymous retired army general 2, Bangkok, 9 November 2015 
13 Interview, Anonymous army officer and CRMA lecturer, Pathum Thani, 12 
October 2015 
14 Interview, Anonymous army officer and CRMA lecturer, Pathum Thani, 12 
October 2015 
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cycle of elections and military coups.15 Most libraries in CRMA are poorly 
maintained, with the exception of the History Department’s library.16 This may be 
due to the fact that Princess Sirindhorn, the popular daughter of the late King 
Bhumibol, served for 35 years as an honorary lecturer at CRMA’s History 
Department before retiring  in 2015 (Post Today 3 October 2015). 
Other factors also play a part in compounding the cadets’ educational 
problems. The opportunity for independent study and research in CRMA is limited. 
Cadets participate in a variety of non-academic activities that do not leave them 
with much time for reading or studying. Some of these activities, such as field 
training, are part of the curriculum. Others, such as hazing, are traditional activities 
aimed at forging bonds between cadets and assimilating them into the military 
lifestyle.17 In addition, there are no failures in CRMA. Cadets can always be assured 
that they will pass their exams no matter how badly they do, meaning that there is 
no real motivation for cadets to take their social science lessons seriously.18 In sum, 
the overall isolation of CRMA cadets from civilian life (Montornkit 2010: 68), the 
lack of a critical thinking culture and the low priority of social science subjects all 
play a part in encouraging CRMA cadets to unquestioningly embrace the Thai 
military culture and its strong emphasis on loyalty to their peers. As McCargo puts 
it (1997: 25-26), the CRMA system promotes a sense of belonging based on tightly 
knit class groups, thereby creating “a ready-made structure of factions within the 
military.” 
Alongside CRMA, another institution that helps forge classmate ties in the 
Thai military is the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School (AFAPS). 
Established in 1958, AFAPS functions as a preparatory school providing training 
and education for pre-cadets. All pre-cadets, whether they intend to join the army, 
navy, air force or the police, study together in AFAPS. As Napisa and Chambers 
observe, a major effect of having pre-cadets of these different services in the same 
                                                             
15 Interview, Anonymous army officer and CRMA lecturer, Pathum Thani, 12 
October 2015 
16 Interview, Anonymous army officer and CRMA lecturer, Pathum Thani, 12 
October 2015 
17 Interview, Anonymous army officer and CRMA lecturer, Pathum Thani, 12 
October 2015 
18 Interview, Anonymous army officer and CRMA lecturer, Pathum Thani, 12 
October 2015 
 
 
44 
school is “a uniting of security officials in the army, navy, air force and police 
through shared educational experience” (2013: 89). Pre-cadets originally spent two 
years in AFAPS before the length of study was increased to three years in 2007, but 
this was shortened again to two years in 2017 (Now26 15 May 2015). Until 2000, 
the school had been located in Bangkok before it was moved to a site close to CRMA 
in Nakhon Nayok in 2001 (Napisa and Chambers 2013: 90). Following the footsteps 
of CRMA, AFAPS pre-cadets are organised into numbered classes and undergo 
much of the same CRMA-style socialisation process, meaning that the ideas of class 
loyalty, respect for elders and the absolute need to obey orders are all ingrained in 
the worldview of the pre-cadets since their mid-teens.19 As Montornkit notes (2010: 
67), one of the key lessons for Thai cadets and pre-cadets is the notion that “the 
commander’s order is a blessing from heaven”. 
In addition to CRMA-based ties, classmate ties developed in AFAPS provide 
another basis of loyalty for Thai officers in the armed forces. In fact, the bonds that 
emerged from the officers’ years in AFAPS can be even more important than CRMA-
based ties because the latter are limited only to officers in the army. A prominent 
example is the case of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a graduate of 
AFAPS Class 10 who was a police officer before starting his business career. During 
his premiership, one of his most notable attempts to shore up his power was how he 
made use of his ties with AFAPS classmates by pushing for promotions of Class 10 
loyalists to important posts in the army, navy, air force and the police (Wikileaks 5 
September 2006). A former army general believes that one of Thaksin’s fatal 
mistakes was his efforts to promote his associates in the armed forces in a way that 
disrespected the military’s tradition.20 In the words of Napisa and Chambers (2013: 
95), AFAPS “serve[s] as the only educational venue for building up ties of unity 
among all military service-sector personnel.” 
While classmate ties have an enduring significance in the minds of Thai 
officers, it would be too simplistic to assume that all officers in the same class year 
are consistently united and loyal to one another. In fact, one observer believes that 
Thai military officers, just like other groups in society, are vulnerable to tensions 
arising from political and ideational disagreements. The ‘Yellow-Red divide’, the 
                                                             
19 Interview, Anonymous retired army general 2, Bangkok, 9 November 2015 
20 Interview, Anonymous retired army general 1, Bangkok, 6 November 2015 
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bitter political conflict broadly between opponents and supporters of Thaksin 
Shinawatra, is one example. Although the military has played a key role in various 
anti-Thaksin political manoeuvres since 2006, this does not mean that such a role 
has gone down well with all officers. Whether due to personal interests or a genuine 
belief in democracy, there are officers who disapprove of what they perceive as the 
military’s anti-democratic political intervention since the 2006 coup that toppled 
Thaksin. One can sense such disagreements over political beliefs during army 
reunion parties, where members of the same class year sometimes sit in separate 
groups based on their political views.21 Accordingly, it can be argued that while 
classmate ties are one of the main elements of factionalism in the Thai military, 
their effects on an officer’s behaviour and attitude should not be overstated. 
 
Conceptual Underpinnings 
Democracy, Civilian Control and the Role of the Military 
Those who have followed the events in Thailand from a pro-democracy perspective 
would be tempted to suggest that the country’s failure to rein in its military has been 
a major reason for democracy’s struggle there. The concept of ‘civilian control’ 
provides an analytical framework for examining the political role of the military and 
its implication on democracy and democratization in a given context. For a 
democracy, ensuring the subordination of the armed forces to civilian political 
authority is among its top priorities (Kohn 1997: 140). A military in a democratic 
society exists to fight wars and eliminate threats to the nation’s security. Its coercive 
power and ability to use violence are not meant to be employed against the 
government of the military’s own nation. Civilian control is defined by Alagappa 
(2001: 29-30) as “the ability of a government to conduct general policy free of 
military interference and to set the limits of military role and behaviour.” Croissant 
et al. (2013: 25) define civilian control as the situation in which “civilians have 
exclusive authority to decide on national politics and their implementation” while 
“the military has no decision-making power outside those areas specifically defined 
by civilians.” In this sense, civilian control is not diminished even if certain 
decision-making powers are delegated to the military, so long as civilians retain the 
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ability to take those powers back.  In principle, this means that all decisions of 
government must be made by popularly elected politicians or their appointees. The 
authority to makes such decisions never falls to the military unless clearly delegated 
to it by civilians (Kohn 1997: 142). Ideally, military activities should be confined 
solely in the realm of national security while the civilian government is responsible 
for all other areas of governance. Even in the national security sphere, the civilian 
government ought to retain the authority to make decisions and set targets. The 
military may be given some autonomy over security-related matters for reasons of 
tradition, convenience or effectiveness, but the government has the right to assume 
more direct control at any time (Kohn 1997: 142).  
At the same time, imposing democratic civilian control over the military is 
not meant to weaken the capacity of the armed forces to carry out their missions 
(Bruneau and Matei 2008: 915-921). The principles of democratic civilian control 
do not conflict with the military’s ability to do its job well; they simply aim to ensure 
that the military does not turn its weapons towards its civilian masters. As Feaver 
(1996: 149) succinctly puts it, one of the major challenges for an aspiring 
democratic country is “to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the 
civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians 
authorize them to do.” For Bruneau and Matei (2008: 921), civilian control over the 
military “is basic and fundamental, but is irrelevant unless the instruments for 
achieving security can effectively fulfil their roles and missions.”  
From this understanding of the military’s position in an ideal democratic 
society, we can infer that democracy is undermined not only when the military 
directly disobeys orders given by its civilian masters—not to mention attempting to 
topple the government—but also when it conducts activities outside the limits set by 
civilian authorities. In many instances around the world, however, the armed forces 
have become involved in matters beyond the realm of national security, 
contributing to developmental projects and disaster relief efforts, for example. The 
military’s participation in these kinds of activities has been a common occurrence in 
developing countries. Civilian governments in those countries tend to suffer from 
varying degrees of institutional weaknesses, making such governments incapable of 
implementing policies and carrying out their projects effectively (Alagappa 2001: 
47-50). The armed forces, on the other hand, are likely to be more modernised and 
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better organised in comparison. Given the limits of civilian institutions’ capability 
throughout the developing world, it thus became preferable or even necessary for 
the armed forces to take part in internal governance and socioeconomic 
developmental projects in order to ensure such projects’ desired outcome (Heiduk 
2011: 252-253). Accordingly, it can be argued that restricting the military to 
national security matters is only appropriate for developed countries where civilian 
governments are more capable. The armed forces in developing countries, on the 
other hand, have commonly taken part in activities outside the national security 
sphere. As Heiduk observes (2011: 253), in Southeast Asia the strict separation of 
civil and military spheres was never in place. When the armed forces venture into 
activities outside national security, civilian control is not necessarily eroded. The 
principle of civilian control in such a circumstance can still be maintained if the 
civilian government retains the ability to authorise, provide oversight over, and put 
an end to those activities (Alagappa 2001: 45). 
In Thailand, however, the notion of civilian control has been almost 
completely neglected by both military and civilian leaders. The Thai military has 
always been a political actor that does not regard civilians as its superiors (Croissant 
et al. 2013: 158). Thailand’s long history of bureaucratic and military domination 
has made it difficult for civilian actors to challenge the pervasive influence of the 
armed forces (Suchit 2004: 56). Even when the country underwent a meaningful 
process of democratization from May 1992 to September 2006, the military never 
wholeheartedly embraced the idea of being subordinate to the civilian government, 
only pretending to respect limits and controls while retaining many of its privileges 
(McCargo and Ukrist 2005: 129). There were no sustained efforts on part of civilian 
leaders to subordinate the Thai military, either. Even Thaksin Shinawatra, a leader 
with popular backing and parliamentary strengths, never confronted the military 
directly but instead sought to convert military officers into his own political support 
base (McCargo and Ukrist 2005: 134-157). Thaksin’s politicisation of the military in 
this manner ensured that uniformed personnel continued to be involved in political 
matters. From September 2006 onwards, the Thai military has grown more 
confident in its ability to shape political outcomes and has steadily reasserted its 
dominance over the political landscape (Chambers 2013b: 73-76). 
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Overall, the concept of civilian control provides us with a normative 
understanding of the military’s expected role in a democratic society. Thai politics, 
however, has largely been characterised by the ability of the armed forces to defy 
and disregard civilian authorities during periods of electoral democracy, while in 
other periods the military ruled the country outright. The lack of political will on 
part of Thai politicians to confront the military may be understandable in light of 
the fact that politicians generally do not want to jeopardise their chance of attaining 
or holding on to power. However, considering the fact that many prominent 
thinkers, policy researchers, academics and politicians in contemporary Thailand 
have spoken out in favour of democracy (for example see Thai Publica, 11 January 
2014), it is notable that over the past two decades there have been no serious 
discussions in the public sphere on concrete measures to reform the military and 
establish civilian control. The idea of democratic control of the military has been 
virtually absent not only from the minds of military elite and civilian politicians but 
also from the agenda of many pro-democracy campaigners and advocates of 
political reform in Thailand. Bruneau and Matei (2013: 346-348) have argued that 
three factors, namely political will, expertise, and external pressure, are crucial in 
instigating and ensuring the success of military reform. 
 
Legitimacy of the Military’s Political Role  
While democratic regimes can draw their legitimacy from the principle of popular 
sovereignty, undemocratic and military-dominated regimes typically need to rely on 
other sources of legitimacy. Although the military possesses the means and ability 
to employ coercive power against its opponents, a regime cannot depend exclusively 
on violence and repression as a tool for governing in the long term. In the words of 
McCargo (2008: 88), “nation-states claim a monopoly on the use of force, but 
where a state resorts to invoking force against its own population, it risks eroding its 
legitimacy.” Thus, as Gerschewski (2013: 18) points out, undemocratic regimes seek 
to appear legitimate in order to avoid using violence as well as to “guarantee active 
consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience, or mere toleration within the 
population.” Governments that totally or partly lack democratic legitimacy have 
commonly justified their rule by pointing to their success in developmental issues, 
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arguing that improvements in people’s quality of life would not have come about 
had politics been more open and democratic (Leftwich 1995: 418-420). 
Alternatively, or in addition to this, an authoritarian government may cite the need 
to maintain order within an ethnically or culturally diverse society, the desire to 
preserve ideological purity of the state, and the necessity of upholding unity in the 
face of threats to national security as reasons for the regime’s dictatorial character 
(Heiduk 2011: 252-253; Gerschewski 2013: 19). When a degree of electoral politics 
is allowed in authoritarian regimes, it exists simply to provide a veneer of 
democratic legitimacy to such regimes, strengthen the real holders of power, and 
forestall true democratization (Brancati 2014: 314-320). 
 Even in a country that has established a degree of democracy, the military 
may claim that it needs to play a tutelage or guardian role in order to protect certain 
fundamentals values of the nation from ever being undermined by the elected 
government or other institutions. The Turkish military, for example, has long 
viewed itself as the custodian of Kemalism, an ideology inspired by Turkey’s 
founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that emphasises the secular character of the 
modern Turkish republic (Varol 2013: 599). In other cases, especially in much of the 
Third World, the military’s guardian role has focused upon ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the state itself amidst threats of separatism, communal violence and 
other potential sources of domestic instability (Heiduk 2011: 252). The armed forces 
in these circumstances, while not openly in control of state power, claim legitimacy 
for their intrusion into politics from the perceived need to protect certain principles, 
values and beliefs considered to be essential to a nation’s existence (Serra 2010: 44). 
It is also possible that a country’s elected civilian government loses some of its own 
legitimacy to govern, often due to corruption scandals and abuses of power, and 
thus provides the military with an opportunity to step in to ‘clean up’ politics. In an 
analysis of the armed forces in Southeast Asia, Mietzner (2011: 14-16) highlights 
civilian leadership and contingent political choices as important determinants 
affecting the military’s actions. He argues that certain choices and decisions made 
by government leaders in Southeast Asia stirred up tension in society and therefore 
opened up an opportunity for the armed forces to intervene. Though Mietzner 
(2011) does not focus on Thailand specifically, he notes that the crisis engulfing the 
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country after 2006 was chiefly a result of Thaksin’s confrontational tactics towards 
his opponents (Mietzner 2011: 15). 
 The notion of legitimacy is highly relevant to any attempt to analyse the Thai 
military’s political role. In Thailand, the concepts of liberal democracy and popular 
sovereignty have struggled to displace the traditional ideological system that 
emphasises nationalism, monarchism and Theravada Buddhism (Dressel 2010b: 
449-455). As discussed earlier, the Thai military regards protection of the monarchy 
as its primary duty. It has been willing to legitimise its foray into politics by citing 
the need to eliminate anti-monarchy threats. Ferrara (2015b: 279) notes that in 
Thailand a strong display of loyalty to the monarchy can lend legitimacy to 
unelected institutions on grounds other than performance. On the other hand, the 
fact that the Thai state has increasingly had to rely on repressive measures, 
including the application of lèse majesté law and the oft-criticised Computer Crimes 
Act (Streckfuss 2011: 291), to combat anti-monarchy threats also reflects the 
growing weakness of the royalist establishment itself. In the words of Ferrara 
(2015b: 292), “[i]f royalists were still able to steer  the course of events behind the 
scenes, through the network monarchy’s vaunted ‘invisible hand’, they would not 
have relied on censorship, lèse majesté, street violence, military firepower, and 
outlandish court rulings as heavily or as frequently as they have.” The effectiveness 
of building legitimacy based on royalism to justify military intervention has thus 
been thrown into doubt in today’s Thailand. 
 
The Military and Society 
Closely related to the issue of legitimacy is the military’s relationship with the wider 
society. For a country’s armed forces to attain and maintain political influence, 
cultivating a positive relationship with the civil society is vital. Public approval can 
strengthen the military’s political power and extend the lifespan of a military-
dominated regime. Mietzner (2011: 11) identifies a number of methods that military 
forces in both democratic and non-democratic countries have used in an attempt to 
control or influence public opinion. These range from benign activities, such as 
publishing newsletters and participating in rural development projects, to more 
malign ones such as taking part in enforcing censorship and sponsoring state 
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propaganda. When public opinion turns against the military, as was the case in the 
lead up to Thailand’s May 1992 violence and the fall of Indonesia’s Suharto in 1998, 
it can become extremely difficult for the generals to preserve their prestige and 
status. 
 The Thai military has a history of channelling much of its energy into 
schemes designed to influence the civil society. When communist insurgents were 
threatening the very existence of the Thai regime during the 1960s and the 1970s, 
the use of force was not the only strategy the army deployed to suppress the 
communists, who enjoyed the support of a substantial portion of rural dwellers. 
Following the US government’s blueprint, military personnel took part in rural 
development projects in the belief that improvements to quality of life would be 
crucial for the Thai state to win support from the rural population (Ockey 2001: 
194). Later, the Prime Ministerial Order 66/2523, crafted with the backing of the 
Young Turks and the Democratic Soldiers factions (Ockey 2001: 196-197), laid out a 
plan to defeat communism once and for all by promising to eliminate social 
injustice, distribute income more evenly and expand popular participation in the 
political process (Baker and Pasuk 2014: 238-239). As Ockey argues (2001: 197), 
the language of democracy during the 1980s (the so-called ‘semi-democracy’ period) 
was more of an anti-communist tool rather than part of a genuine effort to liberalise 
the political structure. This was why the military still kept control of key political 
positions and leftist political parties were outlawed. The eventual victory over the 
Communist Party of Thailand cemented the military’s belief in the importance of 
rallying the public to its side (Montesano 2014: 6-7). This did not mean, however, 
that military leaders were in support of the principle of popular sovereignty. 
Instead, the military’s view remained firmly conservative. People were important, 
but only in the sense of being an essential component of the royalist political order 
(Montesano 2014: 5-9). 
 After the events of May 1992, popular backlash against the military paved the 
way for 15 continuous years of civilian governments. Armed forces leaders then 
spent the following several years trying to repair the damage that 1992 had done to 
the military’s reputation. The language of development, again, proved to be the 
military’s favourite method of engaging with the citizens (Ockey 2001: 203), while 
the large number of television and radio stations still under military control 
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continued to allow it to disseminate information (Ockey 2001: 199). In 1998, the 
army formally amended its slogan of “Nation, Religion and King” so that it read 
“Nation, Religion, King and the People” (Royal Thai Army 1998). The attempts to 
restore the military’s standing were not always successful, however. When the late-
1990s economic crisis hit Thailand, the military’s arms purchases around that time 
were met with widespread public disapproval (Surachart 2001: 87). 
 The issue of the Thai military’s relationship with the public has become 
important again over the past decade as rival mass movements emerged in support 
of or in opposition to Thaksin Shinawatra and his allies. In particular, the military’s 
prominent role in violently suppressing the largely pro-Thaksin ‘Red Shirt’ 
demonstrators in 2009 and 2010 means that the Thai army has possibly alienated a 
significant number of its fellow countrymen (Nelson 2011: 17-18). While I am not 
assuming that all of those who have voted for pro-Thaksin parties in various 
elections are Red Shirt supporters, a look at recent election results can broadly 
indicate the size of the population who today may be holding a less than positive 
view of the military. Successive iterations of pro-Thaksin parties have won every 
general election since 2001, receiving between 11 and 19 million votes each time. 
The pro-Thaksin candidate in the 2013 election for Bangkok’s governor, though 
failing to win, earned more than a million votes (Saksith 2013). Anti-military 
sentiments were also clearly expressed at Red Shirt rallies and gatherings after the 
2010 crackdown (Fuller and Mydans 2010; Montlake 2011). Just over a year after 
the crackdown, a number of army officers involved in suppressing the Red Shirt 
protesters were promoted to important positions, a fact that was likely to fuel 
resentment and anger among the sizeable proportion of Thais who had supported or 
sympathised with the Red Shirts (Kom Chad Luek, 5 September 2011). To explain 
the role of the military in twenty-first century Thailand, the issue of how the 
military has engaged with the civil society, along with how civic groups perceive the 
military’s role, will be part of the questions explored in this study. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter broadly explores some of the important factors and conditions relevant 
to the political role of the Thai military. The Thai monarchy is respected and revered 
throughout Thailand and its varying patterns of relationship with the military have 
been crucial in some of the key political events which will be explored in subsequent 
chapters. Meanwhile, factionalism is another key characteristic of the Thai military. 
The role of military factions will also be part of the discussions in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3  
 Thailand’s 2006 Military Coup: Democratic 
Backsliding, Elitism and Royalism 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses Thailand’s 19 September 2006 military coup and its 
significance within the country’s political development and democratisation 
process. The coup—staged by a junta calling itself the Council for Democratic 
Reform under Constitutional Monarchy, later renamed the Council for National 
Security (CNS)—was the country’s first since February 1991. The elected civilian 
government of Thaksin Shinawatra, having been weakened by a combination of 
street protests, court rulings and machinations by elite figures, was thrown out. The 
CNS then imposed a period of military rule lasting a year and four months before 
allowing a new election to be held in December 2007 under a new military-
sponsored constitution. 
Thaksin’s government was the last in a succession of civilian governments 
that came to rule Thailand since the fall of a previous military regime in May 1992. 
After the September 1992 election, the military became marginalised, allowing 
elected politicians to be the main players in the political sphere up until the coup of 
2006. In a country with such a long history of military influence over domestic 
politics, this fifteen-year period of uninterrupted, election-based civilian rule was 
remarkable, at one point giving rise to the idea that Thailand’s hitherto fragile 
democracy was becoming institutionalised. Even the term ‘consolidated democracy’ 
started to become part of the conversation by the late 1990s, albeit often in terms of 
how far Thailand still had to go to reach that stage (McCargo 2003: 129). From this 
perspective, the 2006 coup that toppled Thaksin, a Prime Minister who had 
achieved two landslide election victories in 2001 and 2005—becoming the first 
elected Thai leader to complete a full four-year term—represented a sharp reversal 
of the country’s political trajectory. Scholars have noted how the 2006 coup shifted 
the balance of power away from elected politicians and towards the military, the 
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traditional elite and the bureaucracy. After a long absence, the military’s return to 
frontline politics appeared to be a throwback to a bygone era in which unelected, 
unaccountable and unrepresentative institutions dominated the Thai state. 
Following the coup, Thailand became a frequently cited example of a country 
afflicted by the ‘democratic rollback’, ‘democratic backsliding’ or ‘democratic 
recession’ phenomenon (Diamond 2008: 36; Kapstein and Converse 2008: xiii; 
Diamond 2015: 145). Pro-democracy observers, understandably, reacted to the coup 
with varying degrees of sadness and shock, though many of those opposed to 
Thaksin welcomed the military intervention. Commentators typically subscribed to 
the idea that the coup marked a sharp reversal of Thailand’s perceived post-1992 
journey towards becoming a stable democracy. Thitinan (2008: 140) remarks that 
“[a]fter fifteen years during which the reins of government had changed hands only 
via elections, it seemed that Thailand had taken a giant step backward.” McCargo 
(2006a) calls the coup “a terrible moment for Thai democracy” and the sight of 
tanks on the streets “the recourse to a solution which we all know is no solution at 
all.” Beeson (2008: 474-475) describes the coup as “largely unexpected”. Prominent 
Thai public intellectual Sulak Sivaraksa remarked that every military coup in 
Thailand, including the 2006 one, had been bad not just for democracy but also the 
citizenry and even the revered monarchy (Prachatai 20 January 2007). Somsak 
Jeamteerasakul, then a firebrand historian at Bangkok’s Thammasat University, 
wrote angry diatribes against scholars he regarded as responsible for providing 
intellectual justifications for the coup (Somsak 2007: 382-430). 
At first glance, given the frequency of military coups in Thailand, it is 
tempting to regard the 2006 one as simply a repeat of the ‘same old story’, not 
dissimilar to previous military interferences in Thai politics. This view, however, 
ignores many of the significant developments that occurred after May 1992. Not 
only did the country’s emerging democratic order allow the elected government to 
apparently gain the upper hand over the military, but there was also an ambitious 
political reform movement that produced the 1997 constitution and, inadvertently, 
led to the ascendancy of Thaksin. In contrast to the civilian governments in the 
1990s which were short-lived and lacklustre, Thaksin, understanding how the 1997 
constitution was designed to favour large parties and a strong executive, became the 
first civilian leader to achieve political dominance mostly through election- and 
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parliament-based means. Although Thaksin, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter, actually went beyond the acceptable boundary of democratic politics in 
order to amass power, the important point is that the 2006 coup, unlike previous 
ones, was the first time in Thailand that a group of generals, along with their 
backers, plotted to overthrow an extraordinarily powerful, democratically elected 
civilian Prime Minister. As noted by Ukrist (2008: 130), at the time of the coup 
Thaksin “had strong control of parliament, the media, the bureaucracy, provincial 
governors, police, significant sections of the military, and the solid support of the 
masses, especially in rural areas.”  
Beside the issue of Thaksin, it is important to consider the broader changes 
brought on by those fifteen years of continuous electoral rule, during which 
Thailand crafted the generally celebrated 1997 constitution, embarked upon a wide-
ranging process of decentralisation and saw Thaksin become the first elected leader 
to complete a full four-year term. Democratic politics, however imperfect, was not 
just a flash in the pan; it was becoming entrenched and a familiar part of life. If the 
Thai people had been disappointed by the political and economic chaos of the 
1990s, they certainly showed greater enthusiasm when the 2001 election was won 
by Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party. Though Thaksin eventually proved to be, at 
best, a contingent democrat, more interested in the majoritarian side than the 
liberal aspect of democracy, his tenure in office was responsible for making 
democratic politics more rewarding—especially in material terms—for a large part 
of the population, in particular the long-ignored rural inhabitants (Ockey 2007b: 
10). As several of Thaksin’s populist pro-poor policy measures began to bear fruit, a 
large number of Thais now had tangible, rather than just abstract, reasons to be in 
favour of democracy. Ockey (2007b: 10) recounts his conversations with low-
income Thais who believed that Thaksin’s opponents were mainly “rich people who 
were unhappy that Thaksin was doing things for the poor.” Furthermore, thanks to 
the introduction of a larger degree of decentralisation under the 1997 constitution, 
political offices in various sub-national levels were now required to be filled by 
elected officials. Elections thus became even more frequent occurrences than 
before, enabling people to appreciate the value of being able to vote for those who 
serve them locally as well as nationally. In this sense, the 2006 coup leaders were 
deposing not just Thaksin’s government but also a nascent democratic culture. 
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The story of the 2006 coup, therefore, is not only about the military’s actions 
but also revolves around democracy. In order to understand this particular coup, 
however, there is first a need to investigate the kind of ‘democracy’ that was present 
in Thailand at the time. This is because the Thai political system since 1932 had 
consistently been one in which elite groups had played an enduring role, and any 
explanation of the 2006 coup needs to recognise this fact. One of the most 
remarkable features of the coup, as Ferrara (2015: 1) observes, was how it was 
“awash in royal symbolism”, which means that it is necessary to analyse the role of 
the Thai monarchy during the 70-year reign of the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
(1927-2016) in relation to Thailand’s political development up until the removal of 
Thaksin. Accordingly, by looking at the interplay between elite and non-elite actors 
in Thailand over the last four decades, we can understand the 2006 coup not just as 
a narrow conflict between Thaksin and his opponents but rather as a product of the 
underlying tensions concerning how the small elite can coexist with forces that 
constantly threaten their interests and privileges. 
The chapter advances this argument in three steps. It first discusses the 
political role of Thai elite groups centred upon the military and the monarchy, 
focusing on the nature of Thailand’s political system since the October 1973 mass 
uprising. It then shows how two major post-1973 trends, namely the growing 
influence of non-elite actors on the one hand and the adaptation of elite forces to 
new realities on the other, contributed to the unprecedented rise of Thaksin 
Shinawatra. Next, it provides an account of the events that led to Thaksin’s downfall 
and allowed the military to stage the coup on 19 September 2006. It then concludes 
by arguing that the coup was ultimately a sign of weakness on part of the Thai 
establishment. 
 
The Military, the Palace, and Thailand’s Controlled Democratisation 
The end of Thai absolute monarchy in June 1932 was supposed to herald the arrival 
of liberal democracy and a constitutionally restrained monarchy. In reality, 
however, it did not immediately produce a democratic regime. The People’s Party, 
the group of military officers and civilians that seized power from King Prajadhipok, 
managed to establish a constitutional system that put a limit on the monarch’s 
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power but eventually became embroiled in an internal power struggle. Despite the 
introduction of modern institutions resembling those in a typical democracy, the 
Party soon descended into a conflict between its military wing and civilian wing, 
unable to fully commit to the post-1932 aim of building a democratic regime. At the 
same time, royalists made attempts to regain lost privileges and claw back some of 
their power, resulting in violent clashes between rival groups of armed forces and 
periods of military dictatorship, most notably under the anti-monarchy, fascist-
leaning Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (commonly known in English texts 
as Phibun). The royalists gained the upper hand after the November 1947 coup, 
fending off challenges from civilian politicians and left-wingers in parliament 
(Hewison 2015: 53-54). The monarchy was further rejuvenated during the 
dictatorial rule of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who took power in 1957 and allied 
himself with the monarchy in order to defeat his chief rival Phibun. At the height of 
the Cold War, the US also lent crucial backing to bolster the Thai military together 
with the monarchy (Kullada 2012: 216-219). Military rule, with palace support, thus 
became an entrenched feature of Thai politics until Thailand’s growing wealth and 
related socioeconomic changes helped spur the anti-military mass uprising of 
October 1973.  
In this section I discuss two narratives surrounding Thailand’s 
democratisation since the 1973 uprising. The first focuses on how the 1973 episode 
opened the way for actors outside the small elite to play a more assertive role in the 
political landscape. The second narrative, while recognising the increased relevance 
of those actors, views Thailand’s subsequent political development as a process that 
was still shaped largely by the military, bureaucratic and royalist elites. These two 
narratives are not necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive; each simply 
shines the spotlight on different aspects of the country’s political structure. I argue 
that the 2006 military coup can be understood partly as a product of the elite’s 
continued struggle to cope with rising threats to its power and privilege following 
October 1973. 
 
Narrative One: The Expansion of the Political Playing Field since October 1973 
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In the first narrative, an underlying theme of Thailand’s political development from 
1973 to the early 2000s was the gradual, though periodically interrupted, opening of 
political space since the October 1973 mass uprising against the military 
dictatorship of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachon. The uprising was a landmark 
event in the country’s modern history. It shattered the aura of invincibility around 
repressive military rule and powerfully challenged the axiom that Thai politics was 
exclusively an affair of the military, royalist and bureaucratic elites. In other words, 
October 1973 was the moment when the citizenry announced its long-awaited 
arrival on the political scene, one of the unfulfilled promises of 1932. Thongchai 
(2005: 151) argues that the uprising established ‘the people’ as the third force in 
Thai politics, upending the previously unquestioned dominance of two other forces, 
namely the royalists and the capitalist-politician alliance. Although the 1973 
protesters were far from consistent believers in democracy—scholars have pointed 
out how the uprising was driven by a combination of several conflicting ideas 
ranging from democratic values and leftist thoughts to conservative elements of 
Buddhism and royalism (Prajak 2013: 88-90; Baker and Pasuk 2014: 186)—the 
uprising left one long-lasting lesson for the country as a whole: it is possible for 
mass power to overcome a mighty military regime. 
For the conservative elite, the consequences of October 1973 were profound. 
Realising how their interests and privileges were being threatened, Thai elite actors 
subsequently adopted a strategy of alternately resisting, containing and responding 
to demands from other actors for more involvement in the political process. From 
late 1973 to 1976, previously suppressed groups such as labourers, farmers and left-
wingers began to make their voices heard (Chai-Anan 2002: 94). The strongly leftist 
flavour of this period proved intolerable for the military and other actors within the 
Thai conservative elite, whose interests and concerns had by then been shaped by 
the Cold War-era fear of communism (Thongchai 2016: 6). Tensions rose to 
dangerous levels, culminating in the bloody massacre of student protesters in 
Bangkok on 6 October 1976. The massacre was carried out by security forces but 
also with the help of state-sponsored right-wing paramilitary groups known to be 
contemptuous of social activism, liberal politics and the left-leaning tendencies of 
the student movement (Anderson 1977: 19-20). Nonetheless, the highly repressive 
military-backed government of Thanin Kraivixien that emerged after the massacre 
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lasted only a year. Elements within the Thai elite apparently realised that extreme 
repression was no longer the right method of governing the country. 
Thus, the 1980s saw the emergence of a more open political order based on 
electoral politics, reflecting the Thai state’s shift towards a less aggressive approach 
to combating the much-weakened communist movement. While conservative forces 
centred on military, bureaucratic and royalist elites still attempted to maintain 
control over the country’s key issues, other actors—especially political parties, 
business groups, civic groups and media outlets—pushed for and gained increased 
influence over politics and society (Anderson 1990: 41; Sidel 1996: 58-59; McCargo 
2006b: 296; Connors 2009: 362). In the view of one veteran politician, an 
important, though somewhat ironic, sign of politicians’ growing power during this 
period was the increased attention the press and the public paid to scandals 
involving members of parliament. If politicians had not been considered important 
players in the system, there would not have been such a high level of attention on 
their wrongdoings.22 The end of Prem Tinsulanond’s long spell as an army-backed, 
palace-favoured Prime Minister from 1980 to 1988, along with his replacement by 
Chatichai Choonhavan, a retired army general whose leadership of the conservative 
Chart Thai Party saw it win the most seats in the 1988 parliamentary election, 
further reinforced the trend towards greater pluralism in Thai politics. The decisive 
victory over communism in the 1980s should have been a glorious moment for the 
military, but ironically it was also a point at which the public began questioning 
whether the country would still need a strongly military-dominated political system 
(Somsak 2013: 110). Although Prem himself had a role in ensuring that Chatichai 
assume the premiership (Tamada 1995: 331), the rise of an elected politician to be 
the country’s leader still marked a dramatic break with the Prem years and a 
symbolic milestone in Thailand’s democratisation.  
Though the military staged a coup against Chatichai in 1991, its attempt to 
re-impose military-bureaucratic dominance on the country ended in a disaster. 
Chatichai’s government was thrown out over allegations of widespread corruption, 
abuse of power, ‘parliamentary dictatorship’, undermining the military, and 
mishandling of anti-monarchy threats (official announcement by the coup group, 
                                                             
22 Interview, Anonymous politician and former Speaker of Parliament, Bangkok, 18 
November 2015 
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reprinted in Thamrongsak 2007: 177-180). The military junta, calling itself the 
National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC), appointed Anand Panyarachun, a well-
respected businessman and former diplomat with close links to the palace, to lead a 
cabinet with strongly technocratic and bureaucratic flavours. The appointment of 
the independent-minded Anand, rather than someone who would simply assume 
the role of the junta’s puppet, was a sign of the military’s need to win confidence 
and trust from the increasingly powerful Thai public (Somsak 2013: 110). Yet the 
army subsequently bungled its attempt to tighten its grip on power, badly 
misjudging the popular sentiment against a return to undemocratic rule. In May 
1992, an anti-military mass protest broke out in Bangkok. The bloody army-led 
crackdown of the protesters then greatly tarnished the military’s standing in the 
eyes of the public. King Bhumibol, by then a long-reigning, highly revered monarch 
(Thongchai 2008: 21-22), made a widely publicised intervention in which he 
summoned both the junta chief, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, and the protest 
leader, Chamlong Srimuang, for a televised dressing-down, demonstrating his 
immense royal authority and putting an end to the violence (Suchit 2013: 171). 
Popular backlash against the military in the aftermath of the crackdown was so 
strong that some military officers resorted to wearing civilian clothes instead of 
their uniforms during their daily commute (Wassana 2002: 85). The military’s 
retreat from frontline politics would last for fifteen years, a remarkably long time in 
the Thai context. At this point, the Thai people appeared to finally gain the upper 
hand over the military. 
A weakened military should have presented the country with a golden 
opportunity to undertake serious reform of the armed forces in accordance with 
democratic principles. However, only a limited degree of reform was carried out by 
the end of the 1990s. Examples of efforts to assert civilian supremacy during this 
period include a proposal in 1996 to restructure the military in order to make it 
more accountable to the civilian government. This was to be achieved by, among 
other things, bringing the military’s supreme commander and the chiefs of each 
force under the defence permanent secretary (Ockey 2001: 199). In the end, 
however, the restructuring plan was toned down according to the wishes of senior 
military officers (Ockey 2001: 200). A more successful attempt to impose civilian 
supremacy was the significant cut in defence budget by Chuan Leekpai’s 
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government in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis. The impact of the crisis on 
Thailand as a whole was severe. The IMF-imposed restructuring plan specified that 
Thailand had to run a budget surplus of 1% of GDP, meaning that all government 
departments had to face large spending cuts (Vilawan 2013: 60). As Ockey notes 
(2001: 202), Chuan “managed to convince military leaders that they must set an 
example by allowing defence cuts at least equal to the average of other ministries”, a 
request which the military voluntarily accepted. General Chettha Thanacharo, then 
chief of the army, remarked that the army was prepared to “share the pain” of the 
budget cuts with everyone else though he was far from pleased with the situation 
(Arthit 19-25 December 1997). A few months later, General Mongkol Ampornphisit, 
then supreme commander, echoed Chettha’s view but added that the government 
should ease the cut in military budget once economic conditions improved (Arthit 
20-26 March 1998). The Chuan government, citing the need to comply with the 
requirements outlined by the IMF, also embarked upon a scheme to privatise or 
part-privatise a number of state-owned enterprises. Previously, Thailand’s state-
owned enterprises had been generally regarded as lucrative cash cows for the rich 
and the powerful. It was common for these enterprises to be run by well-connected 
figures seeking illicit personal gains. While the government’s scheme was not 
directly aimed at weakening the military, several enterprises under the Defence 
Ministry such as the Glass Organisation, the Battery Organisation and the Leather 
Tanning Organisation were affected. As the scheme went ahead, many senior 
military officers lost their positions on the boards of those enterprises (Vilawan 
2013: 68-69). 
Although these reforms were notable, they progressed slowly and did not go 
far enough in terms of meaningfully reducing the military’s role in the country’s 
political, social and economic affairs. There seemed to be a widespread assumption 
that the armed forces had simply been rendered irrelevant and powerless by the 
May 1992 debacle, hence the lack of any need for an urgent and comprehensive plan 
to establish a higher degree of democratic control of the military.23 This 
overoptimistic assumption was perhaps supported by a tendency for senior military 
figures to publicly acknowledge the lessons of May 1992. General Surayud 
                                                             
23 Interview, Anonymous politics lecturer 2, Bangkok, 6 October 2015 
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Chulanont, army commander from 1998 to 2002 who later became the junta-
appointed Prime Minister in 2006, remarked in a May 2002 interview: 
From that event [May 1992], the military has learned many lessons. In 
particular, the military should not get involved in politics. A military 
coup does not solve anything. It just leads to violence and damages, and 
takes the country backward. (Matichon Weekly 24-30 May 2002) 
Surayud, it should be noted, was one of the army officers directly involved in 
the May 1992 violence. While he enjoyed a reputation as a reform-minded army 
chief, he had a role in one of the ugliest scenes of the army-led crackdown on anti-
NPKC civilian protesters. In the words of Chambers (2013: 229): 
During the crackdown, General Surayud Chulanont, then the leader of 
the Special Warfare Command, led troops to the Royal Hotel, which was 
being used as field hospital by demonstrators. These elite forces, in 
video footage, were seen kicking injured protestors. 
 
Narrarive Two: The Enduring Role of Royalist and Military Elites 
 In the second narrative, October 1973 did not represent a defeat of Thai elite 
forces but was a point at which those forces began to devise new ways of coping with 
challenges from lower levels of society. Thailand was inevitably heading in a more 
democratic direction, but whatever kind of democracy that emerged had to be 
contained, tamed and made ‘safe’ for the elite (Kasian 2016: 227). Higley and 
Burton (2006: 7) define political elites as “persons who are able, by virtue of their 
strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political 
outcomes regularly and substantially”, a description that fits the characteristics of 
the monarchy and top military leaders in Thailand during much of the post-1932 
era. The second narrative thus seeks to highlight the ways in which Thai elites 
managed to maintain or even enhance their authority in the post-1973 era. 
Historian Thongchai Winichakul (2005: 150-152), a prominent critical voice 
in the Thai academia, has argued that one of the key consequences of the 1973 event 
is the emergence of the monarchy as a uniquely powerful political actor wielding 
authority beyond the supposed limits of a typical constitutional monarchy. One of 
the most enduring images of the October 1973 episode is that of the royal family, in 
casual clothes, welcoming protesters who were fleeing security forces into the 
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grounds of the Chitralada Palace, the king’s Bangkok residence. The monarchy was 
regarded as being on the side of the people and in opposition to the ‘evil’ military 
dictatorship, thus validating the then recently-popularised idea among the 1973 
protesters that the Thai monarchy had always been a pro-democratic force. In the 
lead-up to the uprising, anti-military demonstrators made references to King 
Prajadhibok’s 1935 abdication letter24—in which he stated that he was willing to give 
away his power and prerogatives to the people but not to another absolutist ruler or 
group of rulers—and portrayed it as a message against military dictatorship 
(Somsak 2001: 9-10). In the aftermath of October 1973, King Bhumibol made 
another important political intervention by directly appointing Sanya Thammasak, 
a Privy Councillor and Supreme Court judge, as interim Prime Minister. The 
appointment was generally well-received and illustrated the palace’s ability and 
willingness to fill in the power vacuum that the military regime left behind (Somsak 
2013: 108). 
For Thongchai, the monarchy’s role during and after October 1973 was 
crucial in establishing a new kind of political order, which he calls ‘Post-1973 
Democracy’ (Thongchai 2005). The essence of this order was that, as a result of the 
palace’s intervention in the uprising, the monarchy assumed a uniquely privileged 
status as an institution ‘above politics’. In the Thai context, the meaning of ‘above 
politics’, or เหนือการเมือง, was a product of what Thongchai (2005: 147-150) sees as a 
sustained campaign by royalists to revive monarchism in the post-1932 era. ‘Above 
politics’ is a term preserved only for the monarchy; no other Thai institutions are 
described as such. To be above politics, in this sense, means to be detached from the 
political realm and thus untainted by the perceived immorality of political activities. 
The term ‘above politics’ also reflects Thailand’s deep-rooted tradition that accords 
the monarchy a sacred, semi-divine status. Unlike European constitutional 
monarchies, the Thai monarchy retains clout, mystique and many other pre-modern 
characteristics largely derived from ancient Buddhist notions of kingship 
                                                             
24 King Prajadhibok, also known as King Rama VII, was Thailand’s last absolute 
monarch who reigned from 1925 to 1935. In 1932 a coup by the People’s Party 
overthrew absolute monarchy, but Prajadhibok was allowed to stay on as a monarch 
with constitutionally restricted powers. In 1935 he abdicated, a highly unusual act 
for a Thai king. The royalist narrative of Thai history portrays him as ‘The Father of 
Thailand’s Democracy’. 
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(Thongchai 2005: 148, 151). The monarchy is therefore seen to be occupying a 
hallowed space, being formally under the constitution but de facto unconstrained by 
it. In other words, being above politics does not mean the monarchy is not allowed 
to become involved in political matters should it wish to, but any royal intervention 
would not be regarded as a political act. ‘Politics’ in Post-1973 Democracy was 
narrowly understood as competition for formal governmental power and 
parliamentary seats. This conception of what constituted ‘politics’ was then 
reinforced and disseminated throughout the country by the education system and 
the media. 
Despite the growing influence of elected politicians throughout most of the 
1980s, Thailand’s gradual democratisation did not diminish the monarchy’s 
authority. Instead, the palace managed to turn itself into a key pillar of the 
emerging democratic order, allowing it to wield enormous influence over various 
national affairs without having to be responsible for its actions. As McCargo puts it 
(2005: 501), King Bhumibol’s “core achievement lay in securing a high degree of 
relative autonomy for the monarchy within Thailand’s increasingly pluralist order.” 
Thus, the word democracy in Post-1973 Democracy is not used to denote a system 
of popular sovereignty but rather to designate the increased regularisation of 
electoral politics, something that actually bolstered the authority of the palace.    
Further adding to the king’s moral authority was the extensive network of ‘royal 
projects’, consisting of thousands of mainly rural-based development schemes 
sponsored in various ways by the palace (Chanida 2007: 3-7). With the help of mass 
media, these projects enabled the king to emit the image of being a benevolent 
monarch who cared deeply for his subjects and was prepared to work hard for them. 
Thailand’s strict lèse majesté law, which criminalised insults and defamation 
against the monarchy, also served to suppress the spread of views that went against 
the official narrative. The revival, or in some cases invention, of majestic royal 
ceremonies and traditions from the 1970s onward served to further impress royal 
grandeur upon the mass (Thongchai 2016: 23-24). 
By mid-1980s, the collapse of Thai communism further strengthened the 
dominance of Post-1973 Democracy. As the ideological battle appeared to be 
decisively settled in favour of the status quo, critical intellectuals, some of whom 
had previously directed their ire at the monarchy, shifted their focus to opposing the 
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military’s political role and advocating parliamentary democracy. In a marked 
contrast to earlier radical writings, the monarchy was either left out of the works of 
these intellectuals or deferentially portrayed as a positive element of democracy. 
Notable among these intellectuals were Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Saneh Chamarik, 
Teerayut Boonmee and Kasian Tejapira (Thikan 2012: 485-562). A particularly 
significant demonstration of the monarchy’s growing strength was the dramatic 
failed coup against Prem Tinsulanond on 1 April 1981. The palace’s clear support for 
Prem was crucial in saving him from the attempted coup, whose instigators were an 
ambitious group of mid-ranking soldiers known as the Young Turks. The royal 
family’s presence alongside Prem at the Second Army Region base in Nakhon 
Rachasrima province was crucial for Prem’s success in mobilising disparate military 
groups against the relatively small group of troops under the Young Turks’ 
command (Tamada 1995: 321-322). Prem himself would go on to have a more 
important role as a key ally of the palace. He was appointed to the Privy Council in 
August 1988 after leaving the Prime Minister post, was elevated to the presidency of 
the Privy Council in 1998 and, after the passing of King Bhumibol on 13 October 
2016, became the country’s regent. 
In May 1992, the palace’s perceived role in restoring calm after the violent 
crackdown on anti-NPKC protesters further boosted its popularity and, in the age of 
mass media, helped to create a new sense of direct connection between the 
monarchy and the people (Somsak 2013: 112-114).  Resembling the aftermath of 
October 1973, the monarchy also had a role in ensuring that a figure acceptable to 
the public, palace favourite Anand Panyarachun, take the interim Prime Minister 
job to stabilise the political situation after the fall of the NPKC (McCargo 2005: 507-
508). The irony of Anand, who had been the military-appointed Prime Minister just 
a year previously, being hailed as the people’s hero exposed the confused messages 
of the anti-NPKC demonstration. Instead of being driven strictly by democratic 
principles, the protesters appeared to also be particularly concerned with moral 
issues. NPKC’s key leader Suchinda had broken his own promise of never accepting 
a political position by taking up the Prime Minister job following the March 1992 
election, and this blatant flip-flopping was perhaps a stronger motivation behind 
the anti-military protest than a genuine desire for democracy (Sirote 2016). Had the 
protesters been truly advocating a democratic form of government, there would 
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have been a major backlash against the return of the unelected Anand. As it turned 
out, the popularity of Anand and the acceptance by the public of his second spell as 
Prime Minister showed how royalists cleverly managed to co-opt popular sentiment 
and used it to their advantage, a further demonstration of the prowess of Post-1973 
Democracy.  
Anand, according to a source close to him, believes his popularity during that 
period arose from being viewed as a “democratic-leaning” figure in comparison to 
the generals.25 In reality, however, he was far from a committed advocate of 
democracy. He has spoken in defence of both the 2006 and the 2014 military coups 
and, in the latter case, has labelled the US government a “hypocrite” for criticising 
the Thai military’s human rights violations. For Anand, democracy is not the only 
indicator of a good political system. He believes democracy is only “75-percent 
important” because in his ideal system of government, good governance should also 
be a significant consideration. This was why he was willing to tolerate military 
governments that promised to tackle corruption and clean up politics.26 
Furthermore, Anand advocates the idea of an all-appointed upper chamber rather 
than an elected one. In his view, one of the ways to improve the Thai political 
system is to make sure that the Senate can function as a truly ‘independent’ body, 
free from the influence of the elected government. Having a powerful all-elected 
Senate, which was the case in Thailand from 2000 to 2006, was a failure because 
Thaksin’s immense wealth had enabled him to easily manipulate senators and gain 
control over many elements of the country’s system of checks and balances. Anand 
argues that Thailand should adopt what he calls the ‘British House of Lords model’. 
By this he means a second chamber whose members consist wholly or partly of 
former high-ranking state officials who get appointed to the chamber by virtue of 
their knowledge and experiences (Wikileaks 21 September 2006). 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Post-1973 Democracy is the rise of 
the monarchy to the unique informal position of Thailand’s ‘supreme arbiter’ 
(McCargo 2005: 501), perceived as not normally involved in politics but capable of 
peacefully putting an end to extreme cases of political turmoil, as most memorably 
seen in 1973 and 1992. In comparison to the various wrongdoings of politicians and 
                                                             
25 Interview, Anonymous royalist elite figure, Bangkok, 28 December 2015 
26 Interview, Anonymous royalist elite figure, Bangkok, 28 December 2015 
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other powerful figures, the monarchy’s clean image, revered status and carefully 
accumulated clout allowed it to “conserve the moral high ground [and] protect the 
legitimacy of its routine interferences” (Ferrara 2015: 185). Under King Bhumibol, 
the arbiter role of the monarchy even became a key element determining a coup’s 
success or failure. As Somchai (2012: 17-19) points out, at least since the October 
1976 coup that installed Thanin Kraivixien, it subsequently became clear that the 
leaders of a coup could be assured of their success on if they could manage to be 
granted an audience with the king. As one of the first moves of a coup’s leaders 
would almost always be to abolish the previous constitution, a new ‘interim’ 
constitution backed by coup leaders would need the king’s formal endorsement 
before coming into effect, meaning that theoretically it was possible for the king to 
decline to sign it and thus completely reject the legitimacy of those leaders. In 
addition, with the king’s authority, there was no need for opposing sides in a coup to 
engage in open combats against each other. The monarch’s tacit endorsement of 
one side over the other was often enough to settle the conflict, usually allowing one 
side to surrender early in exchange for being spared the death penalty, the formal 
punishment for rebellion. In practice, surrender often meant being permitted to 
leave the country with a possibility of being quietly allowed back in later. The king’s 
central role in coup situations was best demonstrated by the previously discussed 
failed coup of 1 April 1981, staged by the Young Turks against Prem Tinsulanond. 
Chambers (2013: 209-210) similarly argues that the Young Turks episode made it 
clear that a military coup could no longer be successful without securing the 
monarch’s tacit endorsement or at least ensuring his neutrality. 
Prominent legal scholar Borwornsak Uwanno (1994: 189-190) once 
explained the rationale behind the need for a military constitution to receive the 
king’s endorsement. In his view, Thai sovereignty had always rested with the 
monarch since time immemorial. The 1932 overthrow of absolute monarchy did not 
take sovereignty away from the monarch’s possession but merely led to a situation 
in which sovereign power was ‘shared’ between the monarch and the people in a 
constitutional framework. Hence, once a constitution is abolished during a military 
coup, sovereignty returns to the king. Whenever there is a new military-backed 
constitution, it inevitably needs the king’s consent to convert ‘his’ sovereignty back 
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to the shared state. For these reasons, royal consent is required to proclaim a new 
military-backed constitution in an event of a successful coup (Somchai 2012: 19). 
 The manner in which the palace engaged in politics was also an important 
issue. The palace under King Bhumibol almost always avoided direct political 
intervention but tended to operate through proxies, entrusting a number of royally-
connected associates with the task of implementing the monarch’s wishes in various 
areas of national affairs (McCargo 2005: 500-503). Prem, Anand and Prawase have 
been key figures in the palace network since at least the 1980s, though they have not 
always agreed with, been close to or got along well with each other. One example of 
a rift within the highest level of royalists is the little-known feud between Prem and 
Anand. In 2007, amidst growing criticisms of Prem’s alleged role in the 2006 coup, 
a website was launched to petition the king to dismiss Prem from the Privy Council. 
In response, a university lecturer called Yodsak Kosaiyakanon, a self-professed 
admirer of Prem, appealed to the police to charge the website’s owners with lèse 
majesté, presumably because Prem was the president of the Privy Council. The 
police flatly refused, pointing out that the Thai lèse majesté law covered only 
members of the royal family and not Prem (The Nation 3 April 2007). While the 
episode was quickly forgotten, Anand particularly disapproved of Prem’s silence 
throughout the affair. A source close to Anand reveals that Anand thought Prem 
himself should have announced very early on that the lèse majesté law did not cover 
him instead of leaving it to the police to do so. According to the same source, Anand 
viewed Prem’s silence as something that could have made people think that Prem 
secretly wished to be covered by the law.27 
The preceding discussion portrays Thailand’s political development from the 
1980s onward as not simply a case of people-empowering democratisation but 
rather a process that accommodated the interests of elite as well as non-elite actors. 
On the surface, the two narratives may appear contradictory. The first narrative 
paints a picture of a political system with an elite whose power had gradually been 
diminished by the growing strength of the citizens and other actors from below. On 
the other hand, the second narrative looks at how the monarchy and senior royalists 
managed to cope with the changing political situation and actually emerged 
stronger. It is possible, however, to view both narratives as complementing each 
                                                             
27 Interview, Anonymous royalist elite figure, Bangkok, 28 December 2015 
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other because without the fall of the Thanom regime and the rising influence of 
non-elite actors following October 1973, the monarchy might not have had the 
opportunity to assume such a uniquely powerful status. Had Thanom survived the 
uprising, the monarchy could have remained merely a junior partner in its alliance 
with the military. In McCargo’s words (2005: 502), the growing pluralism of the 
Thai political order in the 1980s motivated the palace to “permit the formation of 
apparently representative governments, while employing political networks to 
subvert them.” The rise of the mass also proved beneficial for the palace because 
mass support would turn out to be one of the most important factors underpinning 
the monarchy’s power and legitimacy. In sum, Thailand’s political development 
from 1973 to 2006 is a story of continuous tensions. On one side there is the 
conservative bloc comprising military, bureaucratic and royalist elites seeking to 
protect and advance its interests. On the other side, non-elite beneficiaries of 
socioeconomic changes demanded greater inclusion in the political realm. Elite 
forces have been contingent democrats, advocating democracy only in specific cases 
that suit their interests. This palace-centric elitism was eventually challenged by 
Thaksin Shinawatra, an elected politician who successfully converted Thailand’s 
increased pluralism into a potent source of his power and ultimately provoked an 
extreme response by the elite in the form of the 2006 coup. Ironically, the rise of 
Thaksin was made possible in no small part by the elite-shaped 1997 constitution. 
 
The 1997 Constitution and the Rise of Thaksin Shinawatra 
The May 1992 episode was a significant catalyst for the subsequent period of 
wide-ranging political reform that eventually produced the 1997 constitution, 
popularly called ‘The People’s Constitution’ in Thailand. The moniker arose because 
in contrast to Thailand’s previous constitutions, the drafting process of the 1997 
document included elected representatives and wide-ranging processes of popular 
consultation (McCargo 2002: 9). Important democratic milestones in this 
constitution included the creation of a wholly elected Senate, guarantees of various 
basic rights, and the establishment of independent agencies meant to provide 
stronger checks and balances on the government and other public offices (Surin 
2007: 341-342).  
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 While the ‘People’s Constitution’ moniker gave the impression of people’s 
supremacy, the reality was very different. The moniker was ultimately misleading 
because it obscured the role of the Thai elite in the process leading to the charter’s 
promulgation. In fact, some elements of leftist critique of liberal democracy—that it 
guarantees the privileged position of political and economic elites while ‘taming’ the 
mass by showering them with apparent benefits (Baker 1999: 21-24)—could be 
applied to the Thai situation. Although there were popularly elected representatives 
among the drafters, the final decisions over the constitution were firmly within the 
hands of the elite (Rangsan 2007: 17). Instead of being defeated or weakened by the 
calls for reform, Thai elite actors effectively struck a pact with the urban middle 
class, showing recognition of the increased demand for political change and the role 
of middle-class protesters in the overthrow of the NPKC. The constitution was a 
product of an untidy compromise that tried to incorporate the views of both the elite 
and the civil society. In contrast to 1970s-era Thai radical thoughts that were 
strongly critical of the role of the monarchy and other elite groups, the central idea 
of the 1997 constitution appeared to be that Thailand’s political problems were 
chiefly caused by self-serving politicians who cared little beyond their immediate 
interests. For the drafters, creating a better parliamentary system was sufficient to 
placate people’s demand for change. Reforming Thai politics did not need to involve 
reforming the role of the military and the monarchy. As one Thaksin-aligned 
politician put it, the political reform movement that led to the 1997 constitution did 
not do anything to change the military. There was no attempt to establish a clear 
pattern of civil-military relations suitable for a democratic society.28 
As Surin points out (2007: 342-343), a key goal of the 1997 constitution 
drafters was government stability. This was to be achieved by measures such as 
strengthening the executive branch, stripping MPs of their ability to easily 
destabilise a government, and designing an electoral system that favoured large 
parties over small and medium-sized ones. Provisions enhancing executive power 
were expected to help put an end to the post-1992 style of parliamentary politics, 
which, though considerably democratic, was plagued by coalitional infighting, 
uninspiring leadership and corruption scandals. Accordingly, the drafters decided 
to weaken parliament and individual MPs, believing that constraints on executive 
                                                             
28 Interview, Anonymous Thaksin-aligned politician 1, Bangkok, 12 November 2015 
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power would be provided by newly created independent agencies, whose members 
were to be determined by a process largely beyond politicians’ control. Among these 
bodies, the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC), the Election 
Commission (EC) and the Constitution Court would go on to have significant 
impacts, whereas others, such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), 
would simply fail to live up to expectations. Senators, while popularly elected, were 
supposed to be non-partisan and thus were given a large amount of power over 
appointments to the independent agencies. 
The operational failings of certain independent agencies were not the only 
thing the drafters had failed to predict, however. In hindsight, Thailand’s political 
crisis since late 2005 can partly be attributed to the fact that the 1997 constitution 
incorporated two conflicting visions of democratic politics. The first vision was a 
desire for political stability, which was to be achieved by bolstering the elected 
executive and eliminating many potential sources of premature government 
breakdowns. The other vision was a desire for an expansion of rights and freedom, 
which in the liberal democratic tradition is generally realised by establishing clear 
guarantees of civil rights and liberties in order to constrain the elected government. 
In the Thai context, both of these visions can be regarded as beneficial for the 
elite. The desire for stability emerged in response to past experiences; elite interests 
had been threatened by the rise of the mass and other related political implications 
since the 1970s. Yet, if creating a strong executive was a way to ensure stability, 
there would also need to be some guarantees that such a powerful executive would 
not turn out to be a threat to elite actors. Thus, the second vision, emphasising 
protections of rights and liberties as limits on the elected government, was lauded 
by civic groups but also embodied the elite’s desire. As Connors (2008: 144-147) 
points out, the 1997 constitution was shaped by the elitist notion that the people 
were allowed to rule only as long as they made the ‘right’ choice. Popular legitimacy, 
a natural component of an elected government, did not mean the government would 
be allowed to threaten the entrenched interests. In this sense, there would have to 
be meaningful ways to limit the government’s power without relying solely on 
opposition politicians, who, due to being elected, would still be largely influenced by 
the untrustworthy public. It was, accordingly, necessary for the country to have 
institutions that would be both powerful enough to constrain the government and 
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able to carry out their duties independently—that is, in an environment free from 
popular pressure. The independent agencies—to be staffed by capable, experienced, 
well-educated, non-partisan figures—represented this sceptical view of the people’s 
capacity for self-rule. Thai people were apparently empowered but not totally 
trusted. 
At this point, one could argue that there was nothing particularly problematic 
about the coexistence of these two visions. After all, a liberal democratic regime is 
supposed to be based on the ‘majority rule, minority rights’ principle or some 
variations of it. The elected government is not allowed to violate certain rights and 
liberties, and there are non-majoritarian mechanisms in place to protect this 
principle. Counter-majoritarian institutions may even be needed to increase the 
chance of democracy’s survival in difficult situations because they can induce elite 
actors and minority groups to accept democratic rule by protecting their interests 
from being trampled upon by the majority (Albert, Warshaw and Weingast 2012: 
69-75). As Slater (2013: 751) points out, however, these two dimensions of 
democracy—which he calls ‘inclusivity’ and ‘constraints’—are not naturally 
compatible. The liberal democratic order relies on constant compromises and 
bargains in order to reconcile them, and there is always a potential for serious 
problems when such compromises fail.  
Besides the issue of independent agencies, the elitist view of how Thai 
democracy should work was evident in other important ways. The 1997 charter 
required MPs to have a bachelor’s degree, thus disqualifying a large part of the 
population from being able to sit in parliament. The division of MPs into 
constituency MPs and party-list MPs was explained in terms of how the party-list 
component would attract better-qualified candidates who—due to being daunted by 
the prospect of competing with well-connected, locally influential ‘big men’ in 
purely constituency-based elections—previously had no desire to enter politics 
(Surin 2007: 342-343). As Ockey points out (2007: 10), “[t]he authors of the 1997 
constitution were particularly concerned that provincial representatives were often 
corrupt, or even criminal”, hence the need to marginalise them. By implying that 
Thai people had tended to elect the ‘wrong’ type of candidates, the drafters revealed 
their belief that Thai democracy would need to function in such a way that people’s 
power would be constantly kept in check. 
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Even the transformation of the Senate into a wholly elected chamber was not 
a pure expression of trust in popular rule. Senators were barred from belonging to 
any political party and candidates were not allowed to campaign in a traditional 
sense. Instead, they could only ‘introduce’ themselves to the voters in very restricted 
manners using posters or through state-allotted airtime. They were not permitted to 
make public speeches or make any promises as to what they would do once elected 
(Chambers 2009: 13). The rationale was that this system would attract candidates 
whose achievements, qualifications and respectability were already widely 
acknowledged and who would have no need to sway voters with money and 
unrealistic promises. Like the members of the lower house, Senators were also 
required to have a bachelor’s degree. 
In the end, it took the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra to expose many of the 
strengths, limits and contradictions of the 1997 charter. When Thaksin, a 
telecommunications tycoon and one of Thailand’s richest individuals, founded the 
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in July 1999, there were few indications that he would be 
able to lead it to an election victory straight away, let alone to dominate politics and 
usher in sweeping changes as he eventually did. Thaksin’s earlier political stint, as 
the leader of the Palang Dhamma party in mid-1990s, was a failure, an experience 
that shaped his belief that he would be better off creating a new party from scratch 
than joining an already existing outfit.  
From its earliest days, TRT was keen to portray itself as a new kind of party 
that emphasised serious policy platforms and aimed to bring more talented 
professionals into politics, though this was not too different from what a few other 
parties, notably the New Aspiration party (NAP) in the early 1990s, had previously 
claimed to be doing. One Thaksin ally believes TRT transformed the rule of the 
political game by offering a vision of policy-based campaigning instead of the old-
fashioned reliance on patronage, vote-buying and other dirty tricks.29 In addition, 
as the country was undergoing a painful IMF-imposed structural adjustment 
programme following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, TRT championed an 
economic vision that emphasised domestic demands instead of relying solely on 
exports and foreign investment. 
                                                             
29 Interview, Anonymous Thaksin-aligned politician 2, Bangkok, 9 October 2015 
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As McCargo and Ukrist point out (2005: 79-86, 99-100), however, in the 
2001 election TRT ended up being dependent in no small part on existing groups of 
barely palatable politicians whose past electoral successes had been rooted in 
money, local influence and connections more than personal abilities, qualifications 
or talents. Most prominent among these groups was the faction led by Sanoh 
Thienthong, a veteran local boss from Sa Kaew province who was a complete 
contrast to TRT’s forward-looking image. In the end, TRT’s ‘big tent’ approach 
meant that, in contrast to established parties in Western democracies but similar to 
many other Thai parties, it failed to define itself in clear ideological terms. There 
seemed to be no limit as to who TRT was willing to work with, and the sprawling 
party turned out to be little more than Thaksin’s personal vehicle for gaining power.  
TRT’s triumph at the 2001 election was an unprecedented landslide, giving it 
248 MPs in the 500-member lower house. Adding to this success, a remarkably 
broad range of prominent individuals and civic groups announced their backing of 
Thaksin. His early supporters encompassed royally-connected figures, business 
people and civil society leaders, among others. In fact, that so many of the country’s 
most important voices were willing to publicly profess their admiration for the same 
elected leader was an exceptional phenomenon in the Thai context (Sirote 2001: 8). 
Even when the threat of a ruling by the Constitution Court to disqualify Thaksin on 
an asset concealment charge was looming large in mid-2001, elite figures organised 
a petition campaign to demand that Thaksin be allowed to continue as Prime 
Minister (Uchane 2013: 277). Many of them, including Prawase Wasi and Sulak 
Sivaraksa, two of the most widely respected public intellectuals in the country, 
would later become fierce critics of Thaksin. 
 After the Constitution Court acquitted him in a controversial 8-7 ruling, 
Thaksin appeared unstoppable. The ruling seemed to embolden him to the extent 
that, in order to advance his agenda, he was prepared to cut ties with some of his 
erstwhile allies, including even figures closely connected to the monarchy such as 
Prawase and Prem (McCargo 2005: 513-514). Thaksin proved adept at making the 
most of the powers granted to the government by the constitution while 
circumventing and neutering its mechanisms of checks and balances. Government 
stability was one of his most important aims, and the constitution played a key role 
in helping him achieve it. He put together a ruling coalition with the support of 339 
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MPs from five parties, leaving the opposition with fewer than the 200 votes 
required to trigger a no confidence debate against the Prime Minister (McCargo and 
Ukrist 2005: 14). He could govern with the assurance that the MPs within his 
coalition were extremely unlikely to defect or rebel.30 He made changes to his 
cabinet with remarkable frequency, demonstrating his ruthlessness against those he 
deemed unfit or disloyal (McCargo 2006b: 300). He realised the potential threats to 
his rule that could come from the Senate and worked to gain influence over many of 
the nominally impartial senators, enabling him to have a degree of control over 
appointments to independent agencies and ensuring passage of key legislations 
(Surin 2007: 347; Chambers 2013: 248-249). The government’s popularity soared 
as it began to implement key TRT policy promises of cheap universal healthcare, 
debt relief for farmers and accessible low-interest loans. TRT argued that these 
measures were meant to empower the grassroots, though left-leaning scholars have 
criticised them in terms of how they only sought to turn rural dwellers into 
entrepreneurs without addressing the true structural causes of poverty and 
inequality (Kengkij 2009: 305-306). Another common criticism of TRT policies was 
that they were directly responsible for the rise in household debts which could 
cripple the country in the long run (Kasian 2006: 37). 
As Ockey points out (2007: 7), Thaksin did not just want a stable government 
but a centralised and strong one. A charitable observer could argue that he needed 
to centralise power in order to push through his ambitious policy programmes and 
reform plans. He would have had little chance otherwise, given the heavy resistance 
likely to come from the bureaucracy, the entrenched elite and other parts of society 
(Ockey 2007b: 8). Yet it became evident later on that Thaksin was simply not 
willing to be constrained. He showed little interest in the work of MPs and very 
                                                             
30 This was because of the constitutional requirement that a new election be held 
within 60 days after the lower house’s dissolution (Article 116) or within 45 days 
after the end of its term (Article 115). It was a very powerful deterrent on politicians 
seeking to rebel against the government because another provision specified that in 
order to run for a seat in a general election, a candidate must have been a registered 
party member for at least 90 days (independent candidates were not allowed under 
the 1997 constitution). This meant that if a group of MPs threatened to bring down 
a government by switching parties, the government could retaliate by threatening to 
call a new election. As those MPs would be unable to find a new party and be 
registered for 90 days in time for the new election, they would have no choice but to 
remain in their current party, unless they were willing to sit out the next 
parliamentary cycle altogether. 
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rarely attended parliamentary sessions (Ockey 2007b: 7). His government 
undermined and co-opted formal organs of checks and balances by “refus[ing] to 
co-operate with them, obstruct[ing] their work or even offer[ing] them bribes” 
(Kasian 2006: 28-29). His declaration of a ‘war’ on illegal drugs disregarded normal 
criminal justice procedures, allowing security forces to engage in extra-judicial 
killings that left thousands dead and injured (McCargo 2006b: 298-299). Thaksin 
himself summed up his political belief by professing his admiration for Singapore-
style “stable politics”, which he presumably understood as a system in which the 
government was minimally troubled by opposition from parliament, civil society or 
other checks and balances mechanisms (Surin 2007: 348).  
For some of Thaksin’s allies and supporters, however, the rise of TRT as a 
major political force was chiefly based on democratic principles and thus was 
something to be celebrated. Sombat Boonngam-anong, a prominent Thaksin-
leaning civil society activist, argued when interviewed for the 2013 Thai 
documentary Paradoxcracy that Thaksin was not an authoritarian but was simply 
making the most of all the powers he had under the 1997 constitution. A long-term 
ally of Thaksin praised TRT for offering a chance for what he called “the new 
middle-class”, the mainly rural-based beneficiaries of TRT’s key policies, to have a 
meaningful voice in politics. TRT supporters, he argued, felt they truly had the 
ability to influence government policies that directly improved their livelihoods and 
for this reason they were prepared to defend their democratic rights from those 
seeking to suppress them.31 In this perspective, the Thai situation was comparable 
to those in Latin American countries where leaders who pursued pro-poor policies 
were dismissed by opponents as crude populists (D’Eramo 2013: 27-28). A pro-
Thaksin army general believed that many of Thaksin’s opponents were simply 
looking to protect their own interests while disregarding Thaksin’s democratic 
mandate.32 Another Thaksin-aligned politician blamed the disgruntled 
“conservative elite” for stroking the idea that politicians, Thaksin included, were no 
more than a group of corrupt, self-serving people. In his view, elite actors in 
Thailand could never bring themselves to believe in democratic politics because 
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they never embraced the idea of rule by the people.33 It was clear, though, that these 
supporters of Thaksin only highlighted the majoritarian aspect of democracy and 
glossed over Thaksin’s own undemocratic practices and disdain for checks and 
balances. One of Thaksin’s many flaws was that the more he talked up his election 
wins and parliamentary majority, the more he alienated his opponents and even 
those who remained neutral. Even today, this kind of emphasis on democratic 
mandate and majoritarianism, as if no countervailing forces were necessary in a 
democratic system, has recently become a worrying trend among ‘pro-democracy’ 
commentators in Thailand. 
 
Military Reshuffles in the Thaksin Era 
Military reshuffles under Thaksin represented an important area in which 
Thailand’s democratically elected leader clashed with a power structure rooted in 
elite patronage. Thaksin’s pursuit of ‘stable politics’ was not limited to 
parliamentary affairs but also extended to security forces. As a former police officer 
and graduate of the pre-cadet Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School 
(AFAPS), he had connections inside the police and the military. Factionalism is a 
persistent feature in Thailand’s armed forces. As a form of patronage, it plays a 
strong role in promotions and transfers of officers during major reshuffles which 
take place mainly in September of each year (Chambers 2013: 318-324). At the 
rhetorical level, military officers tend to profess their respect for the principle of 
civilian supremacy, which fundamentally requires that the civilian government has 
the ability to determine military appointments. Yet when pressed further, they often 
come up with exceptions and justifications for why the military needs to retain at 
least a degree of autonomy over promotions and transfers of officers (Vilawan 2013: 
98).  
Factions in the Thai armed forces can be based both on horizontal 
connections, such as being in the same AFAPS class year, and vertical connections 
as in the case of officers of different ranks in the same army unit. Personal rivalry, 
class loyalty and factional struggles within the army were important reasons behind 
some of the country’s coups and coup attempts (Alagappa 2013: 100). A memorable 
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rivalry between members of Class 5 and Class 7 of the Chulachomklao Royal 
Military Academy (CRMA), Thailand’s army cadet school, was a significant factor in 
Thailand’s late-1980s politics, the 1991 coup and the subsequent May 1992 turmoil. 
A reshuffle can be a delicate affair both for the government and for the military top 
brass because every move can potentially have a destabilising effect on the political 
order of the day. The extra-constitutional influence of certain individuals, 
particularly Prem Tinsulanond, has tended to overshadow military reshuffles as well 
(McCargo 2005: 501). As explained by Chambers and Napisa (2016: 430): 
Prem maintained influence over the military. He guaranteed and ended 
military careers; used private, informal correspondence with senior brass 
or public speeches designed to punish, warn, promote or praise various 
security officials; was instrumental in the monarchy’s endorsement of 
military regimes; and sometimes helped to ensure the military support 
for civilian governments and worked against those he felt lacked 
sufficient loyalty and obeisance. 
Thaksin understood the potential threats to his government that could come 
from the military. His parliamentary majority would be easily rendered meaningless 
by a military coup, and thus he sought to prevent it not by placating key military 
leaders but by actively trying to put his close friends and associates in important 
positions within the armed forces (McCargo and Ukrist 2005: 134-140). Since the 
early days of his premiership, the issue of military promotions and transfers caused 
a strain in the relationship between the government and the military. In the very 
first annual military reshuffle of Thaksin’s tenure, the government, still emboldened 
by its broad popular support, tried to make changes to the list of promotions and 
transfers that the armed forces had already prepared. Military leaders were upset by 
the ‘disrespectful’ manner in which the government pursued this. General Sampao 
Chusri, then Supreme Commander, argued that the list prepared by each branch of 
the armed forces had already been thoughtfully considered based on military 
tradition and the officers’ competence and suitability. His dissatisfaction with the 
government stemmed not so much from the fact that the government wanted to 
make changes to the lists as how the government wanted to make those changes 
without properly consulting the armed forces beforehand (Thai Rath 11 August 
2001). In 2002, the Thaksin government showed an increased willingness to 
undermine the army when it announced before the traditional military reshuffle 
season that Surayud Chulanont would be ‘promoted’ to the largely powerless 
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position of Supreme Commander while Somdhat Attanant would replace him as 
army commander (Vilawan 2013: 89-90). This provoked negative reaction from 
some military figures. Air Chief Marshal Pong Maneesilp, the air force chief at the 
time, voiced his displeasure and publicly urged the government to revert to the old 
way of doing military reshuffles in the next year (Thai Rath 13 September 2002). 
Thaksin’s cousin, General Chaisit Shinawatra, was promoted to army chief in 
August 2003, a move that caused consternation within the army as Chaisit’s career 
path in a mainly non-combat section of the army had not been one traditionally 
associated with a rise to the top army job (McCargo and Ukrist 2005: 141-147).34 
Chaisit lasted only a year as army chief before being moved to the largely symbolic 
position of Supreme Commander, but Thaksin also had another focus in ensuring 
promotions of his AFAPS Class 10 classmates to important positions. According to 
former US Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, Thaksin himself admitted that he 
deliberately sought to promote his classmates. He told Boyce in a private 
conversation that he had sought to put his Class 10 loyalists in key positions 
throughout the military “not so that they could keep him in power through extra-
constitutional efforts, but simply so they could block such efforts by others” 
(Wikileaks 5 September 2006). Another beneficiary of military reshuffles under 
Thaksin was Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, a former Prime Minister (1996-1997) and 
army chief (1986-1990) who became an ally of Thaksin and still retained some 
influence in the army (Chambers 2013: 260). 
By early 2006, however, the military had been showing more resistance to 
the government’s attempt to promote Class 10 officers to key positions, arguing that 
seniority and suitability, rather than class membership, should be important 
considerations during reshuffles (Thai Post 27 March 2006). The military 
traditionally regarded reshuffles as an internal matter. Despite being an AFAPS 
Class 10 graduate, Thaksin’s career in the police meant he was still seen as an 
outsider from the military’s point of view (Vilawan 2013: 132-133). In fact, Thaksin’s 
police background may have influenced his thoughts on the kind of relationship that 
the government and the military ought to have. Compared to the military, 
Thailand’s police force has much less autonomy. It is structurally organised in a way 
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that allows the government to determine appointments to many of the top 
positions, making the police likely to bend to the will of the government of the day 
(Arisa 2013: 499-500). Buoyed by his early popularity, Thaksin may have felt 
confident enough to try to exert more control over the fiercely independent Thai 
military. In the end, he overestimated his ability to turn the armed forces into his 
support base and to challenge the authority of Prem, the incumbent patron of the 
Thai military. According to one Thaksin ally, a former Defence Minister under 
Thaksin once remarked that even at the height of TRT’s political dominance, Prem 
always had the final say over military promotions and transfers during Thaksin’s 
premiership.35 A number of military officers, including but not limited to Class 10 
graduates, also believed that Thaksin success in making military appointments in 
his favour was limited (Vilawan 2013: 99). Another army officer believed that even 
without Prem, Thaksin’s attempt to woo the military would still have failed because 
the military’s internal culture was strong and highly resistant to outsiders’ 
meddling. In his view, only the ‘worst’ military officers would ally themselves with 
politicians and only because they had no chance of progressing very far in their own 
careers.36 
 
Opposing Thaksin: The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) 
Towards the end of Thaksin’s first term, his government became a target of 
growing criticisms over a range of issues including abuses of power, human rights 
violations, corruption scandals, conflict of interests, erosion of media freedom and 
the violence in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. Many of his previous admirers 
had turned against him. At the same time, the government’s pro-poor policies had 
converted the rural poor in the north and the northeast into reliable TRT 
supporters. Thaksin accordingly shifted his position by the 2005 election, 
portraying himself as a champion of the poor and gradually abandoning his earlier 
image of technocratic competence and cosmopolitanism. One striking change in the 
TRT’s electoral strategy was the adoption of a new, strongly populist slogan, ไทยรักไทย 
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หวัใจคือประชาชน (Thai Rak Thai has the people at its heart), in the 2005 campaign (Pasuk 
and Baker 2008: 67). 
In the end, TRT’s historic election victory in 2005, where it took 377 seats in 
the 500-member lower house and won 32 out of 37 seats in Bangkok, did little to 
silence Thaksin’s critics. The disastrous performance of the opposition Democrat 
party—its 96 seats were below the number of votes needed to trigger a no 
confidence debate against a cabinet minister, let alone the Prime Minister—only 
made Thaksin’s opponents more determined to find a way to bring him down. Yet it 
was one person, media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul, who ultimately had an outsized 
role in galvanising the anti-Thaksin sentiment and paving the way for the eventual 
military coup. Sondhi’s ambitious Manager Media Group had been well-regarded 
among Bangkok’s emerging middle class in the early 1990s, but its overstretched 
business strategy later forced him to seek favour from several politicians and 
executives of financial institutions. Described by Kasian as an early Thaksin crony 
(Kasian 2006: 5), Sondhi’s stint as a current affairs talk show host on the state-
owned Channel 9 television station beginning in 2003 saw him shower Thaksin 
with praises, going as far as to memorably call him “the best Prime Minister 
Thailand has ever had” (uddtoday 2009). The show, called เมืองไทยรายสัปดาห ์ (Thailand 
Weekly), occupied a prime time slot and elevated Sondhi to be a household name.  
By early 2005, however, Sondhi’s failure to gain business privileges from the 
government led him to adopt a drastically more negative view on Thaksin (Pye and 
Schaffar 2008: 40). He started criticising the government in harsh terms on his 
show, while Manager Group’s newspapers and websites also increased their 
negative reports about Thaksin’s administration. In September 2005, after Sondhi 
had contentiously implied for some time that Thaksin was disrespecting and 
undermining the monarchy, Channel 9 took his show off air. This proved to be a 
pivotal moment, as Sondhi defiantly continued to hold the show in a roadshow 
format, promoted it on Manager Group’s media outlets and voiced his thoughts in 
an even more vociferous fashion. The roadshows, held mostly at Bangkok’s Lumpini 
Park but occasionally at other venues around the country, regularly attracted such 
large audiences that Thaksin’s growing number of critics began to regard Sondhi, 
who by this point had appeared increasingly fearless and charismatic, as a figure 
who could front a potential anti-Thaksin mass movement. Given Thaksin’s 
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dominance over state institutions and his pervasive influence over the media 
landscape, a mass demonstration looked to be the only realistic way for his 
opponents to put any kind of pressure on him. Issues that Sondhi raised against 
Thaksin included not only corruption and abuses of power but also substantive 
policy matters such as the government’s plan to privatise key state enterprises 
(Connors 2008: 154-155). As the discussion in the next section will show, however, 
the most potent weapon against Thaksin appeared to be the accusation of 
undermining the monarchy. 
The Sondhi-led opposition movement formed a core of what eventually 
became a larger grouping known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). The 
PAD was officially formed on 8 February 2006, bringing together elements of the 
Thai civil society, academics, politicians, labour unions, business people, civil 
servants, democracy campaigners and religious groups opposing the Thaksin 
government. After the ‘Sondhi phenomenon’ had appeared to be losing steam by the 
end of 2005, Thaksin committed a fatal mistake in January 2006 by allowing the 
sale of his family’s massive business entity, the Shin Corporation, to Temasek 
Holdings, an investment company owned by the Singaporean government (Pye and 
Schaffar 2008: 41) for around $1.88 billion. The deal immediately became 
controversial chiefly because of its tax-free status but also because Shin Corp’s 
strategic telecommunications business would now be under the control of the 
Singaporean state. Sondhi immediately seized upon the issue, holding a large 
demonstration on 4 February 2006 that revitalised the anti-government movement. 
The controversy around the deal was an important factor that united anti-Thaksin 
individuals and groups as they believed a united movement would now have a real 
chance of ousting the government. By the time Thaksin issued a statement on 24 
February 2006 insisting that the Shin Corp deal was conducted legally and 
transparently, the protesters had gained too much momentum (Prachatai 24 
February 2006). 
On 9 February 2006, an announcement was made at Bangkok’s 14 October 
1973 Memorial—an intentionally symbolic location—regarding the foundation of a 
new movement, to be called the People’s Alliance for Democracy. Bringing together 
disparate groups of anti-Thaksin campaigners, the PAD was initially not meant to 
last long; its only mission was to pressure Thaksin to resign but no other long-term 
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goals were stated (Prachatai 10 February 2006). According to Suriyasai Katasila, 
the ‘coordinator’ of the group, the PAD was founded by 40 organisations 
representing various parts of society, and this broad-based nature of the group was 
reflected in the word “Alliance” in its name. Nonetheless, only five individuals were 
chosen to be the ‘core leaders’ of the PAD. Along with Sondhi Limthongkul, they 
were Phipop Thongchai, Somkiat Phongpaiboon, Somsak Kosaisuk and Chamlong 
Srimuang (Pye and Schaffar 2008: 41). Chamlong in particular was a colourful 
personality. Aside from being the leader of the anti-military protest in May 1992, he 
was himself a former army officer in the Young Turks military faction, a former 
governor of Bangkok, a former elected parliamentarian and a key member of the 
officially unrecognised Buddhist sect known as Santi Asoke. He was also the leader 
of the Palang Dhamma party when Thaksin joined it with much fanfare in the 
1990s. By agreeing to help lead the PAD, Chamlong thus became the latest name in 
the long list of Thaksin’s former allies who turned against him. Chamlong was also 
known for his strong will and uncompromising style, qualities that were likely to be 
great assets for any protest movement. 
 
Royalist Politics and the Fall of Thaksin 
While the anti-Thaksin campaign was driven by many issues, the royalist discourse 
provided it with perhaps the most potent weapon. Royalism had not been a major 
political issue since 1992 but occupied a central part of Thai politics in 2005 and 
2006. The PAD, besides its anti-Thaksin activities, is chiefly remembered today for 
its ‘Yellow Shirts’ moniker. From a 2005 government campaign urging civil servants 
and other Thai citizens to regularly wear yellow shirts in honour of the 60th 
Anniversary of King Bhumibol’s accession to the throne, it was remarkable how 
yellow, and royalism, came to symbolise a mass movement seeking to overthrow a 
democratically elected Prime Minister. The PAD’s deliberate strategy of playing up 
the royal dimension of Thai politics was certainly not new for a mass political 
movement; the anti-military demonstrators in 1973 were also under strong 
influence of the royalist narrative of Thai history. Being in violation of royal 
prerogatives, however, was far from the only potential weaknesses of the Thaksin 
government. An anti-Thaksin mass protest could have been organised based on 
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many other kinds of issues.  Thus, the fact that royalism came to occupy a highly 
visible position in the PAD’s campaign was a key characteristic of Thailand’s 2005-
2006 political crisis. Some civil society activists, despite having serious misgivings 
about how Sondhi and others were playing up the royalist theme, decided to join the 
PAD protest because they felt Sondhi was the first protest leader in a long time to be 
able to bring so many people out to the streets (Uchane 2013: 324). 
An important incident during the early months of the anti-Thaksin 
movement was the launch of a book called “Royal Power”, written by former TRT 
MP Pramuan Ruchanaseree (2005). Pramuan had turned decisively against Thaksin 
and wrote the book to attack him, arguing that Thaksin’s government had 
undermined the king in various ways. In a seminar about the book, held at 
Bangkok’s prestigious Thammasat University on 6 September 2005, where Sondhi 
Limthongkul was also one of the main speakers, Pramuan accused the TRT 
government of viewing the palace as a mere rubber stamp for government and 
parliamentary decisions and of deliberately making controversial moves to test the 
limit of royal power (Pramuan, Kaewsan and Sondhi 2005: 43). Sondhi, in the same 
seminar, argued strongly for the monarchy’s indispensable role in modern Thai 
politics. In an early sign of the intensely royalist approach later adopted by the PAD, 
he said to the audience: 
Do we accept that the king is the father of the land? If we do, we 
must also accept that the queen is the mother of the land. 
Therefore, shall we stop talking about this bloody constitution 
already!? Let’s just talk about tradition and custom. (Pramuan, 
Kaewsan and Sondhi 2005: 57) 
 
Despite Pramuan’s and Sondhi’s passionate words, figures close to the palace 
initially distanced themselves from them and the broader anti-Thaksin movement. 
On 9 September 2005, the then rector of Thammasat University Surapol Nitikraipoj 
revealed that two of the most prominent palace-connected figures, Surayud 
Chulanont and Sumet Tantivechakul, had declined invitations to speak at the 
seminar. Surapol claimed that it was Prem who had advised Surayud, who had been 
serving alongside Prem in the Privy Council since November 2003, against joining 
the event (Chanida 2007: 31). 
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Key events that were seen to fit within the Thaksin-challenging-the-king 
narrative include the 2002-2005 controversy over Auditor-General Jaruvan 
Maintaka, whose appointment to the job was ruled illegitimate by the Constitution 
Court. In Thailand’s bureaucratic tradition, people formally get appointed to or 
removed from high-ranking positions in the public sector by royal command, 
though in practice the king typically endorses the list of appointments and transfers 
produced by the government of the day. There was, however, no royal command to 
remove Jaruvan, ostensibly because the Constitution Court’s ruling did not specify 
that she must quit her post. Jaruvan carried on working, and because of the anti-
corruption nature of her work she was increasingly seen as a thorn in the 
government’s side. When the Senate named a new Auditor-General in June 2005 
and forwarded the name to the king, Thaksin’s opponents claimed that the 
government, which by this point had been perceived as having a strong control over 
the Senate, was violating royal prerogatives (Connors 2008: 152-153). Though the 
palace never gave an official explanation, anti-Thaksin senator Kaewsan Atibodhi 
argued that the king had refused to endorse Jaruvan’s removal because the 
aforementioned Constitution Court’s ruling had no legal basis (Pramuan, Kaewsan 
and Sondhi 2005: 70). Beside the Jaruvan affair, a similar controversy erupted over 
the TRT government’s appointment in 2004 of an acting Supreme Patriarch, the 
country’s highest-ranking Buddhist monk, because the elderly incumbent, 
Nyanasamvara Suvaddhana, had been deemed incapacitated. Nyanasamvara was 
King Bhumibol’s mentor when the young king briefly spent time as a Buddhist 
monk in 1956. Sondhi Limthongkul and other opponents of Thaksin, arguing that 
Nyanasamvara was still capable of carrying out his duties, pointed to the 
appointment as another sign of the government’s disrespect towards the king 
(Pramuan, Kaewsan and Sondhi 2005: 61). In addition, critics attacked Thaksin for 
the manner in which he presided over an April 2005 Buddhist ceremony at 
Bangkok’s sacred Emerald Temple. Thaksin, according to the critics, 
inappropriately sat in a seat reserved for the monarch (Connors 2008: 153). 
The royalist theme increasingly permeated the Sondhi-led opposition 
movement and appeared to play a role in attracting more people to his rallies. On 15 
September 205 he said: “When the leader is morally corrupt, people will long for the 
king” (Manager Online 10 November 2005). Then on 11 November 2005 he 
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declared that his anti-Thaksin activities were ultimately “a fight for the king.” The 
number of protesters grew to 50,000 a week later, peaking at approximately 80,000 
on 10 December 2005 (Connors 2008: 155). However, the decision to put royal 
issues at the forefront of the protest also brought its own problems. A number of 
individuals and groups on the anti-Thaksin side, including senior royalists Prawase 
and Anand, had reservations about pitting royalism against a popularly elected 
government (Connors 2008: 159). When the PAD was formed, even one of its core 
leaders, Phipob Thongchai, was initially against making the issue of royal power the 
central part of the anti-Thaksin struggle, though he later relented (Pye and Schaffar 
2008: 42). PAD protesters did not appear to realise that such overt association of 
the royalist ideology with the anti-Thaksin campaign was not necessarily a sign of 
royalism’s strength. If Thai royalism had truly been working as a guiding principle 
for society, it would have served as a unifying force, ensuring a harmonious 
coexistence of millions of citizens living under the same benevolent monarch. 
Instead, royalism during the anti-Thaksin campaign became divisive and 
exclusionary. The PAD leaders did not seem to realise the danger of using the 
charge of disrespecting the king to attack a popularly elected premier. To pit the 
monarchy against Thaksin in such manner was to frame the crisis as one between 
the king’s traditional, deep-rooted authority and Thaksin’s popular legitimacy. 
From the way the PAD pushed the issues, it was as if the Thai population at large 
was forced to choose one and not the other. There was no middle ground or room 
for compromise. If royalism was meant to triumph, it would do so at the expense of 
democracy. 
Eventually, the anti-Thaksin protest allowed Post-1973 Democracy to once 
again rear its head. Tensions grew as the PAD’s pro-monarchy message morphed 
into a call for the king to personally intervene in the conflict. Clearly invoking the 
monarchy’s arbiter role, the PAD tried to portray the anti-Thaksin protest as similar 
to previous demonstrations against ‘evil’ governments in 1973 and 1992, implying 
that any royal intervention against Thaksin would be justified because it would be in 
favour of ‘democracy’ and ‘the people’. The PAD’s campaign was centred on two 
concepts: Article 7 of the 1997 constitution on the one hand, and the traditional 
principle of rachaprachasamasai (ราชประชาสมาสยั, king-people mutuality) on the other. 
Article 7 of the 1997 constitution stated: “Whenever no provision under this 
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Constitution is applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with the 
constitutional practice in the democratic regime of government with the King as 
Head of the State” (Connors 2008: 148). Rachaprachasamasai, unlike Article 7, 
was not a concrete, written piece of legislation but was a term that allegedly denoted 
the mythical idea of an inextricable bond between the Thai monarch and his people 
(Connors 2008: 148-150). The PAD’s argument was that both Article 7 and 
rachaprachasamasai were intrinsic components of Thailand’s political system. It 
thus followed that in a time of great distress, people had the right to bypass normal 
legal procedures and petition the king directly so that the king would exercise his 
powers to resolve the crisis, which in this case meant removing Thaksin, appointing 
a new government and initiating a new round of political reform to fix the flaws in 
the 1997 charter. As debates went on over the legal basis of such an argument, it was 
clear that the unfolding drama actually pertained to the most fundamental question 
regarding the legitimacy of Post-1973 Democracy: Was royal authority superior to 
the authority of a democratically elected leader, let alone a leader who had achieved 
two landslide victories?  
The two election victories of TRT appeared to have pushed Thaksin further 
towards the majoritarian aspect of democracy. In his second term he made 
increasingly frequent references to the number of votes and MPs that TRT had won 
in 2005, implying that his critics were just a minority in the country (McCargo 
2006b: 302-303). Faced with the PAD protest, on 25 February 2006 Thaksin 
decided to call a snap election, scheduled for 2 April 2006, in the hope that TRT’s 
expected win would silence the protesters. In its official announcement, the 
government said the protest was becoming violent and spiralling out of control and 
called for all sides to respect the parliamentary system (Prachatai 25 February 
2006). However, Thaksin’s attempt to regain the initiative was countered by the 
decision of the three opposition parties—Democrat, Chart Thai and Mahachon—to 
boycott the election, leaving TRT as the only major party to compete in the 2 April 
2006 poll.  For TRT, this was a serious problem because the constitution required 
the winner of any single-candidate constituency to gain more than 20% of the votes 
in order for the victory to count, opening up the possibility that many constituencies 
in anti-Thaksin areas would not have winners who could meet that requirement. 
When the election took place, 38 constituencies did not produce winners as per the 
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rules, an outcome that immediately plunged the country into a constitutional 
impasse (Connors 2008: 156).   
Finally, on 25 April 2006 King Bhumibol took centre stage. In a lengthy 
speech to senior judges, the king observed that as the 2 April election was 
incomplete, the country’s democracy could not function. He then remarked that the 
judiciary, normally reserved and passive, actually had the right to determine what 
the country should do. Most importantly, he rejected the calls for the use of Article 7 
to resolve the matter, arguing that Article 7 was not meant to allow the monarch to 
“overstep his duty” by making arbitrary decisions or exercising powers beyond the 
constitutional limits. Bringing up the case of Sanya Thammasak, the appointed 
Prime Minister in the aftermath of 14 October 1973, the king argued that the 
appointment of Sanya had been made in accordance with the law at the time but 
having a royally-appointed Prime Minister in 2006 would not only be unreasonable 
but also downright undemocratic. After expressing his frustration with the 
protesters, he ended the speech by imploring the judges to save Thailand from what 
he called “the worst crisis in the world” (Prachatai 26 April 2006).  
Though the king distanced himself from the PAD’s demands, this episode 
was undeniably a royal intervention, another manifestation of Post-1973 
Democracy. A simple speech by the king, the supreme arbiter, was once again what 
the country was supposed to rely upon to get itself out of a political quagmire. Yet 
the series of events that followed the speech suggested that Post-1973 Democracy, 
instead of gaining strength, was showing signs of decline. While the king’s speech 
cleared the way for the Constitution Court to annul the 2 April 2006 election and for 
other judicial bodies to help make preparations for a fresh election, Thaksin still 
decided to fight on, perhaps encouraged by the king’s refusal to implement Article 7 
and how the king framed his speech in the language of democracy and 
constitutional practices. Thaksin’s decision prolonged the protest against him as 
PAD demonstrators stuck to their demands of wanting Thaksin to quit, and the fact 
that the new election would be held in October 2006 meant that the country could 
face several more months of tension and confrontation. It was evident, therefore, 
that even a royal intervention was insufficient to restore peace and normalcy amidst 
the highly-charged atmosphere of the anti-Thaksin protest. Had Post-1973 
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Democracy remained as strong as it had previously been, the king should have been 
able, like in 1973 and 1992, to put a swift end to the crisis. 
Ultimately, the PAD’s significance paled in comparison to elite machinations 
in the eventual downfall of the Thaksin government. On 29 June 2006, Thaksin 
made a speech before high-ranking government officials in which he blamed “a 
charismatic person” for the “chaos” that was happening (Ukrist 2008: 128). While 
Thaksin did not mention any names, the remark was widely believed to refer to 
Prem (Chambers 2013: 267). On 14 July 2006, Prem himself gave the clearest 
indication yet that he wanted to have a role, and be seen to have a role, in the 
increasingly contentious fight against the government. Appearing in military 
uniform, he gave a speech to army cadets at Chulachomklao academy in which he 
memorably declared that “the soldiers belong to His Majesty the King, not to a 
government. A government is like a jockey [of a racing horse]. It supervises soldiers, 
but the real owners are the country and the king” (Ukrist 2008: 128). He also went 
on to give two more speeches in a similar vein at the Naval Academy and the Air 
Force Academy. Thaksin’s aggressive effort to promote his loyalists to key positions 
within the military during the 2006 reshuffle season was a desperate, and 
ultimately futile, move to prolong the life of his government. According to a leaked 
US diplomatic cable, Anand Panyarachun argued that one of Thaksin’s major 
missteps was the decision to pick a fight with Prem. While Anand did not say 
directly that Thaksin was disrespecting the king, he believed the episode had 
intensified the growing view among some Thais that Thaksin had intended to 
undermine the monarchy (Wikileaks 21 September 2006). 
 
The 19 September 2006 Coup d’Etat 
 By the end of 2005, there had been a number of setbacks against Thaksin 
loyalists and members of AFAPS Class 10 within the military. Sonthi Boonyaratglin, 
the army commander-in-chief, had been promoted to this position in October 2005 
thanks to an intervention by Prem to prevent a Thaksin loyalist, Lertrat 
Ratanavanich, from taking this highly powerful job. Sonthi was known to be loyal to 
Privy Councillor Surayud Chulanont, though he was not particularly close to Prem 
(Chambers 2013: 262). Sonthi’s Muslim faith was also seen to be potentially helpful 
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in Thailand’s fight against insurgents in the three Muslim-majority provinces of 
Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). Nonetheless, in the same 
reshuffle season Thaksin managed to promote Anupong Paochinda, a Class 10 
member, to the important position of the commander of the 1st Army Region 
responsible for Bangkok and nearby provinces. Amidst the increasingly boisterous 
anti-government protest, Anupong’s promotion was a sign that Thaksin was seeking 
to shore up his authority in the most sensitive parts of the army. 
2006, however, was a year that saw Thaksin swiftly lose whatever leverage he 
had within the military. In the run-up to the 2 April election, Thaksin held a talk 
with General Sonthi in order to urge the army chief to cooperate with the 
government’s plan to declare a state of emergency and quell the PAD. Realising that 
the government was planning to shift the blame for any violence on the army, 
Sonthi flatly refused. He then remarked to journalists that the PAD protest was 
peaceful and lawful (Ockey 2007a: 136). This was followed, shortly after Prem made 
his ‘jockey’ speech, by Sonthi’s reshuffle of 129 mid-level army officers, a move that 
weakened the authority of a large number of Thaksin loyalists (Chambers 2013: 
267-268). The deteriorating relationship between Sonthi and the government gave 
rise to a rumour that Thaksin would push Sonthi to the powerless job of supreme 
commander in the 2006 reshuffle. Meanwhile, Saprang Kalayanamitr, the 3rd Army 
Region commander responsible for northern Thailand, which included Thaksin’s 
home province of Chiang Mai, began to speak out frequently against the 
government and even used the army radio network to air his anti-Thaksin views. 
Even Thaksin’s classmate Anupong was drifting away from Thaksin’s sphere of 
influence, fuelling more rumours that a military coup was looming (Chambers 2013: 
268-270). The worsening situation worried US diplomats in Thailand. On 1 
September 2006, Surayud himself felt compelled to defuse the coup rumour by 
describing Sonthi as “a solid professional and an unemotional person — not the type 
to carry out a coup” in a private conversation with the then US Ambassador to 
Thailand Ralph Boyce (Wikileaks 5 September 2006). In 2015, a prominent 
Thaksin-aligned politician claimed that he had realised since early 2006 the extent 
of Thaksin’s problems. He then tried to bring Thaksin “back from the brink” but was 
rebuked by fellow TRT members for doing so. Even when rumours of a military 
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coup began to pick up steam, key TRT figures remained undaunted, believing they 
could easily mobilise masses of people to defeat any military takeover.37 
Such confidence may have been based on the lingering influence of Class 10 
members and other Thaksin loyalists in the army, but it clearly was not enough to 
deter the eventual military coup on 19 September 2006. The army, led by Sonthi 
and supported mainly by troops under Anupong’s and Saprang’s command, seized 
power while Thaksin was attending a United Nations conference in New York. The 
three coup leaders, tacitly backed by Prem and Surayud, had withheld the coup plot 
from supreme commander Ruangroj Mahasaranon because Ruangroj had close ties 
with Thaksin’s cousin, former army commander Chaisit Shinawatra (Chambers 
2013: 261, 275-276). As in many of Thailand’s previous coups, the military 
portrayed its ouster of Thaksin as a necessary action for resolving an extraordinarily 
difficult situation. In this case, the 2006 coup was meant to put an end to the 
protracted political paralysis that engulfed the country since the second half of 2005 
(Ukrist 2008: 140). Among the Thai public, one of the most common justifications 
for the coup was that it was needed to prevent bloodshed that could have taken 
place in a clash between the PAD and security forces. The PAD had planned a major 
anti-Thaksin rally on 20 September 2006, and rumours circulated widely that the 
government would respond with a violent crackdown. Former premier Anand 
Panyarachun was one of those who held this belief (Wikileaks 21 September 2006). 
Coup leader Sonthi, in a meeting with a group of foreign envoys on 20 
September 2006, explained the rationale for the military’s move. A leaked US 
diplomatic cable records that he cited “a lack of political confidence; rampant 
nepotism; corruption; unprecedented social divisions in Thailand; the inability of 
administrative institutions to function properly without political interference; social 
injustice and offenses to the Thai monarch” as key reasons. He then added: “We 
have acted to solve the existing stalemate and remove uncertainty and lack of 
confidence which have existed for too long in Thailand”. It should be noted, though, 
that Sonthi seemed hardly assured of himself in that meeting. At one point he 
bizarrely said that Thaksin “had not done anything legally incorrect”. Instead of 
presenting a bullish image befitting a leader of a military coup, Sonthi was 
described as being “evasive” and generally lacking confidence. He also added that 
                                                             
37 Interview, Anonymous Thaksin-aligned politician 3, Bangkok, 21 October 2015 
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“certain facts” concerning Thaksin were a catalyst for the coup, but did not specify 
what they were (Wikileaks 20 September 2006a). In a steadier performance, 
General Winai Pattiyakul, the junta’s secretary general, told the US Ambassador in a 
private meeting on 29 September 2006 that “anyone with a few billion US dollars 
can take over Thailand easily”, referring to Thaksin’s wealth and his manipulation 
of the various organs of the 1997 constitution. Winai also acknowledged the 
damaging impact of the coup but asserted that there would have been greater 
damages if the military had not intervened (Wikileaks 29 September 2006). Sonthi 
himself would repeat many of these points in later interviews with the press. In 
September 2009, Sonthi said: “You have to understand what was going to happen 
on 20 September [2006]… Both sides were armed. [Who knew what] was going to 
happen to our country?” (Prachatai 14 September 2009). In 2016 he similarly 
claimed: “There would have been use of force on Sept. 20 against the anti-
government crowds. There would be violence, and my job was to take care of the 
internal security of the nation” (Khaosod English 18 September 2016). These quotes 
show that, in contrast to some in the older generation of army officers who tended 
to distance themselves from the 1991 coup and the 1992 bloodbath, Sonthi still 
would like the 2006 coup to be remembered positively. 
Despite the junta’s explanations, what was most remarkable about the 2006 
coup was how it was closely linked to royalism and the monarchical power network, 
both in symbolic and practical terms. The coup leaders, with Prem’s help, had a 
late-night audience with the king and the queen very soon after announcing the 
coup. The photo of their audience was made available to the public shortly 
afterwards (Ferrara 2015: 1). Prem’s role in arranging the audience was hinted at by 
Sonthi’s insistence that he had not sought to meet the king that night but had been 
“summoned” to the palace (Boyce 2006a). If the royal audience was meant to deter 
Thaksin from fighting back, it indeed worked as intended; Thaksin reputedly 
shelved a plan to retaliate against the coup group after learning of the king’s 
apparent endorsement of the coup (Ferrara 2015: 1-2). The Sonthi-led military 
junta even initially named itself the Council for Democratic Reform under the 
Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM), though this was later changed to the Council for 
National Security (CNS). Legal scholar Borwornsak Uwanno, who had joined the 
junta’s team, explained to the US ambassador that the name change was needed in 
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order to avoid “confusion concerning the King's role in the coup” (Wikileaks 25 
September 2006). Surayud Chulanont was named Prime Minister of the coup-
installed interim government, leaving the CNS, headed by Sonthi, in charge of 
security affairs and the country’ overall stability. Sonthi would later express his 
regret regarding this arrangement. According to a source close to him, if Sonthi had 
another chance, he would rather have taken the Prime Minister job himself because 
he felt his lack of direct executive power had restricted his ability to make an impact 
throughout the Surayud premiership.38 In Bowornsak’s conversation with the US 
ambassador, he noted that the CNS would have to exist and retain power alongside 
the interim government because of the need to prevent a potentially violent 
counter-coup by pro-Thaksin forces and to cope with the southern insurgency 
(Wikileaks 25 September 2006).  
The choice of Surayud, a Privy Councillor since 2003, as Prime Minister 
underscored the significant and highly visible role of Prem in the overthrow of 
Thaksin. In a leaked US diplomatic cable, Prem was described by the US 
ambassador as “relaxed, confident, and very pleased with the course of events” 
during their meeting on 25 September 2006 (Wikileaks 26 September 2006). Winai 
also remarked to the ambassador that Surayud was the right choice for Prime 
Minister whose military background should not be a cause for concern (Wikileaks 
29 September 2006). Another leaked US diplomatic cable revealed a conversation 
between former Bank of Thailand Governor Pridiyathorn Devakula and 
Ambassador Boyce. Pridiyathorn, who became Surayud’s Deputy Prime Minister 
and Finance Minister following the coup, told Boyce that the military had 
approached him before the coup to invite him to serve in a coup-installed 
administration (Boyce 2006b). Although he did not specify the exact time of his 
meeting with the military, this revelation shows that there was at least a certain 
amount of advance planning before the coup was launched. In 2012, when asked in 
a public political forum whether Prem had been involved in the 2006 coup, Sonthi 
said that some questions simply could never be answered even if he were to lose his 
own life from not answering them (Thai Rath 22 March 2012). 
 
                                                             
38 Interview, Anonymous retired army general formerly in the CNS military regime, 
Bangkok, 25 November 2015 
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Conclusion: A Coup that Exposes the Weaknesses of Thai Elitism 
It can be seen that despite the political dominance of the TRT government 
following the 2005 election, by the time of the 2006 coup Thaksin had been in a 
weakened position. Elements of the military had pushed back against his perceived 
interferences since 2005. His control of parliament and other state institutions did 
not help him much when it came to dealing with the highly determined PAD 
demonstrators. He made a strategic blunder when he sold Shin Corp. His gambit of 
calling a snap election failed to give him the advantages he needed as he was 
outsmarted by the opposition parties, leading the courts to declare the 2006 
election invalid. As Finer (1988: 64-76) points out in his classic work, a series of 
setbacks against a civilian government presents an army with an opportunity to 
intervene in politics. When asked by the US ambassador why the coup had to take 
place on 19 September 2006, coup leader Sonthi replied: “Thaksin was at his 
weakest and we were at our strongest” (Wikileaks 20 September 2006b). 
On the other hand, the fact that a military coup was needed to resolve the 
situation reflects a deeper crisis within the Thai political order. Specifically, the Thai 
polity before 2006 was bounded by a set of formal and informal rules that preserved 
the elite’s ability to shape political outcomes. When the Thai military suffered a 
catastrophic loss of legitimacy following the May 1992 violence, observers believed 
that democracy would be inevitable. Electoral politics indeed became a norm, and 
military generals mostly faded from the public view. The ensuing democratic system 
in Thailand, however, was a system of compromises, accommodating the interests 
of both elite and non-elite actors. The role of King Bhumibol in defusing the 1992 
crisis, while widely praised, also served to bolster elitism in Thai society by 
reminding the country that it was unable to solve its own problems through 
ordinary means. The 1997 constitution was meant to formalise the relationship 
between elite and non-elite forces in society, moving the country beyond the ad hoc 
arrangements of Post-1973 Democracy. However, aspects of the 1997 document 
inadvertently enabled the rise of Thaksin, a leader who then built his immense 
support base by tapping into the vast rural constituency. Whereas in the 1990s it 
was possible for the royalist establishment to exert great influence behind the 
scenes, as was the case when the Chavalit Yongchaiyudh government was replaced 
by the elite-favoured Chuan Leekpai government in 1997 (McCargo 2005: 510), 
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Thaksin did not need to rely on the elite because of his personal wealth and, more 
importantly, his formidable electoral support.  
Ultimately, Thaksin’s premiership was a logical outcome of the popular force 
unleashed by the 1973 event, and his time in office exposed the tensions related to 
the coexistence of elite-based legitimacy and popular legitimacy inherent in Thai 
politics. The rise of the people continually posed a threat to the privileges and 
interests of the elite, as illustrated by the fall of the 1991-1992 military regime. 
Thaksin’s aggressive accumulation of power, even attempting to build his own 
faction inside the military, provoked a series of elite-backed responses that 
culminated in the 2006 coup.  
The coup, undeniably, was a major event, but this characterisation does not 
mean that it was a moment of triumph for the Thai military and its allies among the 
Thai elite. Thaksin’s unprecedented electoral successes, his massive support among 
the poor and his eventual slide towards a centralised, authoritarian style of rule 
were all significant in putting him in a position to challenge the authority of the 
establishment. He deviated, in a way that threatened the elite’s privileges, from the 
political settlement centred on the 1997 constitution that accommodated the wishes 
of the elite while also, to some extent, meeting the country’s need to reform its 
political system.  The rise of Thaksin, thus, was a disruption to the prevailing Thai 
political order which since October 1973 had been shaped by royalist and military 
elites in many ways.  
Aspinall (2010: 22-25) argues that a coup is not necessarily an indication of a 
powerful military. A truly strong military, in his view, is one that can exert influence 
over politics without having to be responsible for its actions. Running the country 
directly, which is the case in a coup regime, would expose the military to criticisms 
and hostility that would inevitably follow. In the Thai case, the 2006 coup denotes a 
failure of the military and other elite actors to control the country from behind the 
scenes while facing growing threats to their power from Thaksin and his associates. 
Their anxiety, as a result, pushed them to proceed with a military coup while largely 
ignoring the costs of doing so. Ultimately, the coup did not only bring the military 
into frontline politics but also allowed the monarchy, a supposedly neutral and 
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sacred Thai institution, to be embroiled in the highly-charged political conflict 
related to the anti-Thaksin struggle. 
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Chapter 4  
 The Military after the 2006 Coup:  
Encountering Democratic Resilience, Part One  
 
“The way in which certain events come to be perceived 
as a crisis is always complex and always a political act, 
since it authorizes certain courses of action to resolve 
the crisis and restore stability or create a new order.” 
- Andrew Gamble (2009: 65) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first of a two-part analysis of the political role of the Thai 
military after the 2006 coup, focusing on the military’s efforts to manipulate politics 
both during the 2006-2007 military-appointed government and after the December 
2007 election, which marked the point of the formal transfer of governmental 
power to elected politicians. Taken together, this chapter and the next explore two 
broad themes. The first is the political assertiveness of the military, broadly 
understood as a willingness to re-establish itself as a central political actor and 
challenge the authority of the elected government. Secondly, this chapter and the 
next advocate adopting the notion of ‘democratic resilience’ when analysing 
Thailand’s post-2006 political development. In engaging with these two themes, 
these chapters reject the straightforward view that the 2006 coup had an 
unambiguously negative impact on Thai democracy. Instead, it will be argued that 
the coup, along with the military’s subsequent political intervention, provoked a 
strong response in the form of a new push for democratisation, which was part of a 
bitter, wide-ranging struggle between broadly pro-democratic and anti-democratic 
forces in the country. While this interpretation carries the risks of oversimplifying 
the multifaceted nature of the conflict and overstating the democratic credentials of 
certain actors, it avoids the pitfall of characterising the post-2006 developments as 
simply a period of democratic recession and a definitive return to the pre-1992 
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political dominance of the military and other unelected institutions. In other words, 
without taking the considerable role of elections and democratic discourse into 
account, it is not possible to truly understand the military’s political behaviour since 
the 2006 removal of Thaksin Shinawatra’s civilian government. 
Under the military-sponsored 2007 constitution, electoral politics was 
allowed, but the military and other elite actors made significant efforts to shape 
political outcomes and to restrict the authority of elected politicians, particularly 
those associated with the deposed Thaksin. Even after the coup-installed 
government of Surayud Chulanont stepped aside following the 2007 election, the 
military continued to be politically assertive. With the 1997 constitution abolished, 
the 2007 constitution introduced a political system that formally granted more 
power to various unelected, non-majoritarian institutions (Mair 2006: 27), 
ostensibly to prevent the rise of another dominant political party capable of 
translating large parliamentary majorities into unrestrained governmental powers, 
as had been the case under Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT). The military’s anti-
democratic measures enjoyed broad support from many of Thaksin’s opponents, 
including the tens of thousands who had participated in the campaign of the 
People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) against Thaksin’s TRT government in 2005-
2006. Following the coup, it appeared that Thailand’s democratic experiment of the 
1990s and early 2000s would be coming to an end, replaced by a regime that would 
allow elite-controlled actors to play a crucial role in the country’s political structure 
at the expense of popularly elected politicians. 
Thaksin himself refused to bow out of politics. Living in self-imposed exile, 
he retained control over two political parties that succeeded his former TRT party—
the People Power Party (PPP) and subsequently the Pheu Thai Party (PTP). 
Meanwhile, the role of the PAD in paving the way for the coup inspired the creation 
of the pro-Thaksin ‘Red Shirt’ mass movement, which went on to stage large 
demonstrations and became involved in violent clashes with security forces in 
Bangkok in 2009 and 2010. With the rise of the Red Shirts, Thailand entered a 
period of deep political polarisation as pro- and anti-Thaksin forces vigorously 
competed for power through elections, prolonged street protests and legal battles. 
From being an arguably consolidating democracy during the late 1990s and early 
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2000s, Thailand since early 2008 became crippled by periods of political crises, 
bouts of violence and seemingly endless street demonstrations. 
However, while the 2006 coup opened a way for non-elected actors to 
intervene in politics more forcefully, it also gave rise to other important 
developments that strongly threatened the military’s and the elite’s long-term 
hegemony over Thai society and politics. One significant aspect of these 
developments was the fact that democratic practices and discourse played a large 
role in attempts by the military’s adversaries—which included not only Thaksin and 
his allies but also other groups not necessarily associated with Thaksin—to counter 
the effects of the coup. While for some observers the main story of Thailand’s post-
2006 politics was the ‘rollback’ of democracy (for example see Thitinan 2012: 47), it 
will be argued here that the resilience of democracy among some key actors also 
shaped Thai politics significantly. Thus, the concept of democratic resilience 
provides a valuable tool for understanding the situation in Thailand after the 2006 
coup. An exploration of the military’s political role during this period needs to 
involve an analysis of how the military managed its encounters and interactions 
with opponents who employed democratic methods and framed their struggle in 
democratic terms. 
At the same time, to discuss the resilience of democracy does not mean that 
Thailand’s democratisation did not suffer a setback as a result of the 2006 coup. 
The military clearly employed a series of authoritarian measures to dismantle 
Thaksin’s political influence, and many of the changes that took place after the coup 
were detrimental to Thailand’s democratic prospects. Rather, the resilience of 
democracy can be found in the emergence of actors who incorporated democratic 
ideas and methods in their fight to protect or advance their interests in the years 
following the coup. In this sense, the 2006 coup cannot be portrayed as a wholly 
negative development for Thai democracy. Rather, this chapter argues that while 
the coup represented a setback for Thai democracy, in some ways the coup 
ironically highlighted enduring aspects of Thai democracy such as the importance of 
elections and the attractiveness of democratic ideals. In other words, some of the 
effects of the coup were not what the military had expected. Scholars such as Suchit 
(2013: 178) and Ferrara (2015: 220-265) also made observations regarding 
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unintended consequences of the 2006 coup although they did not base their views 
on the notion of democratic resilience. 
 The current chapter focuses on developments during the coup-appointed 
government of Surayud Chulanont and the elected governments of Samak 
Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat. The next chapter will analyse the events 
under the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva and the rise of the ‘Red Shirt’ movement. 
These two chapters together form a single narrative, offering an argument that the 
2006 coup led to a new episode in Thai politics in which the military continually 
struggled to contain democratic currents and aspirations among its opponents. This 
chapter firstly explores the notion of democratic resilience and contrasts it with the 
idea of democratic rollback often present in the democratisation literature. 
Secondly, the chapter analyses anti-democratic efforts by the military and the 
appointed government of Surayud Chulanont. Thirdly, the chapter discusses 
developments during the pro-Thaksin governments of Samak Sundaravej and 
Somchai Wongsawat which assumed power following the December 2007 election. 
These events from 2006-2008 serve to highlight the growing assertiveness of the 
military as well as the considerable degree of democratic resilience in Thai politics. 
 
Democratic Resilience as a Counterpoint to the Democratic Recession 
Narrative 
When the late scholar of democratisation Guillermo O’Donnell (2007) wrote about 
what he called ‘the perpetual crises of democracy’, he was not seeking to add his 
voice to the growing feeling at the time that democracy’s expansion around the 
globe was coming to an end. Rather, he pointed out that the pessimistic narrative of 
democracy’s failures was not the whole story of what was going on in the world. 
Instead of endlessly questioning why democracy did not seem to work in some 
places, it would be more fruitful, he believed, to focus on the enduring appeal of 
democratic ideals. Such ideals, he believed, continued to appeal to a large number 
of people, and even dictators felt compelled to try to dress up their rule as 
democratic. In his words, “we see authoritarian rulers making sometimes amazing 
contortions to persuade the world… that their right to rule flows from the holding of 
free elections” (O’Donnell 2007: 6). From this perspective, the co-optation of 
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democracy by authoritarian rulers represents democracy’s strengths rather than 
weaknesses. 
 This theme of democracy’s resilience has largely been missing from recent 
accounts of global democratisation that seek to highlight democracy’s failures more 
than its successes. Diamond (2008: 36-37) identified several countries where 
democracy was eroded and weakened such as Nigeria, Venezuela and Thailand, 
arguing that the world in the first decade of the twenty-first century was undergoing 
an era of ‘democratic recession’. Later, Diamond (2016: 151-152) went on to argue 
that democracy’s problems over the past fifteen years include not just outright 
breakdowns of democratic regimes but also the growing repressiveness of 
authoritarian governments and the stagnation of democratic progress in post-
authoritarian countries. Similarly, Plattner (2015: 8) observes that democracy’s 
future has been put in doubt by the 2008 financial crisis which inflicted great 
damages upon the economy of most democracies in the West, whereas some 
autocratic countries apparently coped better with the adverse global economic 
conditions. Meanwhile, the expected journey towards full democracy failed to occur 
in many semi-democratic regimes, undermining the inherently teleological 
predictions evident in much of the democratisation literature.  In light of this, 
Ambrosio (2014: 471-473) argues that it is more fruitful to focus on how 
authoritarian regimes remain stable than to view them as perennial candidates for 
democratisation. Recent developments such as the protracted crisis in the European 
Union, Russia’s growing foreign policy ambition and China’s increasing 
assertiveness over its territorial claim in the South China Sea have bolstered the 
idea that autocracy is on the rise. 
 There are good reasons, however, to critique the above viewpoint or take a 
more nuanced stance. Deudney and Ikenberry (2009: 82-87), for example, argue 
that accounts of autocracy’s successes are generally flawed because they tend to 
focus too much on short-term changes. This is problematic because those accounts 
largely ignore the possibility that internal contradictions of authoritarian regimes—
such as the difficulties in balancing economic successes with the need to suppress 
political rights—can weaken them in the long term. For Levitsky and Way (2015: 
56), not only is the idea of democracy’s decline exaggerated, but there has not been 
sufficient academic attention on the resilience of democratic regimes in difficult 
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conditions such as the cases of Brazil, India, Mexico and Taiwan. Furthermore, 
Carothers (2009: 3) cautions against the simplistic tendency to view democracy as 
either making progress or being in decline. Such a viewpoint, he argues, obscures 
the significance of democratic regimes that do not appear to ‘progress’ but still 
persevere in challenging circumstances. 
Although these authors address broad developments across multiple 
countries, their arguments can still provide guidance for our analysis of Thailand’s 
political situation. Just as Duedney and Ikenberry (2009) warn against focusing too 
narrowly at short-term indicators of democratic backsliding, analysts of Thai 
politics should refrain from making definitive conclusions on the state of Thai 
democracy based only on the 2006 coup and its aftermath. Similarly, following 
Levitsky and Way (2015), it is unwise to overlook the endurance of certain aspects 
of Thai democracy after the military’s overthrow of Thaksin. This chapter adopts a 
perspective that recognises both the anti-democratic results of the coup and the role 
of the coup itself in triggering subsequent pro-democratic changes. 
 We now turn to the questions of how we should understand democratic 
resilience and how we can apply that understanding to the Thai case. Burnell and 
Calvert (1999: 4) distinguish between the ‘durability’ and the ‘resilience’ of 
democracy. In their view, the durability of democracy can be detected when 
“effective resistance is mounted in the face of a serious challenge, shock or threat to 
democracy, so preventing a more or less total recession and complete loss of 
democratic credentials other than on a temporary or exceptional basis” (1999: 4). 
The resilience of democracy refers to a situation: 
where an attachment to democratic ideals persists and such ideals 
continue to be canvassed in some quarters, in spite of hostility from the 
officially prescribed values and norms and apparent indifference from 
many elements in society. The persistence of the faith can be evident 
even where the institutional forms have been lost. What is particularly 
impressive is where this entails paying a high price in terms of threats to 
personal security or derogations of personal liberty - the sort of 
privations endured by Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar (Burma), for 
example. Such resilience is of special interest where considerable 
propaganda and other resources are invested by the state in discrediting 
democratic goals, and even more so if the people have no historical 
memory of sustained and successful democratic politics. (1999: 4) 
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Thus, in this conceptualisation the resilience of democracy is associated mainly with 
the persistence of democratic values and ideas among some sectors of the 
population even when democratic institutions have broken down. When democratic 
actors put up resistance to serious challenges to democracy but the democratic 
regime itself has not completely or permanently broken down, Burnell and Calvert 
call it democratic durability. As the 2006 coup represented a breakdown of 
democracy in Thailand, the notion of democratic resilience is more relevant for our 
investigation. 
 
CNS Rule and Democratic Backsliding 
Elite Politics and the Formation of the Surayud Government 
The military’s overthrow of Thaksin put an end to months of protests by the PAD 
and restored a degree of calm to the country. The Council for National Security 
(CNS) junta, appearing to follow the example of the previous coup in 1991, was 
quick to announce that it intended to stay in power only temporarily, promising to 
draft a new constitution within a year and holding a new election shortly afterwards 
(Manager 19 September 2015). CNS leaders were not visibly concerned with 
criticisms and condemnation from the international community. The US, for 
example, announced a $24 million cut in military aid to Thailand, while UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan also voiced his disapproval of the coup (Thai Rath 2 
June 2014). After several days of speculations, the Prime Minister job went to 
former army chief Surayud Chulanont. The appointment of Surayud, who had 
become a Privy Councillor in 2003 and was widely known to be a protégé of Prem 
Tinsulanond, underscored the pervasive influence of Prem in the anti-Thaksin 
efforts both before and after the coup. 
One of the clearest signs of democratic backsliding is when a large part of 
politics is concerned with a small group of powerful elite figures. The role of Prem 
highlighted the significance of elite forces behind the CNS regime. Globally, elite 
cohesion tends to be an important source of support for authoritarianism. The 
survival of an authoritarian regime often depends on the backing it has from a small 
group of elite actors more than the support from the wider population. As Ezrow 
and Frantz point out (2011: 82), “nearly 80 percent of the time dictators are ousted 
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by internal coups rather than by popular uprisings.” Throughout the history of 
Thailand, mass uprisings have been rare. Before the 2006 coup, only the 
demonstrations in 1973, 1992 and 2005-2006 could be regarded as having played a 
pivotal role in toppling a seemingly invincible regime. The strongest threats to 
Prem’s own spell as Prime Minister during the ‘semi-democratic’ 1980s did not 
come from the general public but from the Young Turks military clique who staged 
two failed coup attempts against him. The military-appointed government of Anand 
Panyarachun in 1991-1992 could govern relatively smoothly, and the mass uprising 
against the military only occurred after the junta’s leader Suchinda Kraprayoon 
broke his vow of never seeking a formal political position. Similarly, discussions of 
the CNS regime need to be complemented by a focus on the role of elite figures and 
the extent of their unity or disunity. 
To mention the level of cohesion among Thai elite actors is not to say that 
there were absolutely no frictions between them. The Thai elite is far from a 
homogeneous bloc and there were always power struggles and competing interests. 
The crucial point, however, is any tensions that occurred during CNS rule never 
became strong enough to split the elite into warring factions and destabilise the 
regime. As such, the junta could achieve most of its major aims, particularly the 
passage of the 2007 constitution, by relying on the degree of consensus that existed 
among elite actors. 
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the nominal leader of the military junta, 
represents an interesting case of the power play at the elite level. On 26 October 
2006, Sonthi outlined his vision regarding the future of Thailand’s political 
landscape. Expressing his beliefs in ‘unique’ features of Thailand and its people, he 
argued that the country needed a political system that suited Thai characteristics. 
He described Western-style democracy as inappropriate for Thai society, rejecting 
the notion that Thailand should incorporate elements of foreign political systems in 
its constitutional design. Sonthi also echoed the oft-repeated, but little explained, 
mantra that Thai people naturally lacked discipline and thus should not be granted 
self-rule. A priority for Thailand, he believed, would be to develop the capacity of its 
people so that they could understand “true principles” of democracy (Prachatai 27 
October 2006). It turned out, however, that his opportunity to implement these 
visions was limited. 
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Despite his status as the junta’s head, his influence was constrained 
throughout most of the eighteen months of CNS rule. Sonthi did not become a 
cabinet minister until 1 October 2007, serving out the last four months of the 
Surayud government (Prachatai 3 October 2007). In interviews over several years 
after the end of the CNS era, he alternately defended the coup and distanced himself 
from it. When pressed in a 2009 interview (Prachatai 14 September 2009), he 
refused to say that it had been his idea alone to stage the coup, cryptically hinting 
that revealing the ‘truth’ would cause more conflict in the country. He also criticised 
Surayud’s government in the same interview for being overly cautious and, 
ironically, for failing to emulate Thaksin’s energetic style. In a 2015 interview, 
Sonthi even remarked that the CNS “had no control” over Surayud’s government, 
claiming that the military’s full control over the country had ended upon Surayud 
assuming the premiership two weeks after the coup (Matichon 3 August 2015). 
Nonetheless, according to a source close to him, Sonthi still believed the coup was 
justifiable because it was an appropriate solution to the problems at the time.39 In 
later years, Sonthi developed closer ties with politicians and became the leader of 
the small Matubhum Party, entering Parliament as an elected MP from 2011 to 
2014. His attitudes towards politicians also grew more favourable. According to the 
same source, Sonthi had become more sympathetic to the needs of a typical MP who 
has to keep a busy schedule and maintain a large budget to satisfy voters.40  
Sonthi’s ultimately marginal role in the CNS regime, along with his eventual 
mediocre political career, may appear to cast him as a victim of intra-elite 
machinations. However, there are reasons to regard him as a loser, rather than an 
innocent victim, in the power struggle emanating from the coup. This is chiefly 
because, despite public denials, he began to harbour his own political ambition not 
long after the coup and this put him into a conflict with Surayud and Prem. As 
revealed in a leaked US diplomatic cable (Wikileaks 24 April 2007), Sonthi had 
made plans to oust Surayud since as early as April 2007 according to Democrat 
Party (DP) Secretary-General Suthep Thaugsuban. Suthep also claimed that Sonthi 
had offered to make him a cabinet minister should Sonthi manage to become Prime 
                                                             
39 Interview, Anonymous retired army general formerly in the CNS military regime, 
Bangkok, 25 November 2015 
40 Interview, Anonymous retired army general formerly in the CNS military regime, 
Bangkok, 25 November 2015 
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Minister himself. While Suthep turned down the offer, he noted that Sonthi had 
been considering a ‘national unity’ government which would comprise politicians 
from pro- and anti-Thaksin parties. This would be a clear contrast to Surayud’s 
technocrat-dominated administration which, as discussed below, excluded 
politicians. Sonthi appeared to be frustrated by Surayud’s perceived 
underachievement and reluctance to make full use of the government’s coup-given 
power. Yet Surayud could afford to operate by his own rules because he continued 
to be favoured by Prem. According to Suthep, Prem’s displeasure with Sonthi’s 
scheme to unseat Surayud was such that at one point Prem shunned Sonthi when 
they met in April 2007 (Wikileaks 24 April 2007). 
Surayud’s cabinet consisted mainly of senior technocrats and career 
bureaucrats, earning the moniker khing kae (‘old ginger’) from the Thai press in 
reference to the advanced ages of many of the ministers. The government was quick 
to bolster its royalist credentials by proclaiming that it would adopt King 
Bhumibol’s ‘sufficiency economy’ principles as its guiding ideology (McCargo 2008: 
350). In the beginning, Surayud’s government was notable for the fact that only 
three cabinet positions were filled by military officers, all of whom, including 
Surayud himself, had retired from active military careers several years before the 
coup. For comparison, Anand Panyarachun’s government, created by the 1991 coup, 
was widely praised in Thailand for its technocratic competence but it had eight 
cabinet ministers with military background. On the surface, the relative lack of 
military generals in Surayud’s cabinet was an apparent sign that the junta valued 
competence and personal ability over crude cronyism. However, there are reasons 
to believe that many of Surayud’s ministers were not chosen on a purely 
meritocratic basis. As noted by Supalak (2007: 280-281), several ministers had 
personal connections with Surayud and Prem. Deputy Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister Pridiyathorn Devekula was Surayud’s fellow graduate of Saint Gabriel’s 
College, a leading high school in Bangkok. Deputy Prime Minister Kosit Panpiemras 
had long-term links with Prem stretching back to the 1980s. Minister of 
Information and Communications Technology Sitthichai Pokai-udom was well-
regarded within military circles thanks to his earlier army-related research projects. 
Science Minister Yongyut Yuttawong was Surayud’s high school friend. Deputy 
Interior Minister Banyad Chansena was another long-term associate of Prem. 
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Defence Minister General Boonrod Somthat, one of the few ministers with military 
backgrounds, was Surayud’s classmate at Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy. 
In short, while most of the ministers could reasonably claim to be qualified for their 
jobs, personal links with Surayud and his mentor Prem appeared to have played a 
strong part in determining cabinet positions. 
While the cabinet was mostly military-free, leading members of the CNS as 
well as other senior generals were given important and, in the generally corrupt 
world of Thai bureaucracy, potentially lucrative jobs (Hewison 2007a: 245; 
Hewison 2007b: 941). General Saprang Kalayanamitr, the most outspoken critic of 
Thaksin within the junta, became chair of two of the largest state-owned enterprises 
in the country, TOT (formerly known as Telephone Organisation of Thailand but 
now simply called TOT) and AOT (Airports of Thailand). His appointment in 
January 2007 to the chair of the board of TOT, a major state-owned 
telecommunications enterprise, gave him responsibility over a key strategic sector 
of the country’s economy. Moreover, considering that Thaksin’s business empire 
had been based in telecommunications, Saprang would have an opportunity to 
oversee changes in regulations and policy that could directly affect Thaksin’s 
interests. Besides, the CNS ensured that many other state enterprise chairmanships 
were also given to high-ranking military officers. ACM Chalit Pukpasuk, a senior 
CNS member, was awarded the chairmanship of the board of Thai Airways, the 
national flag-carrier. Admiral Sathirapan Kaeyanont, another senior member of the 
junta, was awarded the chairmanship of the board of Port Authority of Thailand. 
ACM Sommai Dabpetch became chair of the board of CAT Telecom, another major 
telecommunications body (Supalak 2007: 284). Compared to other appointments, 
Saprang’s appointment to the top jobs in two of the most significant state 
enterprises in the country were the most eye-catching and underscored his 
influence in the military at the time. The two jobs may also have helped to placate 
him when he eventually missed out on becoming army chief in the September 2007 
military promotions season. 
In addition to cabinet and state enterprise positions, supporters of the coup 
were allocated seats in other junta-established bodies, three of which, the National 
Legislative Assembly (NLA), the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) and the 
Asset Scrutiny Commitee (ASC) will be briefly discussed here. The first of these 
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bodies, the NLA, was created to serve as the nominal legislative branch of 
government. The NLA consisted of 242 members, of whom 79 were serving or 
retired military or police officers (Insight Foundation 2014). Individual members of 
the NLA had little power as the legislative agenda had already been shaped by the 
junta and the government. Veteran legal expert Meechai Ruchuphan was appointed 
Speaker of the NLA (Royal Gazette 26 October 2006) A reliable conservative figure, 
Meechai would later chair another iteration of the Constitution Drafting Committee 
set up by the leaders of the 2014 coup. Other notable members of the NLA included 
Chamlong Srimuang, one of the PAD’s core leaders, and future coup leader Prayuth 
Chan-ocha. As for the junta itself, none of its members sat in the NLA. This was in 
contrast to the previous iteration of the NLA that had existed during the 1991-1992 
military regime of the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC). During that time, 
three senior members of the NPKC, namely Suchinda Kraprayun, Sawat 
Amornwiwat and Kaset Rojananil, had seats in the Assembly. (Insight Foundation 
2014).  
The second body, the CDC, was created in February 2007 to oversee the 
drafting of a new constitution to replace the abolished 1997 constitution. It 
comprised 35 members drawn mainly from the academia, the bureaucracy and the 
judiciary. Only two members, Attaporn Charoenphanich and Prasong Sunsiri, had 
military backgrounds (Royal Gazette 22 February 2007). Prasong, a former senior 
figure in the Thai security apparatus who later entered politics, had long been an 
outspoken critic of Thaksin and had aligned with the PAD (Connors 2008: 481). 
The third body, the ASC, was a committee equipped with the power to investigate 
alleged corruption and wrongdoings of the Thaksin government. Initially the junta 
appointed Sawas Chotipanich, a former Supreme Court President and former 
Election Commissioner, to head an eight-member ASC. The other members were 
supposed to be drawn from existing members of other state institutions such as the 
Office of the Auditor-General, the Office of the Attorney General and the National 
Counter Corruption Commission (Royal Gazette 24 September 2006). However, the 
junta bizarrely abolished this iteration of the ASC merely a week later and replaced 
it with a new twelve-member ASC. Instead of appointing officials from other bodies, 
the junta specifically named twelve individuals as members of the new ASC. Sawas 
was one of the twelve but resigned from the post shortly afterwards. The other 
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members included known Thaksin adversaries such as Jaruvan Methaka, Klanarong 
Chantik, Nam Yimyaem, Sak Kosaengrueang and Kaewsan Atibodhi (Royal Gazette 
30 September 2006). Taken together, the NLA, the CDC and the ASC constituted a 
way for the junta to reward its supporters who were not in its inner circle or had 
other reasons for missing out on cabinet and state enterprise positions. As observers 
including Farrelly (2013: 290-291) and Veerayooth (2016: 491-492) have noted, 
Thai coup leaders can typically rely on the fact that many members of the 
professional and official elite are not only tolerant of military interventions but also 
willing to help legitimise military rule by accepting appointments to state bodies. 
Ultimately, the coup-established regime was not a homogeneous bloc but was 
a coalition of interests. While the regime included actors and groups that did not 
always have the same goals, they shared a broad preference for military-dominated 
political stability that enabled them to advance their agendas and benefit from state 
power. The situation resembled a description by Marquez (2017: 47) of a typical 
authoritarian regime. In his words, “authoritarian regimes can be understood 
generally as ‘cartels’ of distinct but mutually dependent groups that prefer to limit 
political competition despite many differences in values or preferred policies.” As 
long as divisions within the ruling group are kept under control, such a regime can 
survive for an extended period of time. 
 
Reshaping Democracy: Dismantling the Thaksin Machine 
Curbing the vast influence of Thaksin was one of the top priorities of the CNS 
regime. The 1997 constitution was generally seen as a key enabler of Thaksin’s 
ability to forge a strong government that trampled over various institutions of 
horizontal accountability as well as civil society and the media (Wigell 2008: 247; 
Bogaards 2009: 404; Hewison 2007b: 935). As Nelson (2017: 52) puts it, the regime 
aimed to “use this coup-generated exclusion from power of the Thaksin-aligned 
forces in order to redesign the rules of the game in a way that would reduce the 
election-based power of Thaksin Shinawatra, and increase the power of the 
establishment forces.”  
In what would eventually become the 2007 constitution, many elements of 
the 1997 constitution were kept but some principles were changed in significant 
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ways. In a continuation of the phenomenon that McCargo (1998: 5) has called 
‘permanent constitutionalism’, the CNS appeared to believe that most of what it 
perceived to be Thailand’s immediate problems could be resolved by drawing up yet 
another constitution. In this case, whereas the 1997 constitution was a reaction to 
the weak governments of the 1990s (Apichat 2017: 301-302), the junta’s 
constitution would be a response to the years of power concentration under 
Thaksin. Putting faith in a constitution as a problem-solving instrument reflected 
the kind of top-down thinking that had long afflicted many in the Thai elite. As 
noted by Hewison (2007b: 940), the junta-appointed NLA, CDC and ASC were 
precisely products of this kind of worldview because these bodies excluded 
representatives of workers, farmers and even political parties.  
It would be too simplistic to say that the 2007 constitution was a complete 
abandonment of its 1997 predecessor. In fact, as pro-junta figures such as CDC 
member Somkid Lertpaitoon contended, the 2007 charter retained some 
progressive elements from the 1997 document and even offered improvements in 
terms of people’s political rights (Connors 2008: 484). Examples of such 
improvements included the removal of the university degree requirement for 
parliamentary candidates and the reduction in the number of signatures needed for 
citizens to propose a draft bill to Parliament from 50,000 to 10,000 (Hicken 2007: 
155; Prachatai 4 August 2007). 
However, those improvements were relatively small and paled in comparison 
to other changes. The true overriding concern for the military and the constitution 
drafter was the desire to prevent a repeat of Thaksin’s political dominance. As it 
turned out, the new constitution was expected to help achieve this in two main 
ways. First, there would be provisions to reduce the power of the executive and 
increase that of the judiciary, independent agencies and the Senate. Second, the 
electoral system for both the House of Representatives and the Senate would be 
changed in order to increase the likelihood of parliamentary fragmentation and 
weaken Thaksin’s power base (Thitinan 2008: 145). To gain democratic legitimacy, 
the draft constitution would then be put to a nationwide referendum in which 
people would have a chance to accept or reject the draft. It eventually passed the 
referendum on 19 August 2007, although the referendum was heavily controlled 
and opportunities for campaigning for a ‘no’ vote were tightly restricted (McCargo 
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2008: 338). The junta also failed to clearly specify what would happen if the draft 
was rejected, leading to suspicions that a new election would be delayed unless the 
referendum produced a victory for the ‘yes’ vote. 
Among the clearest indications of the anti-democratic effects of the 2006 
coup were the changes made to the Senate. The 1997 constitution introduced a fully 
elected Senate in Thailand for the first time, but the supposedly non-partisan body 
later became dominated by the pro-Thaksin force. Having control over the Senate 
helped Thaksin to consolidate his power because Senators played a major role in 
selecting members of powerful independent agencies (Chambers 2009: 16-17). The 
2007 charter retained the principle of an influential upper chamber but turned the 
Senate into a half-elected, half-appointed body. The 150-member Senate would 
consist of 76 elected members and 74 appointed members. While a possibility of a 
return to a fully appointed chamber in the mould of pre-1997 systems was discussed 
among the drafters, this was rejected because the drafters feared that it would prove 
too unpopular with the public (Nelson 2017: 60-62). Each of Thailand’s 76 
provinces at the time41 would elect one Senator using a first-past-the-post electoral 
system, unlike the 1997 system which allocated senatorial seats to each province 
proportionally based on population sizes. 
The re-introduction of appointed Senators was controversial. Even critics of 
Thaksin such as former Senators Chirmsak Pinthong and Karun Sai-ngam argued 
against the idea, believing that any appointment process would be afflicted by 
cronyism and patronage (Chambers 2009: 25). CDC member Somkid defended the 
idea by noting that upper chambers in democratic countries such as Britain, 
Belgium and India also consisted of appointed members (Prachatai 4 August 
2007). Somkid clearly ignored the fact that Thailand’s 2007 constitution envisioned 
a much more powerful Senate than the upper chambers in the democracies he 
mentioned, meaning that there were stronger reasons to be concerned with the 
popular legitimacy of the Thai Senate.  
At the same time, the process for appointing Senators reflected the shift of 
political power towards the courts. The new constitution explicitly politicised 
Thailand’s courts by including in the Senator selection process the president of the 
                                                             
41 A new province, Bueng Kan, was later created in March 2011. 
 
 
113 
Constitutional Court, a representative from the Supreme Court and a representative 
from the Supreme Administrative Court (Chambers 2009: 25). Other members of 
the selection panel were the president of the Election Commission, the president of 
the Office of the Auditor-General, the president of the National Counter Corruption 
Commission and the Parliamentary Ombudsman. Bizarrely, the 2007 charter also 
specified that the Senate itself would be involved in the selection of members of 
these bodies. As Hicken observes (2007: 144), this effectively means that Senators 
and the selection panel would appoint each other, raising a clear possibility of a 
conflict of interest and a quid pro quo. The government, meanwhile, would be 
completely cut off from these processes. In the earlier era of a wholly appointed 
Senate in the 1980s and 1990s, the Prime Minister was involved in the selection 
process of Senators but he or she would have no such power at all under the 2007 
constitution (Hicken 2007: 144-145). As such, the 2007 constitution not only turned 
the Senate into a half-appointed body but also strengthened the role of other 
unelected organs of the state at the expense of the elected government and 
Parliament. 
The electoral system for the House of Representatives, along with its 
composition, was also modified. One of the key issues the 2007 drafters had with 
the 1997 constitution was how its electoral system, specifically the party list 
component, had made it possible to tally the number of nationwide votes won by 
each party. After the landslide victory of Thai Rak Thai in the 2005 election, 
Thaksin was fond of boasting publicly about the unprecedented number of votes 
won by TRT nationally. The drafters expressed a belief that anyone making a claim 
of a national mandate was somehow challenging the monarchy’s traditional 
authority (Nelson 2017: 56). The 2007 document replaced single-member 
constituencies with multi-member constituencies, a system used in Thailand prior 
to the 1997 constitution. The total number of MPs was reduced from 500 to 480, 
with 400 coming from constituency seats and 80 from the party list portion. The 
national party list system used under the 1997 constitution was replaced by a 
regional list system in which the country’s provinces were grouped into eight 
regions, each of which would elect 10 MPs. As Hicken points out (2007: 151-152), 
these changes appeared to have been designed to increase the likelihood of political 
fragmentation and multi-party coalition governments. 
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Five other notable attempts to break up Thaksin’s political machine during 
CNS rule will be discussed here. The first is concerned with the financial assets of 
Thaksin and his family. The sale of Shin Corp in February 2006, along with other 
allegations of corruption, provided a significant ammunition for his opponents in 
their attempt to target his wealth (Ockey 2008: 21). The aforementioned ASC then 
decided to seize almost $1.7 billion worth of assets belonging to Thaksin’s family 
(Dressel 2010: 681). Packed with Thaksin’s opponents and empowered by the junta 
to investigate corruption cases specifically related to Thaksin, the ASC clearly lacked 
the neutrality and credibility required in a typical justice system and ended up as 
another political tool of the junta. 
The second attempt, the dissolution of Thai Rak Thai along with giving its 
executives a five-year ban from politics in May 2007, was a continuation of the 
growing political role of the judiciary, a trend that had largely begun with the courts’ 
annulment of the April 2006 election. Although the CNS used its power to abolish 
the existing Constitutional Court immediately after the coup, the junta later set up a 
Constitutional Tribunal to perform the role of the old Constitutional Court. It was 
clear from the beginning that the Tribunal was expected to play a chiefly political 
role. The junta’s interim constitution granted the Tribunal the power to dissolve a 
political party if at least one of its executives was found guilty of electoral fraud. As 
noted by Dressel (2010: 680-681), many of the Tribunal’s nine members were well-
known critics of Thaksin, leading to accusations that political considerations rather 
than legal merits were key factors in the Tribunal’s operation. The case that led to 
the dissolution of TRT was related to electoral irregularities during the April 2006 
election campaign. The Democrat Party, which faced a similar charge in a separate 
case, was acquitted. McCargo (2014: 428-429) argues that the Tribunal’s ruling, 
which not only dissolved TRT but also banned all of its 111 executives from holding 
political offices for five years, was more severe than what General Sonthi expected 
and even contradicted King Bhumibol’s wish.  
The military’s third attempt at weakening Thaksin was to covertly encourage 
the splintering of Thaksin’s political group. In another sign of Sonthi’s political 
ambition, he and some other associates entertained an idea of establishing a 
successor party. Having made plans to allow the resumption of electoral politics in 
December 2007, the military did not wish to leave the electoral field to politicians 
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but actively sought to influence it. While the military never openly declared its 
support for any particular party, members of the CNS, most prominently Sonthi and 
General Winai Pattiyakul, took steps to lure a number of former TRT politicians to 
join the military’s side. This plan was made easier by the fact that some TRT 
members did not have much loyalty toward Thaksin in the first place. As Thaksin 
had tolerated factionalism within TRT for much of its existence, a number of TRT 
members were more loyal to their faction leaders than to Thaksin. Winai, a close 
friend of Sonthi, was identified by Chambers (2013a: 294) as a key organiser of 
various deals encouraging former TRT members to split from Thaksin’s side. 
Regarding the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling, McCargo (2014: 429) notes that 
Sonthi probably wished to see only a limited number of TRT executives banned by 
the Constitutional Tribunal because the military had developed a plan to form a new 
party around a core group of politicians led by Somsak Thepsutin, one of the several 
former TRT members who had headed their own factions. Such a plan would 
become complicated if too many TRT members got banned. Somsak and his 
followers eventually formed the Matchimatippatai party.  
Another party rumoured to be linked to the military during this time was 
Puea Pandin, a party created in 2007 mainly by another group of former TRT 
members who had defected from the Thaksin camp. These included former Foreign 
Minister Surakiart Satirathai, former Public Health Minister Pinit Charusombat and 
former Minister for Prime Minister’s Office Suranand Vejjajiva. Allegations soon 
swirled in the Thai press regarding the party’s origin. A piece in Manager (8 May 
2009) was one of the many media reports highlighting the rumour that the party 
had been backed by “an influential figure in the CNS”. A senior figure in the Thaksin 
side also expressed a belief that Puea Pandin had been backed by the military,42 
while the name of Pinit was also mentioned by DP’s Suthep Thaugsuban as one of 
the politicians recruited by Sonthi and Winai in their efforts to create a political 
vehicle for the CNS (Wikileaks 24 April 2007). Yet another party, Pracharaj, was 
formed by another former TRT faction leader Sanoh Thienthong. Sanoh had already 
fallen out with Thaksin by late 2005 and appeared likely to leave TRT. 
As for the Democrat Party, it escaped punishment by the Constitutional 
Tribunal and remained virtually unaffected by other post-coup developments. The 
                                                             
42 Interview, Anonymous Thaksin-aligned politician 2, Bangkok, 9 October 2015 
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military’s scheme appeared to be to create a favourable electoral playing field for the 
Democrats in the expectation that DP would be able to form a coalition government 
with other non-Thaksin parties, thus keeping Thaksin’s force out of power. Winai’s 
son, Sakolthee Pattiyakul, also joined DP and ran for Parliament in a Bangkok 
constituency in the 2007 election (Chambers 2013a: 295). Even if the election 
produced yet another Thaksin victory, his government would still be constrained by 
the Senate, independent agencies and the newly invigorated judiciary. 
The fourth attempt to undermine Thaksin was the changes made to the 
military reshuffle process. The process of appointing, promoting and transferring 
high-ranking military officers—that is, from the rank of brigadier general and 
above—had previously been an official responsibility of the government of the day. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, however, military reshuffles tended to be an 
important site of struggle for power and influence among Thailand’s political and 
military leaders. Thaksin, as he himself had admitted, had sought to promote 
friends and classmates to key positions in the armed forces, though a Thaksin 
associate said that Prem had always retained the final say over every reshuffle 
during the TRT era.43 Although Thaksin was ultimately unsuccessful in preventing a 
military coup against himself, the CNS still wished to take the power over reshuffles 
back into the military’s hands. In one of the junta’s final acts, the reshuffle process 
of high-ranking military officers was changed so that instead of the government 
having decision-making authority over it, the process would now need to be vetted 
and approved by a seven-person committee consisting of the commanders of the 
army, navy, air force, the supreme commander, the permanent secretary of the 
Ministry of Defence, the Defence Minister, and the Deputy Defence Minister 
(Chambers 2013b: 75). Only the last two of those would be from the civilian 
government whereas the first five members would be from the military. These 
changes would sharply limit the government’s influence over the reshuffle process 
and were apparently geared towards preventing a repeat of Thaksin-style 
‘interferences’ in military appointments. Following Croissant et al (2010: 959-960), 
this was a clearly anti-democratic move because it represented a military refusing to 
be subordinate to an elected civilian government. 
                                                             
43 Interview, Anonymous Thaksin-aligned politician 2, Bangkok, 9 October 2015 
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Fifth, the CNS revitalised the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC), 
a security body originally established in 1965 to fight communism. ISOC had largely 
been neglected since the end of the Cold War and lost its central role in the 
country’s security sector by late-1990s. The CNS, however, saw the potential for 
ISOC to be an instrument through which the military could engage with the public 
directly. As Krittian points out (2010: 205-207), the army appeared to subscribe to 
a far-fetched idea that Thaksin’s populist politics was somehow akin to 
communism, an ‘evil’ ideology capable of undermining the country’s traditional 
social and political structure. For this reason, the military felt there was a need for 
security officials to eliminate Thaksin’s influence among grassroots voters, a goal 
that could be achieved by reviving ISOC. 
 
The PPP-Led Governments and an Assertive Military 
This section covers the eventful period from the December 2007 election to the 
dissolution of the People Power Party (PPP) at the end of 2008. Despite winning the 
election with a comfortable margin, the Thaksin-backed PPP could govern for only a 
year before an electoral fraud case led the Constitutional Court to dissolve the party, 
echoing the fate of TRT previously. Although another Thaksin-backed political 
outfit attempted to form another government, the military devised a scheme to 
draw a group of MPs from Thaksin’s side to support the Democrat Party, resulting 
in a new DP-led government which took office in December 2008. 
 
The December 2007 Election 
Having slapped corruption allegations on Thaksin, dissolved his party and crafted a 
new pro-establishment constitution, the military had reasons to be confident of a 
favourable outcome when it allowed a new election on 23 December 2007. The ban 
on 111 former TRT executives deprived the Thaksin side of contenders for key 
government and ministerial positions. Along with the ban, the defection of former 
faction leaders and the loss of support from former allies in the business community 
left Thaksin in a weakened position. For these reasons, Thaksin’s electoral strategy 
became increasingly reliant on winning votes from the urban and rural poor (Ukrist 
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2016: 144-145). Prior to the 2007 election, Thaksin, who had lived in exile since the 
coup, took over a small party called People Power Party (PPP) and turned it into the 
successor of TRT. In a surprising move, Thaksin brought in Samak Sundaravej, a 
veteran politician and former Governor of Bangkok, to serve as PPP’s leader and 
candidate for Prime Minister. 
The arrival of Samak was perplexing. Known primarily for his brash manner 
and reactionary views throughout his political career, Samak had never displayed 
management excellence or leadership qualities befitting a prime ministerial 
candidate.  His troubling role in the October 1976 massacre of student protesters in 
Bangkok, when as a radio host he made vile accusations that the students were 
armed communists, also created doubts as to whether he would be able to work 
with some of the former student activists from that era who had joined Thaksin’s 
side such as Chaturon Chaisaeng, Surapong Suebwonglee and Poomtham 
Wechayachai (Kanokrat 2012: 207-220). In addition, the independent-minded 
Samak did not appear likely to remain loyal to Thaksin in the long term (Chambers 
2013a: 300) despite his declaration upon joining PPP that he would function as 
Thaksin’s proxy (Ukrist 2016: 145). On the other hand, the choice of Samak may 
have been a way for Thaksin to send out some important messages to the 
establishment as well as the electorate. As an outspoken critic of Prem since the late 
1980s, Samak’s confrontational style may have been an indication that the Thaksin 
camp was determined to resist any attempts by the elite to further undermine it. 
However, Samak was also known for his royalist credentials and his close 
relationship with the military (Chambers 2013a: 298). Thaksin may have regarded 
these qualities as helpful in his effort to dilute the idea, held by many of his 
detractors, that he harboured anti-monarchy ambition.  
Despite the generally unfavourable circumstances, including ISOC-led 
grassroots campaigns by the military to discredit Thaksin in the eyes of rural voters 
(Ferrara 2015: 240), PPP exceeded expectations in the December 2007 election. It 
won 233 out of 480 seats in the lower house and, despite rumours that elite forces 
tried to prevent smaller parties from joining a PPP-led government (Connors 2008: 
485), successfully went on to form a coalition government with Samak as Prime 
Minister. Two CNS-connected parties, Matchimatippatai and Peua Pandin, won too 
few seats to stand a realistic chance of frustrating the PPP and both ended up in 
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Samak’s coalition. The disappointing 21 seats won by Puea Pandin would later 
expose its farcical nature as a political outfit made up primarily of opportunists. 
Suwit Khunkitti, its first leader, was an experienced politician but commanded only 
a small faction in the party (Wikileaks 30 July 2008). With as many as eight distinct 
factions, the party had little unity or any sense of purpose (Manager 8 May 2009). 
By the time the PPP was nearing its end in December 2008, factions in Puea Pandin 
had been openly fighting one another. 
The Democrats, with 165 seats, also performed well compared to the 2005 
election but fell far short of the PPP’s seat tally. Thanks to the redesigned electoral 
system, DP managed to nearly match PPP in the 80-seat regional list contest, 
winning 33 seats in comparison to PPP’s 34. What was more alarming for the 
Thaksin camp, however, was the results in Bangkok. In 2005, TRT won 32 out of 37 
seats in the capital, but DP performed much more strongly in 2007 by winning 27 
seats, comfortably beating PPP’s tally of 9. It became clear that voting patterns in 
Thailand’s national elections were growing more polarised and regionalised. The 
south and inner Bangkok became DP’s stronghold while the north and northeast 
were broadly pro-Thaksin (Thitinan 2008: 147). The polarisation of Thai politics 
would become a persistent theme over the next several years. 
 
The Military’s Political Role during the Samak and Somchai Governments 
Given the various measures and efforts aimed at undermining Thaksin’s electoral 
prospects, the 2007 election results were a disappointment for the military. 
Nonetheless, the military’s political influence remained an issue for the civilian 
government, particularly as it faced renewed opposition from the PAD. As it turned 
out, the PPP-led government made attempts to court the military but they were 
largely unsuccessful. The interests of the government and the military diverged on 
several issues and the government eventually learned that it could not rely on the 
military to support it. 
In power, Samak tried to put his historically warm relationship with the 
military to use. He became only the second civilian ever, following DP’s Chuan 
Leekpai in 1997, to take the Defence Minister office. Like Chuan, Samak occupied 
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the Defence Minister post concurrently with the premiership. One Thaksin-aligned 
politician notes, without giving specific reasons, that whenever the Defence Minister 
job is taken by a civilian, he or she always needs to be the Prime Minister at the 
same time.44 As Chambers points out (2013a: 300), Samak had a team of advisors 
for his Defence Minister role that included former army chief Chaiyasit Shinawatra 
and several peers of Thaksin from Class 10 of the Armed Forces Academy 
Preparation School (AFAPS). 
Samak quickly formed an apparent rapport with General Anupong 
Paochinda, the new army chief. Anupong and Thaksin were AFAPS Class 10 
classmates but he had been one of the key perpetrators of the 2006 coup. Samak 
and Anupong frequently travelled together on official trips abroad (Ukrist 2016: 
146). While Ukrist (2016: 146) argues that Anupong’s closeness to Samak was 
because he was seeking Samak’s support in his aim to extend his army chief tenure, 
this was unlikely to be accurate because the new military-dominated committee 
overseeing military reshuffles was always going to limit the civilian government’s 
influence in that matter. Meanwhile, there appeared to be an uneasy truce between 
Thaksin and his opponents, allowing Thaksin, in exile since September 2006, to 
return to Thailand in February 2008 (McCargo 2009: 12) although in August 2008 
he again left the country and has never returned since (The Guardian 11 August 
2008).   
Any hope the PPP-led coalition might have had that it would be able to 
govern peacefully would soon be dashed. The PAD, largely inactive throughout the 
junta’s rule, resumed its anti-Thaksin protest over an alleged territorial dispute 
involving Thailand and Cambodia. The conflict, centred on both countries’ 
competing claims over territories around an ancient Khmer-era structure known as 
Preah Vihear Temple, had been largely dormant since a ruling in 1962 by the 
International Court of Justice had awarded the Temple to Cambodia (Pavin 2010: 
86-87). In 2001, however, the Cambodian government initiated a process to 
nominate the Temple as a UNESCO World Heritage site. By 2007, the Surayud 
government had become concerned that Cambodia’s proposal could potentially lead 
to Thailand’s territorial loss, but it was during the Samak government that the issue 
became intensely politicised. Samak’s Foreign Minister, Noppadol Pattama, was a 
                                                             
44 Interview, Anonymous Thaksin-aligned politician 2, Bangkok, 9 October 2015 
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close associate of Thaksin. Representing the Thai government, Noppadol signed a 
Joint Communiqué with Cambodia in May 2008 endorsing the Cambodian 
UNESCO campaign. The PAD and the Democrat Party tried to portray Noppadol’s 
role as part of a secret deal which Thaksin had allegedly made with the Cambodian 
government so that he could advance his business interests in Cambodia (Pavin 
2010: 89). The PAD’s message for its new round of anti-Thaksin protest was a 
simple yet powerful one: the government was ‘selling the nation’ by giving up parts 
of Thailand’s cherished territory to another country. The idea that a once-mighty 
Thai kingdom had suffered a series of territorial losses at the hands of various 
foreign enemies had long been a core part of Thailand’s state-promoted nationalist 
discourse, and the PAD’s strategy involved tapping into this body of belief and 
stroking anti-Cambodia fervours among Thais (Pavin 2010: 90-94). 
 The Constitutional Court eventually ruled that Noppadol’s signing of the 
Joint Communiqué had violated the constitution, leading him to resign from the 
Foreign Minister job in July 2008 (Dressel 2010: 682). Overall, however, the Preah 
Vihear controversy on its own did not threaten the government’s immediate 
survival. To prolong its protest, the PAD changed its message from reclaiming Preah 
Vihear to totally rejecting the government’s legitimacy. The protest dramatically 
escalated in August 2008 when the PAD stormed and began to occupy the 
Government House indefinitely so as to force the government’s resignation (Askew 
2010: 36). As the protesters continued to make gains, the government appeared 
weak and impotent.  
What eventually toppled Samak was not the PAD’s protest but a 
Constitutional Court ruling. Before becoming PM, Samak had pursued a secondary 
career as a host of television cooking shows. He continued to front the shows during 
his premiership, which led his opponents in the Senate to first accuse him of conflict 
of interest and then to petition the Constitutional Court. In a remarkable ruling on 9 
September, the Court found Samak guilty of being an employee of a private 
corporation, an offence under the Thai law governing holders of public offices. The 
Court reached this decision by disregarding the definition of ‘employee’ in Thai 
labour laws. Instead, a broader definition drawn from the official Thai dictionary 
was used (Dressel 2010: 682). The ruling meant that Samak lost the premiership, 
and PPP reacted by nominating Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law, as 
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his replacement (McCargo 2009: 14). Although Samak was theoretically eligible and 
wished to return as PM, he had lost the support of PPP (Wikileaks 1 October 2008). 
This marked a point at which Thaksin began to put more trust in his family 
members to run his political machine, ending the brief flirtation with an 
unpredictable outsider like Samak. 
Somchai had an even shorter spell as Prime Minister than Samak, however. 
As PPP continued to be at the core of the governing coalition, Samak’s departure 
was not enough to pacify the PAD. On 7 October, a violent clash broke out between 
the police and PAD protesters outside the Parliament compound. Two protesters, 
Angkana Radabpanyawut and Methee Chatmontri, were killed and several more 
injured. Queen Sirikit and Princess Chulabhorn personally attended the funeral of 
Angkana on 13 October. The Queen remarked that Angkana was a good person who 
loved the nation and the monarchy, and that King Bhumibol had provided a 
donation for her and other victims (McCargo 2009: 15; Thongchai 2014: 97). The 
next day, palace insider Anand Panyarachun presided over the funeral of Methee 
(McCargo 2009: 16). Other injured PAD protesters were also given financial support 
by the Queen (McCargo 2009: 15). Such gestures by the palace helped to further 
embolden the PAD, culminating in its extraordinary decision in November 2008 to 
occupy Suvarnabhumi and Don Muang, two major international airports in 
Bangkok. By the time the Constitutional Court issued its verdict on 2 December 
2008, dissolving PPP along with Chart Thai and Matchimatippatai parties for 
electoral fraud and imposing a five-year ban from politics on Somchai and the 
executives of those three parties, senior PPP figures had privately acknowledged 
that their time was up (Wikileaks 1 October 2008). 
Throughout the turmoil of 2008, the military demonstrated its willingness to 
be an assertive political force despite the lack of formal political power. In the early 
weeks of Samak’s premiership, the government tried to undermine the coup-
established ASC whose investigations focused on corruption cases linked to 
Thaksin. The government’s effort, however, was thwarted by Anupong’s public 
backing of the ASC (Chambers 2013a: 300). In September, as the conflict with the 
PAD escalated, Samak declared a state of emergency and granted Anupong the 
power to disperse the protesters by force. Anupong responded by refusing to order a 
crackdown on the PAD (Askew 2010: 37). Although he instructed 1,000 anti-riot 
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soldiers to be on alert, ostensibly to bolster the police force dealing with the PAD, 
the mobilisation of such a large number of troops could also have been a 
preparation in case another coup would be needed (Chambers 2013a: 305).  
Anupong later revealed that despite his disagreements with the government, 
he was also critical of the PAD. In a demonstration of the army’s autonomy from its 
supposed civilian overlords, he claimed that he had tried to stay in the middle 
ground between the government and the protesters (Wikileaks 30 December 2008). 
He argued that protesters in Thailand were protected too well by the country’s law. 
As there was no clear law regarding public demonstrations at the time, it was 
difficult, in his view, for security officers to maintain order during protests 
(Wikileaks 30 December 2008). Anupong’s dislike of the PAD was separately 
confirmed by Privy Councillor Siddhi Savetsila (Wikileaks 3 September 2008). Near 
the end of Samak’s premiership, Anupong also cooperated with the PM in an effort 
to broker peace talks between the PAD and the government (Wikileaks 5 September 
2008). 
A more dramatic intervention occurred on 16 October in the aftermath of the 
deaths of the two PAD protesters. Anupong, along with the Supreme Commander, 
the navy chief, the air force chief and the police chief, appeared on an evening news 
programme on Thailand’s Channel 3 to urge PM Somchai resign to take 
responsibility for the deaths (McCargo 2009: 19). At some point during the PAD’s 
campaign, Anupong also made an unsuccessful attempt to secretly persuade the 
Chat Thai party, a member of the PPP-led governing coalition, to withdraw from the 
government (Wikileaks 30 December 2008). Furthermore, the PAD’s occupation of 
the two airports was made possible largely due to the army’s calculated inaction 
(Ferrara 2015: 244; Wikileaks 30 December 2008). 
At the same time, PPP’s refusal to bow to direct and indirect pressure from 
the military can be viewed as a sign of democratic resilience. By contesting the 2007 
election under the rules designed to limit its chance of success, PPP exhibited 
democratic resilience in terms of an attachment to democracy during a difficult 
situation (Burnell and Calvert 1999: 4). The party, however, was most likely not 
motivated by democracy’s idealistic appeals but by the fact that electoral democracy 
was a way to gain political power. In private conversations, Thaksin appeared more 
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concerned with protecting his assets and business interests than democracy 
(Wikileaks 23 July 2008). As problems mounted for PPP in mid-2008, the Thaksin 
camp tried to use democratic methods to prolong its hold on power and deter a 
breakdown of democracy. In July, Thaksin floated the idea of a national unity 
government which would bring the Democrats into Samak’s governing coalition 
(Wikileaks 23 July 2008). When this plan failed to progress, Samak turned to 
another democratic method by attempting to hold a national referendum in which 
voters would effectively be asked to choose between the government and the PAD, 
though this plan also collapsed following the end of Samak’s premiership 
(Wikileaks 5 September 2008). As for Somchai, his insistence to stay on as PM in 
defiance of Anupong’s televised demand was another sign of resilience based on 
democratic principles (Wikileaks 17 October 2008). 
Ultimately, considering that Anupong’s various actions failed to bring down 
the government, the military’s determination to be a politically important actor 
produced few tangible results. That Somchai could easily rebuff Anupong’s remark 
that he should resign seems to suggest that the military was actually rather weak. It 
can be argued that the two major court verdicts, one disqualifying Samak and the 
other dissolving PPP, had a larger impact on the country’s politics in 2008 than the 
military did. As Unger and Chandra put it (2016: 124), “it seemed that the courts 
were being used not to impose accountability but to tip the scales in the political 
struggle toward the entrenched elite.” 
However, another interpretation is that Anupong may have wished to make 
stronger moves against the government but he was hindered by certain figures in 
the palace. While there was a scheme in September 2008 backed by Privy 
Councillor Siddhi to pressure Samak to resign, Anupong did not appear to be closely 
involved and the plan was eventually rendered unnecessary by the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling (Wikileaks 3 September 2008). Regarding Somchai, the television 
appearance was probably the most Anupong could do to put pressure on the 
government because another military coup, for some in the palace, was completely 
out of the question. According to palace insider Piya Malakul, King Bhumibol 
himself opposed the idea of another coup (Wikileaks 6 November 2008). Another 
palace insider, Anuporn Kashemsant, believed that the poor performance of the 
Surayud government had shown that the military was “incapable of running the 
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country” and diminished the prospects of another coup (Wikileaks 17 October 
2008). At this point, opponents of Thaksin among the elite appeared to have more 
faith in judicial interventions and backroom deals than an outright military coup. 
Nonetheless, December 2008 marked a point at which the military finally 
had a decisive role. Following the dissolution of PPP, the Thaksin camp once again 
formed a new party, this time called Pheu Thai (PT), and tried to hold on to power. 
What Thaksin did not anticipate, however, was that a major faction in PPP led by 
Newin Chidchob, a politician previously seen as highly loyal to Thaksin, would 
defect from him. With 37 MPs, Newin’s faction was large enough to shift the balance 
of power in the House of Representatives. Many accounts identified Anupong as a 
key person behind the intense lobbying efforts that led to Newin’s defection (Askew 
2010: 42-43; Chambers 2013a: 314-315). As it turned out, Newin’s group went on to 
form a new party called Bhum Jai Thai (BJT) and allied with the Democrat Party 
and most of the former coalition partners of PPP. Their combined parliamentary 
votes were enough to establish a new governing coalition led by the Democrats and 
propel DP leader Abhisit Vejjajiva to be Prime Minister. As part of the deal, BJT was 
rewarded with cabinet positions overseeing the Interior Ministry and the Transport 
Ministry, two of the most important government ministries in Thailand (Askew 
2010: 43). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presents an account that depicts the military as chiefly concerned with 
the ‘Thaksin question’ from 2006 to 2008. While the political future of Thaksin 
Shinawatra took centre stage, the 2006 coup and subsequent actions by the military 
also had a significant impact on Thai democracy. As Thaksin’s political success was 
primarily based on electoral politics, the CNS regime set out to undermine his 
political prospects by redesigning the electoral system and increasing the power of 
non-elected actors in such a way that the elected government would become 
significantly constrained. However, these actions pushed the Thaksin side to rely 
even more on democratic methods as a way of regaining political power. The 
success of PPP in the 2007 election represented a case of democratic resilience and 
clearly was not what the military had expected. After the election, the military 
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demonstrated a willingness to remain an important political actor, challenging the 
elected government at various points and pursuing its own agenda. While it was the 
Constitutional Court that eventually toppled Samak and Somchai, the military 
played a crucial role in ensuring that the Democrat Party could form a new 
government in December 2008. 
 The concept of democratic resilience helps us to analyse the events during 
this period not solely in terms of democratic rollback. While it can be argued that 
the 2006 coup had clear anti-democratic effects, a strong focus on the democratic 
rollback narrative can lead us to overlook the emphasis that Thaksin and his party 
continued to put on democratic principles. The political role of the military should 
be understood in terms of its confrontation with actors that try to stick to 
democratic principles. The issue of democracy assumes even larger importance 
during the conflict between the Abhisit government and the Red Shirts, which will 
be the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
The Military during the Abhisit Government:  
Encountering Democratic Resilience, Part Two 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is an analysis of the Thai military’s political role during the Abhisit 
Vejjajiva government which was in office from December 2008 to July 2011. 
Abhisit, the leader of the Democrat Party (DP), headed a coalition government that 
assumed power following the collapse of the previous Somchai Wongsawat 
government and the dissolution of the pro-Thaksin People Power Party (PPP). As 
noted in Chapter 3, the military, particularly army chief Anupong Paochinda, had a 
crucial role in the ‘silent coup’ (Surachart 2015: 75) that elevated Abhisit to the 
premiership. Growing political tensions during Abhisit’s tenure led to two major 
rounds of street rallies by the largely pro-Thaksin ‘Red Shirt’ movement in 2009 
and 2010, the latter of which culminated in a violent clash between the protesters 
and security forces that left more than 90 people dead (The People’s Information 
Center 2017: 242). In the end, Abhisit’s government completed its term but lost 
power at the July 2011 election, being beaten by Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party (PTP). 
The chapter focuses on how the military managed its encounter with pro-
democratic forces, specifically the Red Shirts and their allies in PTP over the 
duration of the Abhisit government. Although the government took office via a 
parliamentary vote, the Red Shirts regarded it as illegitimate and demanded a new 
election.  The chapter aims to show how the military’s role in protecting the Abhisit 
government and quelling the Red Shirts was a response to the Red Shirts’ 
democratic resilience. The chapter proceeds in four steps. The first section provides 
an outline of the Abhisit government, focusing on the fractious nature of the alliance 
between DP and its most important coalitional partner Bhum Jai Thai (BJT). The 
second section analyses the military’s influence over the Abhisit government and 
notes how Abhisit was a Prime Minister with limited authority. The third section 
examines the confrontation between the Red Shirts and the military in 2009 and 
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2010. The chapter portrays the Red Shirts as agents of democratic resilience in the 
context of Thailand’s post-2006 politics. The last section provides a conclusion. 
 
Democrats and Bhum Jai Thai: Unlikely Allies 
Upon the dissolution of Somchai Wongsawat’s PPP-led government by the 
Constitutional Court in late 2008, there was little appetite among the Thai elite for 
another military coup (Ferrara 2015: 244-245). As no new election was called, the 
Thaksin side was still in a position to form another government. However, it turned 
out that Thaksin’s major advantage, the numerical superiority of MPs supporting 
him, would be easily nullified by the military’s scheme that broke up the former 
ruling coalition and propelled Abhisit to power.  This section provides an overview 
of the Democrats and Bhum Jai Thai (BJT), the two most important participants in 
the Abhisit-led coalition. 
Founded in 1946, the Democrat Party is Thailand’s oldest political party still 
in existence. The party’s modern history, however, is marked by its repeated failures 
to win a general election. Over the last three decades, DP’s only victory in a general 
election was a narrow one in September 1992. It fared especially badly during the 
peak of TRT’s dominance, winning only 96 out of 500 seats in the 2005 election 
with most of its MPs coming from its stronghold in southern Thailand. The party’s 
poor showing on that occasion led to the resignation of its leader, Banyat 
Bantadtan. He was quickly succeeded by Abhisit Vejjajiva, an Oxford-educated 
politician long seen as DP’s prodigy and a protégé of former DP leader Chuan 
Leekpai. Chuan, who had two stints as Prime Minister in 1992-1995 and 1997-2001, 
continued to be an influential figure in the party and retained longstanding support 
throughout much of southern Thailand (Thai Publica 3 February 2014). 
Under Abhisit, DP joined forces with two other opposition parties to boycott 
the February 2006 election amidst the intense anti-Thaksin campaign by the PAD. 
When Thailand’s politics grew more polarised during Thaksin’s last few months in 
office, DP defined itself as a thoroughly anti-Thaksin party. Though it never had a 
formal association with the PAD, several DP members joined PAD rallies in 2005-
2006 and again in 2008. Somkiat Pongpaiboon, one of the PAD’s five ‘core leaders’, 
also became a Democrat MP in 2007. Another DP member, Kasit Piromya, was 
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widely mocked for defending his participation in the PAD’s occupation of 
Suvarnabhumi and Don Muang airports in late 2008 by saying that the food and 
music at both rally sites had been “excellent” (The Telegraph 21 December 2008). 
In fact, one of the factors that gave rise to the PAD’s mass rallies was the Democrats’ 
poor performance in the 2005 election. Not only did DP’s defeat enable TRT to 
comfortably form a one-party government, but it also highlighted the futility of 
trying to oppose Thaksin through parliamentary channels. One DP member, 
Charoen Kanthawongs, even remarked in a condescending tone that the party 
should simply give up trying to win votes in Thailand’s populous northeastern 
region, a major Thaksin support base (The Observer 21 December 2008). The 
despondent mood in anti-Thaksin circles at the time contributed to the belief that 
street rallies could be a more effective means of constraining his administration. 
Thus, during the late 2000s it was possible to view DP and the PAD as part of the 
same broad anti-Thaksin movement in Thai politics. 
In a notable development, Kasit became Foreign Minister in Abhisit’s 
cabinet. Although Kasit was a former ambassador, his appointment to the cabinet 
was a surprise because, firstly, his contentious involvement in the PAD’s airport 
occupation was hardly befitting of a Foreign Minister and, secondly, DP already had 
a more obvious candidate for Foreign Minister in Sukhumbhand Paribatra. During 
the premierships of Samak and Somchai, Abhisit had set up a British-style ‘shadow 
cabinet’ to monitor the government’s performance. Sukhumbhand, who had 
previously been Deputy Foreign Minister from 1997 to 2000, was given the ‘Shadow 
Foreign Minister’ title in February 2008, signifying his readiness to become a real 
Foreign Minister should DP gain a chance to form a government (Bangkok Post 9 
February 2008). Kasit was also in the shadow cabinet as Sukhumbhand’s deputy, 
but the fact that it was Kasit who became the real Foreign Minister was an 
indication that some elements in DP wanted to maintain a good relationship with 
the PAD. At the same time, it should be noted that by early 2009 the PAD’s 
importance in Thai politics was beginning to decline. With the Thaksin side out of 
power, the movement lost much of its energy to sustain its momentum and continue 
its activism. The appointment of Kasit would be the only major sign of the PAD’s 
influence in the Abhisit government. 
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 Historically, DP had alternately supported and opposed the military’s role in 
Thai politics. While Chambers (2013a: 315) argues that DP possessed an anti-
military image which was tainted by its acceptance of the military-brokered deal to 
establish the Abhisit government, his view ignores the fact that the party never had 
a consistent record of opposing the military. Although DP was one of the parties 
that joined forces with street protestors in opposing the military-backed 
premiership of General Suchinda Kraprayoon in 1992, in other periods some of its 
leading members had tacitly or openly backed the armed forces. Even in the 1992 
case, DP did not wholeheartedly endorse the protest. While it prominently 
participated in the mass rallies, it later criticised the decision of Chamlong 
Srimuang, the protest leader, to eschew parliamentary politics in favour of street 
demonstrations (McCargo 1997: 266). 
During the turbulent 1970s, the party was divided between conservatives and 
liberals. Prominent Democrat Party right-wingers included Thammanoon Tien-
ngoen and Samak Sundaravej, while the liberal wing was led by Surin Masdit, 
Chuan Leekpai and Veera Musikapong (Somsak 2001: 169-171). Although the 
liberals distanced themselves from the reactionary tendencies of the Thai state at 
the time, the right-wingers were generally more supportive of the military. DP’s 
right-wingers were also complicit in the demonisation of student activists who later 
became victims of the brutal state-sponsored massacre on 6 October 1976 (Somsak 
2001: 178-181).  In the ‘semi-democratic’ era of the 1980s, DP was a member of 
every one of Prem Tinsulanond’s coalition governments which were broadly 
supported by the military. Nonetheless, the party adopted a firm stance against the 
army’s attempts to claim more power. A clear example of this was its resistance to 
an army-backed proposal to amend the constitution in 1983 which, if successful, 
would have allowed active duty military officers to serve in the cabinet (Suthachai 
2008: 194-195; Connors 2009: 360). By the time of the 1988 election, however, 
DP’s persistent support for the unelected Prem was at odds with the public’s 
demand for more democracy and less political meddling by the armed forces 
(Suthachai 2008: 206-207). From these examples, it is evident that the Democrats 
never consistently opposed the military’s role in politics. The emergence of the 
Abhisit government was not a betrayal of DP’s supposedly anti-military tradition 
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but simply an act of political opportunism that made a mockery of the party’s 
purported democratic objectives (Connors 2011: 287). 
 If DP’s alliance with the military in 2008 was motivated by self-interest, the 
party’s lack of principles was further compounded by its acceptance of Newin 
Chidchob’s BJT as a coalition partner. Newin, a scion of a political family in the 
northeastern province of Buriram, had been one of the most notorious politicians in 
Thailand’s recent history (Montesano 2010: 275). He initially gained a reputation as 
a rising political star in the ‘Group of 16’, a 1990s-era cross-party group of relatively 
young MPs touted as future high achievers (Handley 1997: 100). As an opposition 
MP, Newin had a prominent role in the 1995 censure debate against the DP-led 
coalition government of Chuan Leekpai (BBC Thai 8 September 2017). That same 
year, after Chuan had called a snap election due to the political fallout of that 
censure debate, Newin’s fame quickly turned to notoriety when vote canvassers 
working for him were arrested. They were found to be in possession of 11.4 million 
baht in cash along with Newin’s campaign leaflets which were affixed to banknotes, 
strongly suggesting that the money had been prepared for vote-buying purposes 
(Callahan and McCargo 1996: 390). Since then, the Thai media started labelling him 
as hopelessly corrupt. 
Shortly after Thai Rak Thai’s (TRT) victory in the 2001 election, Newin 
joined TRT and gradually rose through the ranks. He was seen tearfully hugging 
Thaksin when the latter announced on 4 April 2006 that he was taking a break from 
politics (Wikileaks 5 April 2006; BBC Thai 8 September 2017). Under the Samak 
government, Newin became one of the most important figures in the pro-Thaksin 
People Power Party (PPP) even though he was one of the former TRT executives still 
serving a five-year ban from holding a political office (McCargo 2008: 341). Given 
Newin’s apparently unwavering loyalty to Thaksin, his defection to the military’s 
side in December 2008 was an unexpected occurrence that, thanks to the more than 
20 MPs under his command, shifted the parliamentary balance of power towards 
DP. In an acknowledgement of Newin’s key part in the new government, Abhisit 
staged a media event with him on 9 December 2008 during which the two men 
shared an awkward embrace (BBC Thai 8 September 2017). As noted in Chapter 3, 
the coalition agreement was highly generous for BJT, granting it important cabinet 
positions overseeing Interior, Commerce and Transport Ministries. When Abhisit 
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took office, his government immediately faced accusations of hypocrisy because DP 
had previously used Newin’s poor reputation to undermine Thaksin (Chairat 2010: 
304). 
Although the brotherly embrace of Abhisit and Newin was meant to portray a 
cosy relationship, in reality the coexistence of DP and BJT was far from smooth. As 
early as June 2009, an anonymous source claimed that Abhisit and a few other 
figures in DP were seriously contemplating pushing Newin’s party out of the 
coalition amidst growing worries that a major corruption scandal involving BJT 
could be imminent (The Nation 19 June 2009). Newin, relishing his status as the 
coalition’s kingmaker, was certainly willing to use his influence for personal gains. 
In August 2010, he opposed a plan by Thai Airways, the national flag carrier, to 
launch a new low-cost airline because it could undermine the business of Thai 
AirAsia, a commercial low-cost carrier to which he was closely connected. It was 
reported that Transport Minister Sopon Sarum, a key BJT member, openly lobbied 
against the plan on behalf of Newin (Bangkok Post 3 August 2010). Other conflicts 
between DP and BJT included disputes over appointments of high-ranking 
bureaucrats, especially those serving in BJT-controlled ministries (Chairat 2010: 
316-320). Despite the relatively small number of MPs under the BJT banner, the 
party scored some important victories such as by having its favoured candidates 
appointed as Permanent Secretary of the Interior Ministry as well as governors in 
major provinces (Chairat 2010: 318). Overall, BJT’s ability to extract concessions 
from DP was a clear indicator of its influence in the coalition. 
 
The Military’s Influence in the Abhisit Government 
If, as Ferrara argues (2015: 246), the primary aim of Thai elite actors since 2006 
was to “make democracy so dysfunctional as to both legitimise and materially 
enable the tutelage offered by the palace, the military, the bureaucracy, and the 
courts”, the transition to the Abhisit government marked an important point at 
which the military’s tutelage distorted the parliamentary process. As a civilian-led 
administration, the Abhisit government bore resemblances to a normal democratic 
government. Its formation, made possible by mass defections of MPs from the 
previous pro-Thaksin ruling bloc, followed parliamentary procedures which 
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specified that the Prime Minister be chosen by the lower house. Indeed, this was 
precisely how Abhisit chose to defend himself. In an interview with CNN in 
December 2008, for example, Abhisit stressed that he had become Prime Minister 
“through a democratic, constitutional system according to parliamentary rules.”45 In 
the words of Montesano (2010: 276), Abhisit “appeared to view his path to the 
premiership as entirely legitimate, notwithstanding the roles played by airport 
occupiers, helpful Constitutional Court justices and the army commander in 
preparing that path for him.” 
The problem with this emphasis on formal procedures, however, was that the 
defections of those MPs would not have occurred without the informal role of the 
military. Before Abhisit’s case, the last time power changed hands due to a 
parliamentary vote was in 1997 when Democrat’s Chuan Leekpai replaced Chavalit 
Yongchaiyuth as Prime Minister. In both cases, influential actors worked behind the 
scenes to ensure a change of government while preserving the veneer of 
parliamentary democracy. Commenting on the Chuan case, McCargo (2005: 510) 
points out that a mysterious elite pact involving Prem Tinsulanonda and certain 
members of the military top brass was instrumental for Chuan’s rise to power. In 
the same vein, the Abhisit government was a result of a backroom deal chiefly 
orchestrated by Anupong (Askew 2010: 42-43; Chambers 2013b: 73-74). Because an 
outright coup was not on the agenda, Anupong’s intervention was a way to bring 
about a desired outcome without abolishing the pro-elite institutional framework 
established by the 2007 constitution. In a private conversation with US diplomats, 
Anupong and Prayuth denied that the military had played any role in the formation 
of the new government. Yet they also added that they believed Abhisit would do a 
“good job” as Prime Minister (Wikileaks 30 December 2008). 
Once Abhisit took office, the military was largely content to play a 
background tutelary role. At the cabinet level, the only sign of the military’s 
increased influence was at the Defence Ministry. After Samak and Somchai took the 
Defence Minister job themselves during their consecutive premierships, the Abhisit 
government reverted to the norm of giving the job to a retired general. With 
Anupong’s support, the job went to General Prawit Wongsuwan, a former army 
                                                             
45 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wptg2DS8IUU, uploaded on 18 December 
2008 
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chief and key figure in the ‘Eastern Tigers’ army faction (Vilawan 2013: 143). Prawit 
first rose to prominence as army chief during the Thaksin era. He had political 
connections with many of Thaksin’s associates. His rise in the army largely 
coincided with TRT’s own upward trajectory following the 2001 election. In 2002, 
he was promoted to First Army Commander, a traditional stepping stone towards 
the post of Army Commander-in-Chief, thanks to his good relationship with key 
TRT member Sanoh Thienthong. He then became army chief in 2005, occupying 
the post for a year before offering support for the appointment of General Sondhi 
Boonyaratglin, the eventual leader of the 2006 coup, as his successor. To cement 
the ascendancy of the Eastern Tigers, Prawit also had a significant role in promoting 
Anupong and Prayuth to important positions (Nation Weekend 8 January 2016: 5). 
The fact that Prawit’s career progression took place during an era dominated by 
elected politicians meant that he maintained relationships with various figures 
across the political spectrum. Through a deal involving Com-Link, a major Thai 
telecommunication company, Prawit also developed business ties with Thaksin and 
Pojaman Damapongse, Thaksin’s former wife.46 In addition, Prawit is an older 
brother of Patcharawat Wongsuwan, the national police chief in office during the 
violent clash between the police and the PAD in October 2008.  
Prawit’s eclectic background means that it can be difficult to determine his 
motives, but what is certain was that his appointment as Defence Minister reflected 
the Eastern Tigers’ growing political clout. As Defence Minister, one of his key 
achievements was in 2009 when he managed to secure a 10-year military 
procurement programme that would ensure continual budget increases and new 
military hardware for the Thai armed forces (Napisa and Chambers 2017: 54). This 
was part of an overall upward trend in Thailand’s military budget since the 2006 
coup. As Chairat points out (2010: 324), the rise in the military’s annual budget was 
remarkable, increasing from 86 billion baht before the 2006 coup to 167 billion baht 
in 2009. Prawit would go on to serve as Deputy Prime Minister and Defence 
Minister in the government of Prayuth Chan-ocha after the 2014 coup. 
 
                                                             
46 Interview, Anonymous businessman with elite connections, Bangkok, 22 October 
2015 
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Abhisit’s Limited Authority 
A persistent theme during Abhisit’s premiership was that he struggled to 
impose himself as much as he would have liked. From the start, he did not have a 
personal mandate befitting an elected leader. Given his failure to lead DP to a 
victory in the 2007 election, Abhisit would not have ascended to the premiership 
without the military’s brazen intervention. Compared to Thaksin, Abhisit was never 
in a position to replicate the former’s political dominance. On the one hand, Abhisit 
admittedly had some success in terms of imposing his will on DP and the 
government. He managed to build a clique of loyalists and to promote some of 
them, such as Korn Chatikavanij, Buranaj Smutharaks and Sirichok Sopha, to 
senior positions. In response to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 which was 
posing serious challenges to the Thai economy, his government also demonstrated 
technocratic competence by putting together an economic stimulus package called 
‘Thai Khem Kaeng’ (Walsh 2010: 4-6). In addition, the government successfully 
pushed for the appointment of Thawil Pleansee, a civilian bureaucrat, as Secretary-
General of the National Security Council. This was remarkable because most 
previous holders of this job had been military officers (Vilawan 2013: 144). Abhisit’s 
reliance on his clique of younger DP members was so pronounced that it alienated 
some older stalwarts in the party. One of his critics within the party was former DP 
leader Bhichai Rattakul. Bhichai, who was born in 1926, remarked in several 
interviews that Abhisit should consult older members in the party more often (Thai 
Rath 29 May 2017). 
On the other hand, the extent of Abhisit’s power throughout his premiership 
was constrained by factors beyond his control. On this issue, Montesano offers a 
particularly harsh assessment. He outright refuses to acknowledge Abhisit as the 
true leader of the government, calling him a mere “nominal leader” and “front-man” 
for the coalition (2010: 275). For Montesano (2010: 275), this characterisation of 
Abhisit as a figurehead arose not just from the government’s military origin but also 
from the overarching influence of veteran politicians in the coalition such as DP’s 
Suthep Thaugsuban and Chart Thai Patthana’s (CTP) Sanan Kachornprasart, both 
of whom were well-versed in the art of negotiations and secretive horse-trading. 
Suthep, who at the time was DP’s Secretary-General and a Deputy Prime Minister 
under Abhisit, even proudly called himself “the government’s manager” who 
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supposedly oversaw the less pleasant side of coalitional politics and let Abhisit get 
on with governing (The Nation 19 June 2009). The need for a skilled political 
operator like Suthep was also particularly evident given the challenge of having to 
deal with Newin’s BJT.  In addition, a Bangkok-based politician like Abhisit lacked 
the authority and charisma to command the support of voters in DP’s southern 
stronghold, making it necessary for him to give Suthep, a southerner, a large role in 
the party. In addition, Suthep was needed to be the government’s main liaison with 
the military because Abhisit did not enjoy a close relationship with the armed forces 
(Vilawan 2013: 143). Therefore, even when not taking the military’s influence into 
account, DP’s internal politics and the realities of coalitional compromises were 
already imposing considerable limits on Abhisit’s power. From this perspective, the 
Oxford-educated Abhisit appeared primarily to be an attractive face presented to 
the public while the ‘real’ governing businesses were conducted behind the scenes. 
All in all, some elite figures were largely willing to help defend him against 
doubters. Prem, for example, clearly thought that having Abhisit in charge of the 
country was a favourable outcome. As revealed in a US diplomatic cable: 
Regarding Abhisit, Prem referenced widespread criticism that the PM 
was too young and not strong enough to be an effective leader in trying 
times. However, Prem felt that Abhisit had proved in 2009 that he was 
up to the challenge of doing what was necessary to run a fractious 
coalition government, no easy task.  In addition, there were no other 
politicians available who were more principled and had more integrity 
than Abhisit, and Thailand needed such a leader at this point.  Prem 
expressed hope that Thais and foreigners alike would be more patient 
with Abhisit, who he believed was the right man to serve as premier 
(Wikileaks 25 January 2010). 
 
 In sum, the Abhisit government was a potentially fractious coalition led by a 
Prime Minister with a limited authority. Typically, when such a government exists 
in a democracy, it is unlikely to last long. For the Thai military, however, a weak 
government provided an opportunity for the military to exert more influence 
because, given the threats from Thaksin-aligned politicians and the Red Shirts, the 
Abhisit government had to rely considerably on the military’s support and 
protection. In this sense, the military’s view appeared to be that having a weak 
civilian government in charge of the country was a price worth paying in exchange 
 
 
137 
for keeping Thaksin’s party out of power. From these considerations, the behaviour 
of the Thai military during this period resembled what Nordlinger (1977: 22-23) and 
Finer (1988: 150-151) call ‘praetorian moderators’ and ‘limited indirect rule’ 
respectively. Nordlinger (1977: 22-23) defines praetorian moderators as a military 
that exercises power over a civilian government without taking control of the 
government itself, often aiming to protect the status quo rather than to instigate 
major societal changes. In the same vein, Finer argues that one of the main types of 
military rule is limited indirect rule, referring to a situation in which the military 
allows civilians to govern and intervenes “only from time to time to secure various 
limited objectives” (1988: 150-151).  
One of the clearest signs of the military’s ability to pursue its corporate 
interests during Abhisit’s premiership was the establishment of a new army 
division, the Third Cavalry Division, in April 2011. Headquartered in Khon Kaen, 
the division was created after Prem Tinsulanond’s had made public his wish to see a 
new cavalry division in Thailand (Vilawan 2013: 113). Another area that illustrated 
the military’s growing strength was the mid-year reshuffle in 2009 which saw a 
purge of Thaksin-aligned senior officers across the army, the navy and the air force. 
Among those adversely affected by this reshuffle were Air Chief Marshal Sumeth 
Phomanee, General Manas Paorik and General Prin Suwannathat. At the same time, 
officers favoured by Anupong, Prayuth and Prawit received promotions (Chambers 
2013a: 317-318). 
 
Confronting Democratic Resilience: The Military and the Red Shirts 
With the collapse of the PPP-led government in December 2008, the effects 
of the 2006 coup continued to be felt in Thailand. As Thaksin’s side lost power, 
street rallies ironically became a new means for him to pursue political goals, 
especially considering the impact of the PAD in 2005-2006 and again in 2008. The 
Thaksin-aligned mass movement, known as the Red Shirts, professed to fight for 
democracy, dismantle Thailand’s rigid hierarchical system and weaken the elite’s 
domination of the state and society. Eventually, their rhetoric as well as their 
protest methods would prove to be intolerable for the military, leading to violent 
crackdowns on their Bangkok demonstrations in 2009 and 2010. 
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While observers have noted, based on the role of Thaksin’s patronage 
network evident in many aspects of the Red Shirts (Ferrara 2015: 246), that they are 
far from an ideal pro-democracy movement, the fact remains that the Red Shirts 
campaigned for a political system in which the elected government has sufficient 
power to stand up against the military and other supposedly elite-controlled 
institutions. On the one hand, it is true that material benefits were part of the 
driving force behind the protesters. As noted by Ockey (2014: 63), “the military had 
intervened against the interests of those in the rural northeast, where it had spent 
so much time cultivating ties during the campaign against the Communist Party of 
Thailand.” Yet this should not detract from the larger goal of a more democratic 
society that the Red Shirts demanded. In this sense, Red Shirt protesters can be 
considered agents of democratic resilience. Drawing on Burnell and Calvert’s 
definition of democratic resilience as “where an attachment to democratic ideals 
persists and such ideals continue to be canvassed in some quarters, in spite of 
hostility from the officially prescribed values and norms and apparent indifference 
from many elements in society” (1999: 4), the Red Shirts’ fight to push Thailand to a 
more election-oriented direction was broadly consistent with the notion of 
democratic resilience. This section explores the role of the military in suppressing 
the Red Shirts’ democratic demands.  
 
The Red Shirts and Thailand’s New Era of Mass Politics 
The origin of the movement later known as the Red Shirts can be traced to the last 
few months of Thaksin’s premiership when anti-Thaksin sentiments were in full 
swing. To counter the PAD’s street protest, elements within the TRT government 
tried to mobilise mass support to bolster Thaksin’s claim that he remained a 
popular Prime Minister. The Buriram faction of TRT, then led by Newin Chidchob, 
was instrumental in organising the appearance in Bangkok of a group called the 
Caravan of the Poor, made up mostly of rural inhabitants in the northeast. Another 
group, the Club for the Interest of Taxi Drivers, supposedly represented taxi and 
motorcycle taxi drivers working in Bangkok. Around 5,000 pro-TRT taxi drivers 
flocked to hear a speech by Thaksin on 25 December 2005 during which he 
denounced his opponents and unveiled government schemes to improve the 
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livelihoods of taxi drivers (Manager 25 December 2005). By March 2006, these two 
groups had become the most visible pro-Thaksin ‘grassroots movements’ and had 
begun to organise their own street rallies to show their opposition to the PAD 
(Uchane 2010). 
At the time, these protests only had an implicit support from TRT politicians 
who did not yet see the need to make conspicuous appearances at pro-government 
rally sites, preferring to remain somewhat detached from the protests. Ironically, 
TRT’s tactic of mobilising supporters onto the streets would soon backfire. Not only 
did the pro-TRT protesters fail to match the PAD’s energy and determination, but 
their appearance also provided fuel to the rumour in early September 2006, 
possibly spread by the military, that the government was bringing a large number of 
thugs from the countryside to Bangkok in order to violently disperse the PAD. 
Ultimately, while these pro-government rallies yielded few tangible benefits for TRT 
at the time, many of these protesters would go on to participate in the Red Shirt 
movement. 
The dynamics of street movements in Thailand changed considerably after 
the 2006 coup. In response to the military’s ouster of Thaksin, small movements 
emerged to oppose the coup, albeit in a mostly haphazard manner. Early anti-coup 
groups included the 19 September Network against the Coup, the Saturday People 
against Dictatorship, the Citizenship group, the Democracy Association, the Friends 
of the 1997 Constitution group, the 24 June Democracy group, and the Taxi Drivers’ 
Community Radio group (Ubonphan 2010: 31-41). These movements faced a 
number of challenges: they had to conduct their activities in defiance of the 
military-imposed ban on the gathering of more than five people, their lack of funds 
prevented them from organising a protest even remotely approaching the scale of 
the PAD, and there was an ideological division between pro-democracy and pro-
Thaksin activists in these movements. In other words, activists who opposed the 
coup were not necessarily supporters of Thaksin, and some of them had previously 
been fierce critics of TRT. Sombat Boonngam-anong, who later became a prominent 
face of the Red Shirts, was one of the activists who grew uncomfortable with the 
pro-Thaksin rhetoric emanating from some of the early anti-coup rallies (Ubonphan 
2010: 34). Regardless of Sombat’s concerns, it would soon become apparent that 
the only realistic way of creating a mass movement to challenge Thailand’s 
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entrenched elites would be to rely primarily on Thaksin’s financial power and 
network of politicians. 
For several months after the coup, TRT politicians did not systematically 
support any of the anti-coup groups. Only in March 2007 did Thaksin-affiliated 
figures begin to play a prominent role in the street campaign against the military. 
Future Red Shirt leaders such as Veera Musikapong, Natthawut Saikuea, Jatuporn 
Prompan and Jakkrapob Penkae organised their first anti-coup rally at Sanam 
Luang in Bangkok on 23 March 2007 which drew a crowd of around 3,000. Their 
movement, known at the time as the PTV group, quickly emerged as the best-
resourced and best-run of the various anti-coup groups. In light of this, groups such 
as the Saturday People against Dictatorship decided to join PTV’s subsequent rallies 
in April and May 2007 (Ubonphan 2010: 42-43). From that point, the anti-military 
activities grew more centralised as it became evident that the Thaksin-linked PTV 
group was best-equipped to sustain a prolonged campaign. After the junta-
appointed constitution tribunal had ordered the dissolution of TRT on 30 May 
2007, a new movement called the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship 
(UDD) was formed on 6 June 2007 with the stated aim of overthrowing the junta 
(Ferrara 2015: 249). The UDD was meant to be an umbrella organisation 
encompassing disparate anti-junta groups, but in practice the PTV group remained 
the core. The founding of the UDD gave a sense of permanence and seriousness to 
the street campaign against the military. 
At the same time, the UDD also began to show signs of radicalism rarely seen 
in Thai street protests since the peak of King Bhumibol’s moral authority in the 
1990s and early 2000s. One example was its demand that the military step down by 
24 June 2007. In the Thai context, 24 June is a highly symbolic date because 
absolute monarchy was overthrown on 24 June 1932. However, decades of 
domination by conservative thoughts on the Thai life had significantly 
deemphasised the meaning of that date. By reviving the importance of 24 June, the 
UDD hinted that it was willing to tackle the entrenched conservative elite and 
challenge the kind of social order that had allowed so many military coups to take 
place. An important cause of this anti-elite sentiment was the role of Prem 
Tinsulanond in the 2006 coup. As the Privy Council President, Prem was expected 
to be a politically neutral figure, but his politically-charged speeches criticising the 
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TRT government in the months before the coup symbolised the high degree of 
influence retained by traditional institutions in Thai society. It soon became 
evident, however, that at this point the UDD was too weak to pose a threat to the 
CNS regime. For the pro-Thaksin side, the best hope of regaining political influence 
was the December 2007 election (Ferrara 2015: 249). 
Throughout 2008, as the pro-Thaksin People Power Party (PPP) became the 
leader of the coalition government, the Red Shirts shifted from being an anti-coup 
group to being a group with clearer democratic ideas. For example, when the re-
energised PAD proposed in early 2008 a highly reactionary plan to turn Thailand’s 
legislature into a mostly appointed body, the Red Shirts professed to defend the 
principle of one-man-one-vote and uphold the power of elected politicians (Nostitz 
2014: 179). As the PPP-led government faced intense pressure both from the PAD 
and from state institutions including the Constitutional Court, the UDD was 
adamant in its aim of protecting the elected government. For the Red Shirts, the 
Samak and Somchai governments represented electoral politics which continued to 
be under siege from elite-aligned forces operating under the military-backed 2007 
constitution (Nostitz 2014: 180). By this point, Veera, Natthawut and Jatuporn had 
established themselves as the core leaders of the UDD. They became popularly 
known as สามเกลอ or ‘the Trio’ (Naruemon and McCargo 2011: 995). Jakrapob, who 
had earlier been one of the leaders of the PTV group, became Minister for the Prime 
Minister’s Office in Samak’s cabinet. However, he quit in May 2008 due to a lèse-
majesté charge arising from a talk he had given in 2007 at the Foreign 
Correspondents' Club of Thailand (Prachatai 30 May 2008). Jakrapob later fled the 
country after the 2010 army-led crackdown on the Red Shirts, adopted a more 
radical stance and split from the UDD to co-found a splinter group called Red Siam 
(Naruemon and McCargo 2011: 997). The Red Shirts’ activities and confrontation 
with the military and the Abhisit government in 2009 and 2010 will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
Elements of Democracy in the Red Shirt Movement 
In the polarised atmosphere of Thai politics beginning from the PAD’s 2005-2006 
campaign, there has been a tendency for observers to regard events in Thailand in 
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terms of binary opposition. While the PAD, the military, elite figures, urban 
dwellers and the Democrat Party are frequently depicted as conservative, anti-
democratic forces, media reports have often portrayed the Red Shirts as a primarily 
rural movement fighting for more democracy (Naruemon and McCargo 2011: 999). 
Thaksin is inevitably a central figure in these accounts. One way of interpreting 
Thailand’s conflict is to see it as a fight between anti- and pro-Thaksin forces, and 
the Red Shirts are seen as clearly belonging to the latter group. Subsequent studies 
have introduced more nuance into this debate. Naruemon and McCargo argue that 
the Red Shirts are not a unified movement but constitute “an extremely pragmatic 
alliance among groups ranging from idealistic post-leftists to others of a rather 
thuggish disposition” (2011: 998). For the authors, the diversity of Red Shirts was 
key to understanding the movement as well as the multi-layered nature of the 
various challenges that Thailand’s political system needed to overcome. 
 Even when taking into account the diversity of the Red Shirts, it is still 
possible to see strong elements of democracy in the views and actions of the Red 
Shirts. The argument that Red Shirt protesters were motivated by material benefits 
does not diminish the claim that they fought for democracy. In fact, democracy for 
the Red Shirts was not an abstract, idealistic concept but was closely tied to their 
livelihood and wellbeing. The policies of Thaksin Shinawatra enabled many of the 
Red Shirts to experience for the first time that an elected government could 
concretely improve their lives. Although it can be argued that state policies had 
always contributed to improving the livelihood of Thais long before Thaksin arrived, 
the TRT government successfully promoted a clearer link between voters, the 
government, elections and state policies (Apichat 2017: 300). For the Red Shirts, 
Thaksin’s economic populist scheme was “a legitimate way to gain votes through 
governmental projects using public funds, which is the power of the poor to have a 
say in public policy decisions” (Naruemon 2016: 106). In other words, supporters of 
Thaksin underwent a ‘political awakening’ process (Viengrat 2015: 161), eventually 
arriving at the idea that the TRT government was ‘their’ government, a concrete 
expression of their democratic rights. This means that the 2006 coup, along with 
subsequent attempts by the PAD and other unaccountable forces to undermine the 
pro-Thaksin PPP government, was a serious affront to many of the Red Shirts who 
kept voting for successors of TRT. Viengrat (2015: 161) considers the conflict to be 
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one between ‘newly activated citizens’ whose sense of political duties had emerged  
because of major changes brought by the rise of Thaksin on the one hand and 
undemocratic forces within the state apparatus on the other. 
The increased salience of democratic ideals among the Red Shirts was 
particularly evident when one considers the military’s failed attempts to use various 
development projects as a way to win over his supporters in rural areas. As noted by 
Ockey (2014: 63), “the military sought to compete with the Thai Rak Thai party 
directly for the hearts and minds of the people… by improving the economy.” 
During the premiership of Surayud Chulanont following the 2006 coup, the military 
engaged in grassroots campaigns to entice Thaksin’s supporters, including 
establishing a “Centre for Poverty Eradication and Rural Development under the 
Philosophy of Self-Sufficiency Economy” (Ockey 2014: 63). In 2008, as the Red 
Shirt movement began to take shape, the military spent one billion baht on “rural 
projects aimed at weakening the pro-Thaksin red-shirt movement” (Chambers 
2010: 207). These attempts, however, largely failed to eliminate the resentment 
among Thaksin’s supporters towards the military, the PAD and other anti-Thaksin 
elements. Had the Red Shirts been motivated purely by material considerations, the 
anti-Thaksin side should have had few problems winning over them by offering 
them similar guarantees of material benefits. As it turned out, material benefits 
arising from the TRT government played a part in transforming the Red Shirts into 
defenders of electoral democracy, making it impossible for the military and its allies 
to pacify them by offering Thaksin-style policy packages while still denying them 
political rights. For the Red Shirts, the 2006 coup and the military-backed Abhisit 
government were simply illegitimate. 
As Apichat (2017: 300) puts it, “[c]herishing the right to vote is an 
inseparable part of the concept of citizenship among the Red Shirts. They define 
elections as the minimum requirement for a country to be considered a democracy; 
every individual equally has one vote to appoint or remove their government.” In 
the words of Glassman (2011: 26), the Red Shirts demanded “levels of popular 
participation and empowerment unprecedented in Thai history, including serious 
consideration of the votes and political preferences of the majority.” Ferrara 
similarly notes that “the UDD complemented calls for ‘democracy’ with the demand 
that no unelected institution, no matter how close to the palace, should have the 
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authority to substitute its own judgement for that of the electorate” (2015: 250). 
Red Shirt informants interviewed in Naruemon and McCargo’s study also asserted 
that they were “strong supporters of more elections at all levels, because once you 
had elections, you could easily get rid of bad people” (2011: 1015). The Red Shirts’ 
relentless emphasis on elections and majority rule prompted a leading figure in the 
Democrat Party to argue that a truly democratic government is not a majoritarian 
one but one that is constrained by a system of checks and balances.47 While this is 
undoubtedly correct in a general sense, such a view does not take into account the 
context of Thailand’s post-2006 politics where the principle of electoral rule could 
easily be displaced by the military and the politicised judiciary. Thus, a demand for 
the inviolability of electoral rule was simply a necessary first step for a proper liberal 
democracy to be established in Thailand. For these reasons, the Red Shirts can be 
considered agents of democratic resilience. 
One of the most important themes of Red Shirt protests was a revival of the 
pre-modern Thai terms of phrai (commoners) and ammat (aristocrats). While in 
everyday life these words had long fallen into disuse,  the Red Shirts brought them 
back as a tool to attack elite figures who allegedly sought to suppress the democratic 
will of the people.  In a 2011 interview, Red Shirt leader Natthawut Saikuea 
explained that the phrai-ammat rhetoric was a way of depicting the unequal, 
strongly hierarchical distribution of power in Thailand. He argued that the Red 
Shirts did not want to see themselves as phrai but it was the ammat who regarded 
their opponents as phrai (Thitikorn et al. 2016: 75). In this sense, phrai became a 
tool to foster a collective identity for Red Shirt protesters who came from different 
social, regional and economic backgrounds (Ferrara 2015: 250). Ferrara further 
observes that phrai in the Red Shirts’ usage also carried a meaning of ‘not being 
acknowledged as fully Thai’ (2015: 251). While it was not until the Red Shirts’ 2010 
Bangkok demonstration that the phrai-ammat discourse became prevalent, the use 
of phrai in Thailand’s post-2006 political landscape had appeared, albeit 
sporadically, in earlier anti-coup protests. For example, phrai was the main theme 
of a poem by Jakrapob Penkair which he read at an anti-coup rally in August 2007 
(Thitikorn et al. 2016: 70). 
                                                             
47 Interview, Anonymous high-ranking member of the Democrat Party, Bangkok, 12 
November 2015 
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 Given the association of phrai and ammat with the era of Thai absolute 
monarchy, the use of these terms became one of the most contentious subjects 
regarding the Red Shirts. Opponents of the Red Shirts accused them of using these 
terms as code words to conceal their real intention of attacking the monarchy and 
the Privy Council (Thitikorn et al. 2016: 76-77). It was true that the Red Shirts 
openly condemned some Privy Council members, most prominently Prem 
Tinsulanond but also others such as Surayud Chulanont and Chanchai Likitchitta 
(Thitikorn et al. 2016: 74), but Red Shirt leaders publicly stressed that the 
monarchy was not a target of their campaign (Thongchai 2014: 96). Moreover, 
attacking Privy Council members was not a new phenomenon. Before the 2006 
coup, Thaksin himself alleged that an ‘extra-constitutional charismatic person’ was 
plotting to oust him, a remark widely understood to be a reference to Prem (Surin 
2007: 355). Some speakers at Red Shirt rallies also accused the ammat of exploiting 
the monarchy for their own gains.48 While some elements of the Red Shirts had 
republican leanings, the movement as a whole did not have a clear strategy or 
message regarding the monarchy. Amidst the domination of royalism and the  strict 
application of the lèse-majesté law in Thailand, the phrai-ammat discourse may 
have served as a way for some Red Shirts to implicitly criticise the monarchy. 
Nonetheless, the military and its allies played up the image of the Red Shirts as an 
anti-monarchy group to build societal support for the army-led violent crackdown 
on the protesters in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Crisis and Confrontation in 2009 and 2010 
Echoing the treatment of Samak and Somchai by the PAD, Red Shirt protesters in 
2009 tried to constantly harass and heckle Abhisit during his visits to parts of the 
country with a strong Red Shirt presence (Chairat 2010: 311). Viewing the Abhisit 
government as illegitimate, the Red Shirts began organising major rallies against his 
government in early 2009 a few weeks after he took office. On 25 March 2009, the 
Red Shirts held a large rally at Sanam Luang in Bangkok and set up another protest 
site next to the Government House the following day. The protesters made three 
central demands. First, they wanted Prem, Surayud and Chanchai to step down 
                                                             
48 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n98mgwGV8wM (in Thai) 
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from the Privy Council. Second, they demanded the resignation of Abhisit. Third, 
they wanted the country to be governed according to “internationally accepted 
democratic standards” (Suthachai 2013). As their demands were not met, tensions 
escalated from 9 April as the protest greatly swelled in size. Protesters camped 
outside the Si Sao Tewes residence of Prem and briefly blocked streets around the 
Victory Monument in central Bangkok. While the government had the resolute 
backing of the military, the Red Shirts were hoping to stage a PAD-style prolonged 
demonstration to bring down Abhisit. 
 Another confrontation occurred in Pattaya, two hours outside Bangkok. On 
10 April, when the Thai government was hosting the fifteenth ASEAN summit, a 
group led by Red Shirt hardliners Arisman Pongruangrong and Surachai 
Danwattananusorn travelled to the summit venue in Pattaya to file a petition 
rejecting the legitimacy of Abhisit’s government to the ASEAN Secretariat. Near the 
venue, the Red Shirts were met by a group of provocateurs donning dark blue shirts, 
allegedly linked to Newin Chidchob (Suthachai 2013). The ensuing chaos led to an 
embarrassing  evacuation of foreign leaders from the venue and the cancellation of 
the summit (Chairat 2010: 307-308). On 12 April, amidst rumours that Abhisit was 
close to declaring a state of emergency in order to forcefully disperse the Red Shirts 
in Bangkok, another Red Shirt hardliner Suporn Attawong led a group to confront 
the Prime Minister at the Interior Ministry. The protesters surrounded and 
assaulted a car carrying Abhisit, an incident that turned public opinion strongly 
against the Red Shirts (Suthachai 2013). The military made its move on 13 April 
upon the declaration of a state of emergency. Troops led by Major General Paiboon 
Kumchaya, who would later become an influential Justice Minister in the 2014 coup 
regime and subsequently join King Vajiralongkorn’s Privy Council in December 
2016, used live bullets and tear gas to disperse Red Shirt protesters in the early 
morning (Suthachai 2013). Sensing that the military clearly had the upper hand, 
Red Shirt leaders declared an end to their demonstration on 14 April. Two Red Shirt 
security guards were later found dead although it was unclear whether the military’s 
crackdown had caused their deaths (Suthachai 2013). It became evident from this 
episode that unlike the military’s previous refusal to protect the Samak and Somchai 
governments from the PAD, this time the military would be prepared to use force to 
defend Abhisit from civil disorder. As Finer points out (1988: 138-139), when a 
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military actively chooses whether or not to protect a civilian government from 
disorder, it is undemocratically intervening in politics because it is playing a strong 
part in determining the government’s survival. 
The Red Shirts regrouped in early 2010, staging a new round of anti-Abhisit 
demonstration in Bangkok following a Supreme Court decision to seize 46 billion 
baht in assets belonging to Thaksin in February 2010 (McCargo 2014: 431-432). The 
central demand of their demonstration this time was for the government to call a 
new election. Sensing the increased intensity of the protest, the military allowed 
Abhisit and Suthep to spend most of their time at the 11th Infantry Headquarters in 
northern Bangkok. A ‘war room’ was set up inside the Headquarters so that the 
government and army leaders could closely cooperate and manage the situation 
(Chambers 2013a: 326-327). Abhisit held several rounds of negotiations with Red 
Shirt leaders in March but both sides failed to come to an agreement. There were 
also concerns among military leaders that some of their subordinates could secretly 
be disloyal to the top brass. A frequently heard expression tahan taengmo or 
‘watermelon soldiers’—green on the outside, red on the inside—referred to soldiers 
who sympathised with the Red Shirts (BBC Thai 22 September 2017). The most 
prominent pro-Red military officer at the time was Major General Khattiya 
Sawasdipol, popularly known as Seh Daeng. He was an active duty maverick officer 
who oversaw the training of a group of Red Shirt security guards called King 
Taksin’s Warriors (Naruemon and McCargo 2011: 997). Allegedly, he was also the 
mastermind behind violent elements in the Red Shirts such as those who launched 
various grenade attacks on targets linked to the military, the government and the 
PAD (Chambers 2013a: 328-329; Nostitz 2014: 184). According to a retired army 
general who knew him, Seh Daeng was a highly determined person who was willing 
to sacrifice friendship in pursuit of personal political goals.49 Other military officers 
suspected of having ties with the Red Shirts included known Thaksin associates 
Panlop Pinmanee, Prin Suwannathat, Manas Paorik and Pornchai Kranlert 
(Chambers 2013a: 328). Rumours of a potential split in the army fuelled a sense 
that this time the Red Shirts could come out on top. 
 As the Red Shirts embarked on a permanent occupation of two key Bangkok 
areas of Rachadamnoen and Rachaprasong from March 2010, the Abhisit 
                                                             
49 Interview, Anonymous retired army general 2, Bangkok, 9 November 2015 
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government and the military practically assumed a crisis mode. The government 
ramped up its information operation by setting up a new Center for the Resolution 
of the Emergency Situation (CRES), appointing Suthep Thaugsuban as its director 
and granting the military sweeping powers in dealing with the demonstration. With 
its control of state media, the government was able to continuously broadcast its 
justifications of its heavy-handed approach in managing the crisis. It coined benign-
sounding terms such as “Reclaiming the Area” and “Tightening the Cordon”, using 
them as euphemisms for army-led crackdowns on the protesters (The People’s 
Information Center 2017: 7-8). A violent clash between the military and a 
mysterious armed group known as the ‘Men in Black’ on 10 April at the Red Shirts’ 
Rachadamnoen rally site left 26 people dead, including five soldiers. One of the 
soldiers killed in the incident was Colonel Romklao Thuwatham, a rising star 
rumoured to be a favourite of the queen (Chambers 2013a: 328).  
The 10 April incident could have persuaded Red Shirt leaders to call off the 
demonstration in order to prevent further losses of lives. Instead, they kept the 
rallies going because “most of the protesters were still enraged over what had 
happened… and wanted Suthep Thaugsuban, Director of the CRES, to turn himself 
in to the police to show accountability” (The People’s Information Center 2017: 8). 
The clash on 10 April also created a sense of uncertainty within the military. Some 
of the army’s operations during the Red Shirt rallies were poorly executed. One 
incident on 28 April resulted in a death of a young soldier due to ‘friendly fire’ 
(Nostitz 2014: 184). While army chief Anupong began to have doubts about 
continuing to pursue a hardline approach towards the protesters, some of his 
subordinates, particularly future leader of the 2014 coup Prayuth Chan-ocha, 
remained in favour of keeping the same unrelenting stance (Chambers 2013a: 329). 
As for the Red Shirts, a split also occurred between moderates and hardliners. Veera 
Musikapong, who favoured a compromise with the government, resigned from his 
leadership position, allowing hardliners to exert more influence over the remaining 
protesters (Nostitz 2014: 185). In the end, public opinion turned against the 
protesters who were regarded as stubborn and unreasonable. Despite last-minute 
attempts at negotiations by a group of Senators, troops began their violent dispersal 
of the protesters on 13 May. Seh Daeng, whose tactical acumen could have caused 
trouble for the army, was shot by a sniper and died on 17 May (Chambers 2013a: 
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329). Upon the completion of the crackdown on 19 May, more than 90 people were 
killed, the majority of whom were unarmed protesters (The People’s Information 
Center 2017: 5-6). Lertrat Ratanavanich, a Senator involved in the failed negotiation 
efforts, claimed that it was “the government side that refused to give up their plan of 
suppression of the mass protest because this plan was already carefully conceived of 
in detail” (The People’s Information Center 2017: 8). 
Despite the fact that the violent crackdown further deepened the division in 
Thai society, the military regarded it as a success (The People’s Information Center 
2017: 76). The Abhisit government and the military consistently promoted the view 
that the Red Shirts had dangerous armed elements which made the crackdown 
necessary (Nostitz 2014: 186). Officers involved in the crackdown received 
promotions in the 2010 October reshuffles. With Anupong reaching mandatory 
retirement, the job of army chief went to Prayuth Chan-ocha, cementing the 
domination of the Eastern Tigers faction in the army. The elevation of Prayuth was 
significant because he would have a chance to be army chief for four years until 
reaching mandatory retirement, a remarkably long time. Daopong Rattanasuwan, a 
leading figure in the May crackdown who did not belong to the Eastern Tigers 
faction, also received a notable promotion (Chambers 2013a: 330). Daopong would 
later become Education Minister in Prayuth’s 2014 coup-installed government 
before subsequently becoming a member of King Vajiralongkorn’s Privy Council in 
December 2016.  
Nonetheless, as the Abhisit government approached the end of its term in 
mid-2011, Thailand once again faced the prospects of being governed by a Thaksin-
backed party despite the quiet confidence among some in the government that this 
time the Democrats could beat Thaksin’s PTP. For example, DP deputy leader Korn 
Chatikavanij believed that, based on pre-election polls, DP would beat PTP in the 
2011 election (Voice TV 18 June 2011). During the run-up to the election, Prayuth 
recorded a message, broadcast on military-owned television stations Channel 5 and 
Channel 7, in which he urged Thai voters to ensure that this election would not 
produce a ‘more of the same’ outcome and to elect ‘good people’ to protect the 
nation and the monarchy (BBC Thai 22 September 2017). As it turned out, 
Thaksin’s inexperienced sister Yingluck Shinawatra led PTP to a stunning victory in 
the July 2011 general election and once again consigned DP to the opposition. The 
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electoral triumph of PTP was said to have considerably damaged Prayuth’s self-
confidence (Matichon Weekly 8-14 July 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
In the context of Thailand’s post-2006 politics, the military-backed 2007 
constitution gave more power and influence to various state organs to act as 
countervailing forces against the elected government. Nonetheless, bringing down 
the Thaksin-aligned Samak and Somchai governments still required questionable 
decisions by the Constitutional Court as well as the involvement of the military in a 
deal to establish the Abhisit coalition government. Under these conditions, the Red 
Shirts emerged as the largest mass group to push back against these anti-
democratic developments. Their democratic resilience, though hindered by issues 
such as Thaksin’s significant sway over the movement, was a quality that 
distinguished them from the military. As can be seen from the military’s atctions 
throughout Abhisit’s premiership, the military intended to preserve the post-2006 
political order that had rolled back Thailand’s democratic development over the 
preceding 15 years. Although it could suppress the Red Shirts’ demonstrations in 
2009 and 2010, in the end it was unable to prevent the victory of Thaksin’s PPT in 
the 2011 election. 
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Chapter 6 
The 2014 Coup and Anti-Democratic Politics 
 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer two major questions. Why did the 2014 military coup 
take place? Why has the resultant military regime, led by the National Council for 
Peace and Order (NCPO), endured? The chapter first examines the events leading to 
the coup, arguing that a combination of protesters, the Democrat Party and 
powerful unelected institutions greatly weakened the government of Yingluck 
Shinawatra and created a situation of power vacuum that provided a pretext for 
military intervention. It then argues that the military’s job has been made easier by 
the lack of resistance from the pro-Thaksin Red-Shirt movement, which could be 
because of a secret deal between Thaksin and the conservative elite. Next, drawing 
on the framework provided by Gerschewski (2013) regarding the three pillars of 
legitimation, repression and co-optation as foundations of autocratic regimes, the 
chapter explores the junta’s actions strength and endurance. While the events 
leading up to the 2014 coup have important similarities to the chaotic situation 
prior to the 2006 coup, the 2014 junta has learned some important lessons from its 
2006 predecessor. The NCPO’s determination not to repeat the same mistakes can 
help explain its undemocratic tendencies. 
Reflecting on Thailand’s recent political development, Italian scholar Claudio 
Sopranzetti wrote in 2016: 
Before the 2014 coup, many scholars—including myself—believed a 
return to military rule was unthinkable, if not at the risk of a 
widespread uprising. We were wrong. As events have proven, 
Thailand’s democratization remains haunted by the possibility of 
relapses into authoritarian rule. (Sopranzetti 2016: 18) 
His wrong prediction, in some ways, was understandable. Thailand’s 22 May 
2014 military coup, which toppled the democratically elected government of 
Yingluck Shinawatra, the youngest sister of the highly influential self-exiled former 
premier Thaksin Shinawatra, has defied expectations in a number of ways. Given 
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the widespread anti-dictatorship sentiment among Thaksin supporters and other 
sectors of the Thai population since the previous coup in 2006, Sopranzetti opted to 
take the optimistic view that Thailand had learned to reject another sustained 
period of military rule. If, as seen in 2009 and 2010, it had been evident that tens or 
perhaps hundreds of thousands of Red-Shirt supporters could be swiftly mobilised 
against perceived enemies of Thaksin, there should have been little incentive for the 
armed forces to oust a Thaksin-aligned administration from power again so soon. 
Instead, the 2014 coup has thus far been able to impose military rule on the country 
for more than two years. Coup leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha appointed himself 
Prime Minister as well as head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), 
which is the name the junta chose to call itself. His rule has already outlasted each 
of Thailand’s two immediate preceding coup-installed governments. The 
government of Anand Panyarachun, put in place by the 1991 coup, lasted 
approximately one year. Surayud Chulanont’s government persisted for around one 
year and four months following the 2006 coup. 
If the potential of an anti-military mass protest alone was not enough to 
deter army leaders, the post-2006 political structure of Thailand itself had already 
seemed to have rendered another coup unnecessary. The military-sponsored 2007 
constitution restricted the power of elected politicians while giving unelected bodies 
such as the judiciary, independent agencies and half of the Senate50 more say in how 
the country would be run (Ockey 2008: 22). If the aim of the constitution was to 
eliminate or at least contain Thaksin’s vast electoral influence, these counter-
majoritarian mechanisms appeared to work as intended. The year 2008, for 
example, saw the Constitution Court issue rulings that removed two pro-Thaksin 
prime ministers, Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat, and dissolved the 
pro-Thaksin People’s Power Party (PPP), additionally slapping 109 PPP executives 
with a five-year ban from politics. Thus, assuming that a principal purpose of the 
2007 constitution was to secure a long-term position of influence for the military 
and other conservative unelected actors, the fact that another coup was needed 
suggests that not everything had gone as planned. The 2011 election, which saw the 
                                                             
50 The Senate was changed from a 200-member wholly elected body under the 1997 
constitution to a half-elected, half appointed 150-member upper house under the 
2007 constitution. 
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pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai Party (PTP) win 265 out of 500 parliamentary seats, was a 
clear indication that Thaksin’s appeal could not be easily diminished.  
The occurrence of the 2014 coup has not been the only setback for Thailand’s 
democracy, however. As the generals continue to impose their will on the country 
without encountering much opposition, the NCPO coup is shaping up to be one of 
the most consequential coups in the country’s history. While observers such as 
McCargo (2014b) and Porphant (2014) could see some early signs that this 
particular coup would be different from previous ones, the unexpected durability of 
the current coup-installed regime has important implications not only for Thais but 
also for democratic theorists and advocates elsewhere. Why, after all, has it been 
possible in today’s global environment for the 2014 junta to be so openly repressive? 
Why have prominent government and military figures had no qualms about publicly 
expressing their disdain for democratic politics, which they blame for causing 
conflicts and corruption? Furthermore, the junta has brought back certain 
practices—previously thought to be out of fashion—from earlier eras of military 
rule, such as naming the coup leader as Prime Minister, giving important cabinet 
jobs to senior serving military officers, and proposing to reserve parliamentary seats 
for senior military officers even after the end of junta rule. Considering these events, 
Sopranzetti’s characterisation of Thailand’s post-2014 developments as a “relapse 
into anti-democratic tendencies” (2016: 6) is an accurate portrayal. 
 
Background of the May 2014 Coup: A Case of Déjà Vu 
There is a case to be made that the 2014 putsch is one part of the ‘twin’ anti-Thaksin 
coups, with the 2006 coup being the other part (Baker 2016: 2). Both coups were 
staged to remove Thaksin and his associates from power. Both were carried out 
against elected governments with large parliamentary majorities. Both were also 
preceded by rowdy, well-attended, highly determined and occasionally violent street 
demonstrations in Bangkok lasting several months, involving losses of lives, 
damages to public properties and constant disruption of government operation. The 
military instigators of both coups gave the public similar reasons for taking power, 
citing the need to restore order, protect the monarchy from alleged threats and get 
rid of corrupt politicians (International Crisis Group 2014: 16). Moreover, both 
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coups shared broadly the same popular support base (Aim and Arugay 2015: 112). It 
was common for anti-Thaksin protesters from 2005-2006 to turn up in the streets 
again in 2013-2014, even though the core leaders of those two rounds of 
demonstrations were different. Most importantly, both the 2006 and 2014 coups 
took place following extended periods of turmoil, political impasse and power 
vacuum that had been caused not only by the demonstrators but also by political 
parties and other agents and institutions of the state. 
 The People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), the protest group that 
took to the streets against the Yingluck government, appeared to have learned 
several lessons from earlier rounds of major demonstrations that Thailand had seen 
over the past decade. Throughout those years, the Thaksin-aligned political faction 
and his opponents have repeatedly shown the inability and unwillingness to 
compromise, resulting in the use of confrontational tactics and brinkmanship by 
both sides. Amid all the damages, losses of lives and economic costs, it had become 
evident that mass protests could severely weaken Thaksin-backed parties and 
governments, rendering their parliamentary majorities and control of state power 
virtually meaningless. When Yingluck Shinawatra led the Pheu Thai Party to a 
decisive victory in the 3 July 2011 election, it was only a matter of time before anti-
Thaksin groups would converge in the streets again (Baker 2016: 4). 
The PDRC was formed on 29 November 2013, giving a name and a sense of 
organisation to the anti-government protest that had already been underway. A 
month earlier, protesters converged in Bangkok to demonstrate against the ruling 
Yingluck government (International Crisis Group 2014: 10). The catalyst for the 
demonstration was the passage in the lower house of parliament of an amnesty bill 
that the government said would help bring Thai society towards reconciliation. The 
bill was highly controversial because the opposition Democrat Party (DP) and other 
anti-Thaksin groups viewed it as a scheme to whitewash Thaksin’s criminal 
convictions and thus allow him to return freely to Thailand (The Guardian 11 
November 2013). The bill would also absolve former Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva and former Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, both leading DP 
members, of the charges related to the 2010 crackdown of Red-Shirt protesters, but 
ironically it was Suthep who took the leading role in mobilising protesters against 
the bill. The government eventually relented, agreeing to drop its support for the 
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bill. This strategic move failed to placate the protesters, however. Sensing 
momentum, the PDRC leaders shifted the aim of the protest (or “upgraded the 
protest” in PDRC parlance) from stopping the amnesty bill to outright overthrowing 
the government (International Crisis Group 2014: 10-11) and began to employ 
increasingly aggressive methods to pursue that goal. The protesters later framed 
their demands around the notion of ‘reform’, arguing that Thailand’s electoral 
democracy would need to be suspended for an unspecified amount of time until a 
‘People’s Council’, consisting of individuals not associated with any political party, 
could undertake wide-ranging programmes to eradicate corrupt politicians and 
state officials (MThai 12 December 2013). 
 For observers of Thai politics, the PDRC protest was a familiar sight in some 
ways. Thailand has grown used to major anti-government demonstrations since the 
days of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which first demonstrated 
against Thaksin in 2005-2006. There are notable similarities in some of the 
methods used by the PAD and the PDRC. Government buildings were targeted, 
normal operation of the government was greatly disrupted and the protesters 
showed almost no willingness to compromise. Both groups also broadcast their 
rallies on dedicated television channels, whose in-house reporters keenly covered 
the protests and helped bridge the distance between the protest sites and the 
viewers at home (Baker 2016: 4). Both relied on eclectic groups of on-stage 
speakers, mixing skilled orators who could be trusted to rouse the crowd with 
academics and civil society activists who added credibility to the movements.  Many 
of the same methods were present at pro-Thaksin Red-Shirt rallies in 2009 and 
2010 as well. However, unlike the PAD’s core leaders who—except former Palang 
Dharma Party leader Chamlong Srimuang—mostly had non-parliamentary 
background, many of the PDRC’s leaders were drawn from the Democrat Party. 
Apart from Suthep, DP figures who became prominent in the PDRC included 
Thaworn Senniam, Witthaya Kaewparadai, Sathit Wongnongtoey, Puttipong 
Punnakan, Issara Somchai, Akanas Prompan and Chitpas Kridakorn. The root of 
the DP’s shift from traditional parliamentary politics towards mass activism can 
arguably be found at Suthep Thaugsuban’s decision to quit the powerful position of 
DP Secretary-General in July 2011. At the time, Suthep remarked that he was 
leaving the job in order to devote his energy to creating a DP mass support base to 
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counter the Red Shirts, who had reliably turned out in numbers to rally and vote for 
Thaksin’s parties (Siam Intelligence 31 August 2011). It should be noted, however, 
that non-DP groups also had considerable influence within the PDRC particularly in 
the later weeks of the protest, a point I will return to later in this chapter. 
Large-scale anti-government mass protests in 1973 and 1992 are two of the 
best-regarded events in Thai history. Drawing on these events, the PAD was largely 
responsible for instilling in the public’s mind the idea of how a strong-willed and 
well-equipped mass protest movement can destabilise a government in twenty-first 
century Thailand. The PDRC, however, considerably ramped up the anti-democratic 
rhetoric. While both groups claimed that electoral politics in Thailand was broken, 
the PAD never went as far as to oppose elections or actively prevent a general 
election from happening. Some PAD members even set up a political party and 
competed in general elections (Prajak 2016: 7). In contrast, the PDRC’s steely 
determination to ‘temporarily’ suspend electoral politics saw the protesters 
successfully disrupt a large part of the 2 February 2014 election, which had been 
called by the Yingluck government to reaffirm its legitimacy. Among other things, 
PDRC protesters blocked access to polling stations, harassed election officials and 
stormed a building where ballot papers were being printed (Prajak 2016: 12-13). 
The anti-election rhetoric was prevalent in PDRC rallies, and the failure of the 2 
February election was a major contributor to the sense of anarchy and power 
vacuum engulfing the country prior to the May 2014 coup (International Crisis 
Group 2014: 12). Many PDRC protesters and sympathisers argued that Thailand’s 
electoral politics had failed not only because of allegedly rampant vote-buying but 
also because voters in rural areas often lacked the knowledge required to make 
informed decisions. Exemplifying this line of thinking, Chirmsak Pinthong, a 
television host, academic and PDRC ideologue, wrote several months before the 
PDRC’s emergence:  
In a dog contest, we require a majority of votes by the judges. The 
judges need to be well-informed on dog matters. Yet in Thailand, we 
have a contest to choose people to serve as members of parliament, 
senators, ministers and even Prime Minister, but the judges of this 
contest (the voters) can be anyone. They don’t have to be well-informed 
on political matters. Each person has one vote, equally. Does this mean 
that we set a higher standard for a dog contest than for a contest to 
choose the people who will run the country? If we want good and 
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competent politicians, the first thing we need to do is to have qualified 
judges. We need to be confident that the judges are politically well-
informed, perhaps by requiring them to pass an exam before they have 
a right to vote for politicians. (Chirmsak 2013) 
While PDRC leaders often maintained that they were not in favour of a 
military coup, claiming that the PDRC themselves would be the ‘sovereign’ (rat tha 
ti pat) who would implement reform measures after kicking the government out 
(Prajak 2016: 9), the implausibility of their “Reform before Election” rhetoric and 
demands suggested that they were not as interested in genuine reform as in merely 
causing chaos and paving the way for other actors, most probably the military, to 
‘finish the job’. Even some of the protesters themselves probably did not have much 
faith in the notion of reform; they simply wanted to throw out a government they 
did not like. In this sense, the PDRC transformed from a movement that opposed 
the amnesty bill to one that was ‘knocking at the barracks’, to use Linz’s (1978: 30) 
expression. Based on a period of on-the-ground observation of the PDRC by a 
senior army officer who later went on to work for the NCPO’s leadership,51 the most 
important issue that energised the PDRC protest was neither the amnesty bill nor 
the dreams of reforming the country but the allegations of large-scale corruption 
under the Yingluck government, particularly those involving the rice-pledging 
scheme that had been a flagship policy of Pheu Thai (International Crisis Group 
2014: 11). A lack of concrete reform plan that would have a reasonable chance of 
success was a recurring feature of the PDRC. For example, political scientist Sombat 
Thamrongtanyawong, speaking as a PDRC supporter, claimed in December 2013 
that electoral politics would need to be suspended for as long as necessary until the 
proposed People’s Council could eliminate vote-buying, a persistent problem in 
Thailand’s elections, but he failed to explain how exactly to achieve such a lofty aim 
(Thai Democracy 2013). Reforming Thailand’s police force, another one of the 
PDRC’s goals, was a similarly ambitious proposal that suffered likewise from a lack 
of seriousness. The PDRC seemed better at identifying problems that offering 
solutions. 
The PDRC protesters, while undoubtedly important, were not the only factor 
that undermined the democratically elected government of Yingluck. By boycotting 
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the 2 February election and allowing many of its members to join the PDRC, the 
Democrat Party threw its weight behind the anti-election discourse. The Democrat’s 
previous election boycott in 2006, a decision taken in conjunction with Chart Thai 
Party and Mahachon Party, helped to create the political deadlock that partly 
enabled the military to seize power in September that year. Some DP members, 
including Suthep himself, formally quit the party to fully participate in PDRC 
activism, while other leading members such as Abhisit Vejjajiva and Korn 
Chatikavanij showed up at protest sites on various occasions. The Blue Sky Channel, 
the main television channel covering the protest, had strong links with the 
Democrats and regularly featured DP members on its programmes. Many of the 
protesters in later weeks of the demonstration were also bussed in from the DP’s 
stronghold in the south (Baker 2016: 5). Furthermore, all 152 Democrat MPs 
resigned from parliament en masse in December 2013 to put pressure on the 
Yingluck government (The Nation 9 December 2013). In tandem with the PDRC, 
the Democrat Party resembled what Linz (1978: 27-38) calls a ‘disloyal opposition’, 
meaning that both the party and the protesters were actively opposing not just the 
democratically elected government of the day but also the existing democratic 
regime itself.  
It is important, though, to note that not every Democrat Party member was 
fully committed to the PDRC’s cause. Party leader Abhisit, while broadly supportive 
of the protesters, hinted that he was more interested in contesting an election than 
the PDRC’s reform rhetoric (Thai Rath 25 March 2014). Veteran DP politician 
Pichet Panwichatkul also denounced the PDRC’s disruption of the February 2014 
polls (Prachatai 6 February 2014). A leading Democrat politician confirmed that 
there were PDRC-related tensions within the party and many members were not 
aware of Suthep’s true intentions.52 One thing to keep in mind, however, is that any 
dispute within the party regarding the PDRC was likely to be part of a broader rift 
between Abhisit’s and Suthep’s factions. A significant sign of the rift could be 
detected when Sukhumbhand Paribatra, the controversial DP Governor of Bangkok 
rumoured to be aligned with Suthep, was dramatically expelled from the Democrat 
Party in January 2016 (Krungthep Turakij 23 January 2016). 
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In addition, as the protest went on, it became evident that the PDRC was far 
from being a united movement that a small group of Democrat-affiliated individuals 
could dominate. In fact, as more protest sites were set up in locations across 
Bangkok, the influence of non-Democrat groups within the PDRC gradually became 
more prominent. Groups such as the Network of Students and People for Reform of 
Thailand, the group linked with Rangsit University and the group led by Buddhist 
monk Buddha Issara were handed responsibilities over different protest sites. 
Buddha Issara even remarked at one point that his protest site, at the massive 
Chaeng Wattana government complex in northern Bangkok, had considerable 
autonomy from Suthep (Sanook 28 January 2014). Thus, while the Democrat Party 
played a major role in the early phase of the protest, the PDRC later grew to be an 
umbrella movement in which different groups formed their own spheres of 
influence. 
Other key contributors to the pre-coup crisis include the Election 
Commission (EC) and the Constitution Court. The Election Commission, made up 
of five commissioners serving seven-year terms, is the body responsible for 
organising elections in Thailand both at the national and the local levels. It has 
extensive powers to manage elections, investigate electoral irregularities and file 
criminal charges against candidates and others deemed to have violated electoral 
laws (Office of the Election Commission of Thailand n. d.). Despite supposedly 
being politically neutral, the EC showed a remarkable lack of effort in organising the 
2 February 2014 election. While it was true that violence flared up during the 
election season in parts of the country where PDRC support was strong, making it 
difficult for candidates, election officials and voters alike to participate in the 
electoral process (McCargo 2015b: 342), the EC failed to perform its duties to the 
best of its abilities. As PDRC protesters managed to force the cancellations of voting 
in large parts of Bangkok and provinces in southern Thailand by blocking access to 
voting stations, the EC refused to endorse the election results and would not set the 
date for by-elections in constituencies where voting was disrupted (Ferrara 2015: 
287; Prajak 2016: 14). Somchai Srisutthiyakorn, an outspoken and media-savvy 
Election Commissioner, was seen taking photos with PDRC protesters in Bangkok, 
publicly expressed doubts about whether the election could go ahead and said 
shortly before the polling day that he would prefer to see the election postponed 
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(New York Times 22 January 2014). "As election officials, it is our job to make sure 
elections are successful, but we also need to make sure the country is peaceful 
enough to hold the election," he told reporters (Reuters 27 January 2014). The EC’s 
claim—that proceeding with the election would lead to further chaos—is 
undermined by the fact that elections have taken place in countries ravaged by 
worse levels of violence and disorder than Thailand, such as Afghanistan (BBC 14 
June 2014). The Thai EC’s reluctance to fulfil its obligations helped to legitimise the 
PDRC’s sabotage of the election. 
The Constitution Court’s important role in Thai politics, particularly since 
2001, has been well-documented (Dressel 2010a; McCargo 2014a; Mérieau 2016). 
The Thai judiciary has been involved in a number of key political episodes, issuing 
rulings that affected the survival of governments, political parties and other players 
on the political scene. The Constitutional Court, established under the 1997 
Constitution, has come to be viewed as a court of last resort, being relied upon to 
deliver a solution for seemingly intractable political problems. It has removed three 
serving Prime Ministers from office, disbanded several political parties, and barred 
a significant number of prominent politicians from competing in elections (Dressel 
2010a; McCargo 2014a). While on certain occasions the courts managed to restore 
calm to society, some of their rulings simply fuelled more tension. In the period 
leading up to the 2014 military coup, the Constitution Court made three especially 
controversial rulings. The first one, made on 20 November 2013, struck down 
Parliament’s proposed constitutional amendment that would have transformed the 
Senate from a half-elected, half-appointed body to a fully elected chamber (New 
York Times 22 January 2014). The second ruling, on 7 May 2014, removed Yingluck 
Shinawatra from Prime Minister as a result of a case involving the transfer of 
Thawil Pliensri, a previous Secretary-General of Thailand’s National Security 
Council, which the court considered to be an abuse of power (Ferrara 2015: 288). 
The Court’s third ruling, made on 21 March 2014, annulled the February 2014 
election due to the fact that voting could not be completed in one day throughout 
Thailand  (Ferrara 2015: 287; Prajak 2016: 14). These rulings struck heavy blows 
upon the government and bolstered the PDRC protest, though Pheu Thai’s own 
reaction against the constitutional amendment ruling also proved to be unwise. In 
the wake of that ruling, the party made the unusual move of declaring its opposition 
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to the Court’s judgement. This bold move did the party few favours, and PDRC 
protesters were then able to claim that the government was disrespecting the Court 
and therefore became illegitimate (Prajak 2016: 8). 
The endless protest, the annulled election and the government’s inability to 
enforce order increasingly pushed Thai politics toward a dead end. Yet, by early 
2014 there had been few clear signs that a military coup was imminent. Army 
leaders publicly declared their neutrality, refusing to be dragged into any talk of a 
possible coup to end the chaos (Reuters 13 December 2013). Jittanat Limthongkul, 
an anti-Thaksin commentator and son of former PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul, 
remarked with exasperation that General Prayuth, who as army commander-in-
chief was the most powerful military officer in the country, seemed “infatuated” 
with Yingluck (Jittanat 2013). Prayuth himself gave confusing signs regarding his 
intention. In December 2013 he did not rule out a coup, saying that the door was 
open for all options (The Nation 27 December 2013). Yet, as violent incidents 
related to the PDRC protest became more deadly and frequent, on 24 February 2014 
Prayuth appeared on television to declare that a military intervention would not be 
the right answer to the crisis (Manager Online 24 February 2014).   
 In the following month, there was clearer evidence of the military’s 
preparations for a coup. After having mostly left it to the police to deal with the 
protesters, the army grew more assertive in March and started placing makeshift 
military bunkers at various locations around Bangkok (MCOT 7 March 2014). The 
increased military presence in the capital began to be noticed but still failed to put 
an end to PDRC-related violence. As late as 10 May 2014, Prayuth still refused to be 
drawn into coup talks, remarking that he did not believe a coup would solve 
anything (Chaophraya News 10 May 2014). On 15 May, after assailants had brutally 
attacked PDRC protesters with firearms and an M79 grenade, the army issued a 
strongly-worded statement condemning the incident and declaring the army’s 
readiness to stop the violence (Wassana 2014: 177-180). When Prayuth unilaterally 
declared martial law on 20 May, a coup became a highly probable outcome 
(International Crisis Group 2014: 16). Apparently undaunted by the fact that the 
2007 constitution did not allow the army chief to declare martial law by himself, 
Prayuth used his martial law powers to summon representatives from the PDRC, 
the government, the Democrat Party and the Red Shirts to negotiate with each other 
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face-to-face. The supposed negotiations lasted two days. At the end of the second 
day, with all parties refusing to back down, Prayuth announced his power grab 
(Ferrara 2015: 289). 
At this point, two questions remain. First, why was the coup necessary if it 
had been clear that the Yingluck government had already seen its power diminished 
by court rulings and the uncooperative Election Commission? Military coups, 
despite their frequency throughout Thai history, have mostly been an extreme 
option, and army officers involved in a coup plan are essentially risking their lives 
and careers. A repeat of a 2008-style ‘judicial coup’ would have provided a softer 
image for the country, drawn fewer criticisms from abroad and allowed the military 
to stay out of the limelight. The answer to this question is not clear, but one 
possibility is that the Thai judiciary, due to its increased involvement in politically-
charged issues over the past decade, has generated so much controversy and come 
under such strong criticisms that it has lost much of its respectability and perceived 
status as a neutral arbiter of conflicts. Some of the Constitution Court’s most 
contentious rulings have provoked negative reactions not only from Thaksin 
supporters but also from academics, most prominently the group of Thammasat 
University law scholars known as Nitirat (McCargo and Peeradej 2015). If the Thai 
elite had hoped to continue relying on court decisions to overcome Thaksin, they 
may have started to realise that incessant politicisation of the judiciary would be 
less effective over time and risk turning the cherished courts into another one of 
those permanently discredited Thai institutions. The PTP’s opposition to the 
Constitution Court’s constitutional amendment ruling in November 2013 was a sign 
that the Thaksin camp began to feel emboldened enough to confront the judiciary, 
while Nitirat’s direct criticisms of the Constitution Court had made the group 
increasingly popular among Thaksin supporters and other sectors of the population. 
Thus, the military coup was arguably seen as a more effective way to end the chaos. 
The second question is why the military took as long as it did to stage the 
20114 coup. Nearly seven months passed between the start of the anti-Yingluck 
protest and the May 2014 coup. Had the coup occurred earlier, there would have 
been fewer deaths, violent incidents and economic damages related to the protest. 
McCargo (2015b: 350) argues that this delay demonstrated the generals’ reluctance 
to intervene. I would add that from the Thai military’s perspective, a decision to 
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carry out a coup should never be taken hastily. One army officer close to the NCPO 
leadership pointed out that the 2006 coup had been staged without proper 
planning.53 According to him, troops aligned with Thaksin had a real chance of 
fighting back on the night of 19 September 2006, and the coup, while ultimately 
bloodless, actually came close to triggering an open firefight that would have cost 
lives. He also believed that the allegations of wrongdoing against the Thaksin 
government in 2006 had been largely vague, in contrast to the more serious 
corruption allegations surrounding the Yingluck government. The 2014 coup, he 
argued, was also better planned in the sense that there was no chance for resistance 
by the government or its potential allies. For these reasons, he was supportive of the 
2014 coup but not the 2006 one. Overall, the question of why the coup took place in 
May 2014—and not before—could be answered partly by the military’s reluctance 
but also partly by the idea that the military, having learned a lesson from 2006, took 
its time in order to ensure the coup’s success. 
The events leading up to the 2014 coup resemble those that paved the way for 
the 2006 one in many ways. The army in both instances did not stage the coups 
against governments that were in a position of strength. The governments in both 
events had been paralysed by mass protests and unfavourable court rulings. 
Opposition parties played a role in pushing the situations toward gridlock. The 
breakdowns of democracy in both 2006 and 2014 involved disloyal oppositions 
which were willing to defect from the democratic process in order to bring down the 
governments. The main differences between the 2006 and 2014 military regimes lie 
in what they did after assuming power. 
 
The Quiet Red Shirts 
The military’s seizure of power on 22 May 2014 went swiftly and surprisingly 
smoothly. It was a surprise because for around six weeks up to the day of the coup, 
the pro-Thaksin Red Shirts had been holding a rally in support of the Yingluck 
government in a suburban area to the west of Bangkok, close to a resident of Crown 
Prince Vajiralongkorn (The Nation 5 April 2014). The Red Shirts overtly declared 
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affection for the Crown Prince (McCargo 2015b: 347-348), sparking wild 
speculations as to what they were hoping to gain from that. For reasons that have 
not been clear, the Red Shirts did not put up much of a resistance to the coup either 
on 22 May or afterwards. The military may have known beforehand that it could 
carry out the coup without having to battle the Red Shirts. When Pheu Thai won the 
2011 election, there were speculations that a deal was in place between Thaksin and 
the conservative elite which allowed Yingluck to govern as long as her government 
refrained from undermining the monarchy and the military (International Crisis 
Group 2014: 9). This theory appeared to gain credibility in late 2012 when an anti-
government rally led by Boonlert Kaewprasit, a retired army general, fizzled out due 
to a lack of support by most actors in the anti-Thaksin coalition (Phuket Gazette 25 
November 2012). Had Boonlert’s rally been backed more strongly by Thaksin’s 
influential opponents, it is reasonable to assume that the rally could have caused 
serious trouble for the government. An important source of strength for the PDRC 
was the support it received from the conservative elite and some business groups 
(Prajak 2016: 8; Baker 2016: 5). Running the PDRC’s campaign cost more than 10 
million Thai baht (approximately 245,000 GBP) per day (The Nation 17 January 
2014). It is hard to believe that such a large amount of money was raised through 
small donations alone. 
 To further confirm the deal theory, an internal US State Department memo, 
released as part of the Hilary Clinton email affair, shows the extent to which the 
Yingluck government attempted to build a good relationship with the military and 
the palace. In a 2011 meeting with an American embassy official, Yingluck was 
quoted as saying: 
I’m determined to use my mandate to bring people together and foster 
reconciliation, like I said in the campaign. I’m working hard to win 
over the military and help them see they have a real place here without 
interfering in politics. I’m working hard to do the same with the palace. 
But let’s face it: democracy here is still fragile. We need the US 
engaged. (Brooks 2011) 
 Another sign of there being a deal in place can be found in events 
surrounding Thailand’s mid-2011 floods, the country’s worst in decades. After 
having badly mishandled the flood crisis which engulfed large parts of the country, 
the Yingluck government appeared to receive backing from the palace when Sumet 
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Tantivejkul, a long-time advisor to the king, was appointed to a government 
committee set up to resolve the situation. Given the close bond between Sumet and 
the palace, it was highly probable that Sumet’s appointment was blessed by the king 
(Brooks 2011). Furthermore, a Pheu Thai politician who worked closely with 
Yingluck believed that despite her being Thaksin’s sister, many palace figures had 
initially warmed to her. It was only when the amnesty bill became an issue that the 
good relationship broke down. Yingluck herself did not expect the bill to contain 
provisions absolving Thaksin of his criminal convictions. Earlier drafts of the bill 
would only grant amnesty to ordinary protesters involved in previous anti-
government mass protests but not to politicians (The Guardian 11 November 2013). 
She only learned of the changes in the final version, this politician claimed, after the 
bill had been pushed through the lower house.54 A military officer close to the 
NCPO’s leadership also revealed that he had initially agreed to support Yingluck’s 
government, particularly by working closely with one of her cabinet ministers, as 
long as it governed transparently and competently. He withdrew his support around 
late 2013 when corruption scandals related to the rice-pledging scheme grew more 
serious, at which point he defected to the anti-government side and started to 
advocate a coup d’état as a possible solution.55 
 The deal theory should still be treated with caution, however. If there really 
was a deal, it must have broken down completely by the time that the PDRC was 
able to mount such a massive campaign against the government. It may be possible 
that both the Thaksin and the elite sides did not expect the protest to spiral out of 
control due to the extremely large turnout, but as Prajak (2016: 8) and Baker (2016: 
5) point out, the PDRC rally bore all the hallmarks of having received backing from 
influential opponents of Thaksin. A Thaksin-aligned retired army general also 
believed that broadly the same groups of people had been behind all major anti-
Thaksin street demonstrations. These people, he claimed, had deliberately 
engineered crisis situations in order to provide a pretext for military intervention.56  
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It could be argued, nonetheless, that although the deal broke down with the 
amnesty bill episode, another deal was struck shortly before the coup, which could 
explain the lack of Red-Shirt resistance to the military. Thaksin may have been 
forced into this new deal from a position of weakness after the protest and several 
court decisions had rendered the Yingluck government almost completely toothless. 
General Prawit Wongsuwan, a key member of the NCPO and mentor of Prayuth, 
once had a good relationship with Thaksin and may have helped to bring the two 
sides to a compromise. Prawit became army commander-in-chief in 2004 during 
Thaksin’s premiership, and the two had once been involved in a business 
arrangement related to a company under the control of Thaksin’s wife.57 The link 
between Prawit and Thaksin endured even when Prawit was appointed Defence 
Minister under the Democrat-led government in 2008 (Wassana 2014: 129). The 
2014 military regime has largely refrained from going after the remaining business 
interests of Thaksin’s family in Thailand. In May 2016, when eight people were 
arrested for running an anti-junta Facebook page, Prawit denied the widespread 
rumour that Thaksin’s son Panthongtae Shinawatra was behind the group (Post 
Today 3 May 2016). There are also reports that Thaksin has met several times with 
Prawit and other junta representatives at various locations outside Thailand 
(Crispin 2016).   
If the deal truly exists, it can help explain why Thaksin may not want to 
escalate tension by mobilising the Red Shirts to rally against the military. Confident 
that he still enjoys the support of voters in the populous northern and northeastern 
parts Thailand, he may prefer to wait until the junta restores electoral politics in 
2017 as it has promised. To press for confrontation now would threaten his business 
interests and may provoke more criminal charges against him and his family 
members. A local Red-Shirt leader in northern Thailand, who repeatedly used the 
Thai word nai (master) to refer to Thaksin, believed that the Red Shirts would be 
ready to take to the streets as soon as Thaksin gave his approval, implying that the 
absence of a large-scale anti-military protest by the Red Shirts so far has really been 
because Thaksin does not want it.58 A PTP politician even completely dismissed the 
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Red Shirts’ potential to spontaneously rise against the junta, seeing them as “not a 
genuine mass movement.”59 It should be added, though, that several prominent 
figures within the red-shirt movement such as Suda Rangkupan, Jaran Ditta-
aphichai and Sunai Chulapongsathorn took refuge abroad following the coup, a fact 
which may have weakened the remainder of the movement in Thailand. As for 
Thaksin himself, he has remained in self-imposed exile and mostly kept a low 
profile since the coup although he has occasionally resurfaced to criticise the junta 
via media interviews and his personal Facebook page (The Guardian 22 February 
2016). 
 
NCPO Rule: Power, Legitimacy and Authoritarianism 
Regardless of any reluctance the generals may have had prior to the coup, once in 
power the junta was determined to ensure that its regime would not be remembered 
as an ineffective, bumbling administration like the 2006 military-led Council of 
National Security (CNS) regime. There had been a widespread feeling among 
Thaksin’s critics that the 2006 generals had ‘wasted their chance’ (sia khong) and 
failed to leave a lasting legacy, especially by not having done much to dismantle 
Thaksin’s electoral machine. The failures of the 2006 coup are still fresh in the 
minds of the 2014 coup leaders and there have been indications that the NCPO is 
not willing to repeat those mistakes. To this end, the 2014 junta has employed what 
could be described as a deliberate strategy to uphold its undemocratic rule. This 
section will examine the NCPO’s rule through the lens provided by Gerschewski’s 
(2013) conceptualisation of legitimation, repression and co-optation as the three 
pillars underlying the stability of autocratic regimes. 
Legitimacy is a highly important issue for any political regime, whether 
democratic or not. While democratic regimes can draw their legitimacy from the 
principle of popular sovereignty, undemocratic and military-dominated regimes 
typically need to rely on other sources of legitimacy. Although the military possesses 
the means and ability to employ coercive power against its opponents, a regime 
cannot depend exclusively on violence and repression as a tool for governing in the 
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long term. In the words of McCargo (2008: 88), “nation-states claim a monopoly on 
the use of force, but where a state resorts to invoking force against its own 
population, it risks eroding its legitimacy.” Thus, as Gerschewski (2013: 18) points 
out, undemocratic regimes seek to appear legitimate in order to avoid using 
violence as well as to “guarantee active consent, compliance with the rules, passive 
obedience, or mere toleration within the population” and these regimes cannot rely 
solely on their abuse of power in the long term. In other words, the issue of 
legitimacy is important for authoritarians precisely because they are aware of the 
limits on their power. Legitimacy and limits of authoritarian regimes are two sides 
of the same coin. 
Governments that totally or partly lack democratic legitimacy have 
commonly justified their rule by pointing to their success in developmental issues, 
arguing that improvements in people’s quality of life would not have come about 
had politics been more open and democratic (Leftwich 1995: 418-420). 
Alternatively, or in addition to this, an authoritarian government may cite the need 
to maintain order within an ethnically or culturally diverse society, the desire to 
preserve ideological purity of the state, and the necessity of upholding unity in the 
face of threats to national security as reasons for the regime’s dictatorial character 
(Heiduk 2011: 252-253; Gerschewski 2013: 19). 
 The notion of legitimacy is highly relevant to any attempt to analyse the Thai 
military’s political role. In Thailand, the concepts of liberal democracy and popular 
sovereignty have struggled to displace the traditional ideological system that 
emphasises nationalism, monarchism and Theravada Buddhism (Dressel 2010b: 
449-455). The Thai military regards protection of the monarchy as its primary duty. 
It has been willing to legitimise its foray into politics by citing the need to eliminate 
anti-monarchy threats. Ferrara (2015: 279) notes that in Thailand a strong display 
of loyalty to the monarchy can lend legitimacy to unelected institutions on grounds 
other than performance. The NCPO has clearly attempted to draw its legitimacy 
from sources other than popular mandate. Prayuth himself has made many public 
remarks admitting that the method he used to acquire power was undemocratic. 
The coup, he often said, was needed to resolve the chaotic situation for which the 
previous government and the protesters were to blame. 
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NCPO, Prayuth Chan-ocha and Non-democratic Sources of Legitimacy 
In one of the earliest signs that the NCPO regime had learned important lessons 
from the 2006 coup, Prayuth and his fellow coupmakers were in no rush to 
establish a proper government or appoint a Prime Minister. In 2006 there were 
clear signs from the start that Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the coup’s leader, would not be 
Prime Minister, which made him look weak and gave rise to rumours that he had 
been reluctant to carry out the coup. An army officer close to the NCPO’s top brass 
argues that Sonthi’s unclear stance in 2006 was a sign of cowardice and a refusal to 
assume responsibilities for such a major event as a coup.60 The 2014 coup leaders, 
in contrast, appointed themselves to oversee government ministries. Prayuth, 
despite his lifelong military background, also decided to appoint himself to chair at 
least 15 government committees in charge of important national economic policy 
(Sopranzetti 2016: 9). It took until August 2014 for Prayuth to formally become 
Prime Minister, having ruled the country simply as NCPO chairman up to that 
point. The NCPO chairmanship already gave him absolute power, allowing him to 
govern using martial law, and Prayuth could conceivably have picked a well-
respected civilian figure to be Prime Minister in order to improve the regime’s 
image in the same way as how Anand Panyarachun, an aristocratic former diplomat 
and businessman, became Prime Minister in Thailand’s 1991 coup-installed regime. 
Instead, Prayuth appeared to believe that being a junta leader without heading the 
government was likely to be a complicated affair and would diminish his real 
influence. A retired army officer involved in the 2006 coup revealed that Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin deeply regretted not becoming Prime Minister himself.61  
 Ever since he became army commander-in-chief in 2010, Prayuth Chan-ocha 
has been noted by observers for his staunch royalism and his alleged antagonism 
toward Thaksin Shinawatra and the Red Shirts. A member of the ‘Eastern Tiger’ 
army faction, he was seen as having had a close bond with the royal family—and the 
queen in particular—due to his association with the elite Queen’s Guard army unit. 
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The Queen’s Guard unit, whose specially trained troops nominally provide 
protection for the queen, was established in 1981 in accordance with the queen’s 
recommendation (Wassana 2014: 91). Prayuth was promoted to army chief four 
years before his mandatory retirement age, which was a relatively rare occurrence 
because an army chief usually gets to occupy the position for only one or two years 
(Wassana 2014: 88). His rapid ascent through the ranks was partly thanks to his 
closeness to General Anupong Paochinda, a fellow Eastern Tiger and one of the key 
force commanders during the 2006 coup against Thaksin (Chambers 2013: 276). 
Prayuth himself does not like the Eastern Tiger label, seeing it as an unhelpful 
indication of division within the army, though he has implied that he is highly 
proud of his Queen’s Guard background (Wassana 2014: 92).  
As Prime Minister, Prayuth has been known for his often fiery temper during 
press conferences, his weekly televised addresses and his long-winded speeches on 
official occasions. Prominent themes in his public speeches and utterances include 
nationalist rhetoric, the unsuitability of western-style democracy for Thailand, the 
need for stability and reconciliation, and patronising concerns toward poor rural 
dwellers (Sopranzetti 2016: 12). He has also portrayed himself as a man who gets 
things done, especially thanks to the fact that he can exercise power without having 
to deal with parliamentary opposition or messy coalition partners. Article 44 of the 
junta’s interim constitution grants Prayuth absolute power to do virtually anything 
in the name of public order, replacing his earlier reliance on martial law. Prayuth’s 
Deputy Prime Minister and legal scholar Wissanu Krea-ngam justified Article 44 as 
being “a fast cure for critical problems that cannot be solved quickly” (Strait Times 
7 April 2015). Essentially this is a classic authoritarian line of thinking: emphasising 
rapid problem solving while disregarding the lack of public participation in the 
political process. Article 44 has proved to be a favourite tool of the junta. It has been 
used on a wide range of issues such as suspending local government elections, 
enforcing correct pricing for government lotteries and clamping down on rowdy 
street motorbike racers (iLaw 2015). A leading Democrat Party politician, despite 
having expressed disagreements with the NCPO over some crucial issues including 
both the 2015 and 2016 draft constitutions, believes that Prayuth’s authoritarian 
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way of governing has found support among a sizeable number of Thai people.62 
Projecting an image of a strong, hard-working and sincere leader, Prayuth bears 
similar characteristics to those that propelled Thaksin to popularity a decade 
previously. Another example of a Thai leader in this mould is Sarit Thanarat, a 
military strongman who ruled Thailand with an iron fist in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Thak 2007). 
Apart from Prayuth’s personal style of governing, the NCPO’s emphasis on its 
performance in order to make up for its democratic deficit can be found in other 
ways. There are signs that the NCPO has been promoting its governing 
achievements in comparison to those of the Yingluck government. In comparison to 
her brother’s premiership from 2001 to 2005, the administrative performance of 
Yingluck’s government was poor in several notable areas. Its bad management of 
the 2011 flood crisis exposed Yingluck’s inexperience, which was not helped by the 
fact that a number of key PTP figures were still serving their political bans related to 
the dissolution of two previous Thaksin-aligned parties, Thai Rak Thai (TRT) and 
PPP. Though they may have provided some advice, the bans meant they could not 
participate fully in the government, leaving Yingluck surrounded by incompetent 
ministers (Brooks 2011). The flagship rice-pledging scheme also turned sour as the 
project’s huge costs and related corruption scandals became known to the public 
(The Economist 10 August 2013). The failings of the rice scheme would go on to be 
one of the issues the junta frequently uses to attack Pheu Thai politicians. Soon after 
the coup, the NCPO regime authorised a payment of 92 billion baht owed to rice 
farmers who had not received their money under Yingluck. Portraying himself as 
the ruler who will “Return Happiness to People”, Prayuth also ordered Thai 
terrestrial television channels to broadcast live World Cup football matches and 
embarked upon a public order crusade that included cracking down on public 
transport mafias, unsightly declining beach beds and other daily annoyances 
(Porphant 2014: 6-7). The junta, it could be seen, was keen to promote itself as a 
regime that focuses on working for the greater good and ‘cleaning up the mess left 
behind by politicians’. The end of street protests also boosted commerce and 
returned a sense of normalcy to Bangkok residents (Sopranzetti 2016: 5). 
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Another relevant indicator of government performance in Thai politics is the 
issue of corruption. Corruption has been a long-term plague on Thailand, and 
coming up with stronger ways to tackle the problem has been an important goal or 
even an “obsession” for reform-minded Thai political actors at least since the 1990s 
(Aim 2014: 526-527). Past leaders of military coups also tended to legitimise their 
regimes by accusing the previous government of being afflicted with corruption 
scandals. As mentioned earlier, corruption issues under the Yingluck government 
were one of the main factors that persuaded one military interviewee to defect from 
the Yingluck side to the side of the army leaders who eventually became the top 
brass of the NCPO regime.63 Sopranzetti (2016: 9) identifies anti-corruption as one 
of the ideological forces behind the 2014 junta. Yet, even though eliminating 
corruption will undoubtedly lead to better governance and higher quality of public 
services, among others, the NCPO’s supposed anti-corruption drive has failed to 
unify the population behind the military. In particular, the corruption scandal 
surrounding the construction of Rajabhakti Park, an army project involving the 
erection of statues of seven historical Thai kings in close proximity of the current 
king’s official residence in Hua Hin, occurred under the junta’s watch but the army’s 
subsequent internal investigation was declared to have found no irregularities 
(Channel News Asia 30 December 2015). The incident was nonetheless heavily 
damaging for Udomdej Sitabutr, Prayuth’s successor as army chief who inaugurated 
the project (The Nation 12 November 2015). Since the scandal, it has been difficult 
to take the junta’s anti-corruption rhetoric seriously as it appears that the junta has 
been targeting politicians while conveniently ignoring itself. The scandal has 
nonetheless faded away and the junta has not been seriously weakened by the 
episode. 
Thailand’s monarchist ideology also forms an important part of the NCPO’s 
attempt to appear legitimate. During his tenure as army chief, Prayuth stated many 
times that one of the most important missions of the armed forces is to protect the 
monarchy (Suchit 2013: 179). Two major nationwide bicycle-riding events, called 
Bike for Mom and Bike for Dad in honour of the queen and the king respectively, 
were organised in August and December 2015 and heavily promoted through the 
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media and other official channels. In a speech on 28 October 2015, Prayuth even 
made an eye-catching comment addressing the dissatisfaction of some Thaksin 
supporters regarding the queen’s widely publicised visit to a funeral of a PAD 
protester in October 2008. Arguing that the queen had not done anything wrong, 
Prayuth claimed that the queen had personally told him that she had made the visit 
because the PAD had never spoken ill of her, unlike some other groups (Kittiwat69 
2015). 
 Meanwhile, the use of lèse majesté law to crack down on insults and 
disrespect toward the monarchy, already an issue under previous governments, has 
grown more severe. The number of arrests has spiked, and those arrested have been 
put to trial in the military court instead of the civilian court. In Thailand a ruling 
made by the military court is final, with no possibility of an appeal (iLaw 2014). The 
use of coercive mechanisms to enforce loyalty to the palace is not a good sign for 
Thai royalism. Even before the 2014 coup, the increased reliance on repressive 
measures, including the application of lèse majesté law and the Computer Crimes 
Act (Streckfuss 2011: 291), to combat anti-monarchy threats actually reflected the 
growing weakness of the royalist establishment itself. In the words of Ferrara (2015: 
292), “[i]f royalists were still able to steer  the course of events behind the scenes, 
[…] they would not have relied on censorship, lèse majesté, street violence, military 
firepower, and outlandish court rulings as heavily or as frequently as they have.” 
The NCPO does not appeared to be concerned, however. The regime appears to 
believe that being tough on lèse majesté offences is a way of demonstrating 
steadfast loyalty to the throne while also galvanising support from the public. 
 
Legitimacy, Reform and Constitution Drafting 
Another important way in which the NCPO has tried to legitimise its rule is claiming 
to engage in making long-term plans to improve the country’s political system. In a 
departure from its 2006 predecessor, the 2014 military regime has made 
determined efforts to shape the future of the country. Clearly not content with 
simply having put a brake on violent conflicts, the NCPO argues that a quick return 
to civilian rule will bring back the same old cycle of political turmoil. The rhetoric of 
reform, most recently associated with the PDRC, has become part of the junta’s 
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action plan. Alongside the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) which the junta 
established to perform legislative functions (in practice the NLA has been a rubber-
stamp parliament), a 250-member body called the National Reform Council (NRC) 
was created and tasked with coming up with plans to reform Thai politics and 
society (McCargo 2015a: 331). Talks of long-term planning soon became one of the 
junta’s favourite lines. A retired general sitting on Prayuth’s cabinet remarked that 
the NCPO would like to leave a legacy “as a gift for the younger generations”.64 Like 
the NLA, however, the NRC was dominated by military personnel and junta 
loyalists (Human Rights Watch 2015), its membership hardly reflecting the 
diversity of opinions within contemporary Thailand. 
 The NCPO, having abolished the 2007 constitution, also set up a body in 
charge of drafting a new one. Previous military governments engaged in similar 
exercises. It has become somewhat of a tradition that a Thai military coup 
automatically means the end of the existing constitution. The coupmakers will then 
rule using an interim charter, while a committee is formed to write a new 
constitution which will come into effect once the military decides to resume 
elections. The 2006 military regime, however, created an important precedent: a 
constitution drafted under military rule was now required to be put to a national 
referendum. The 2006 regime hoped that the referendum it organised, which took 
place on 19 August 2007, would bestow popular legitimacy on its draft charter. 
Despite criticisms regarding the undemocratic nature of that referendum 
(Meisburger 2007), the notion of holding a referendum on matters of national 
importance has become engrained in Thai politics since then. In July 2012, when 
the Yingluck government attempted to amend the 2007 constitution so that a new 
one could be written, the Constitution Court ruled that any new constitution would 
have to pass a referendum because the 2007 one had been endorsed in a 
referendum (Manager Online 6 July 2012). 
 The first Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) set up by the NCPO was 
also going to come up with a draft constitution that would be put to a referendum. 
The CDC, chaired by public law scholar Bowornsak Uwanno, was made up of 36 
members nominated by the NRC, the NCPO, the cabinet and the NLA (McCargo 
                                                             
64 Interview, Anonymous retired army general now serving in Prayuth Chan-ocha’s 
cabinet, Bangkok, 25 November 2015 
 
 
175 
2015a: 333-334). The draft it produced eventually attracted controversy for, among 
other reasons, containing provisions on a special ‘crisis committee’ that would wield 
enormous power over the elected government (The Nation 12 August 2015). Before 
it had a chance to be put to referendum, the draft produced by the Borwornsak-led 
CDC was voted down by the NRC and thus was immediately discarded. The NCPO 
then created a new 21-member CDC, this time chaired by veteran legal expert 
Meechai Ruechuphan (McCargo 2015a: 339). In contrast to the Borwornsak CDC, 
all members of the Meechai CDC were handpicked by the junta to ensure a 
harmonious working relationship.65 It turned out, however, that the junta became 
so dissatisfied with the new CDC’s performance that it publicly issued a list of its 
own proposals for the CDC to consider including in the draft. Among the NCPO’s 
proposals was the idea of having an all-appointed Senate, a small number of whose 
seats will be reserved for senior military figures, for a so-called ‘transitional period’ 
of five years after the constitution comes into effect (The Nation 8 March 2016). 
Several members of the Meechai CDC have expressed their discomfort at being 
pressured by the junta, though there have been no premature resignations. These 
developments illustrate the NCPO’s desire to leave a long-lasting impact on the Thai 
political landscape, especially by pushing for the creation of non-majoritarian 
institutions and mechanisms strong enough to restrict the power of future elected 
governments. The junta aims to lessen the relevance of electoral politics and make 
sure that unelected institutions, most probably aligned with the conservative elite, 
will have an important role to play.  
Eventually, Meechai’s draft constitution passed a referendum in August 
2016. The referendum, however, was deeply problematic because the junta refused 
to allow free and fair campaigning by those who opposed the draft. Politicians and 
activists critical of the draft were arrested and harassed, and media outlets 
apparently decided to self-censor their coverage for fear of reprisals (McCargo et al. 
2017: 71-72). 
 
Repression 
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Regardless of the effectiveness of legitimation strategies, repressive mechanisms 
remain essential for undemocratic regimes (Gerschewski 2013: 21). Repression and 
legitimacy are not totally separate issues. It is common, for example, for an 
authoritarian regime to try to legitimise its use of repressive measures upon the 
population. The repression under the NCPO regime has been justified mainly in the 
name of public order, conflict solving and reconciliation. One of the foremost 
priorities for the junta after assuming power was to impose order. People exhausted 
by months of PDRC-related political turmoil were hoping to see peace and calm 
return to Bangkok streets. Media censorships were imposed as the junta disallowed 
the dissemination of information deemed threatening to government stability and 
public morality. As was the case in 2006 and in some of the country’s other coups, 
the military put the need to restore order as its central message during the early 
months of NCPO rule, believing that the deteriorating and endless conflict was 
threatening stability and national interests (International Crisis Group 2014: 17). 
The military’s job was made easier by the absence of resistance from the Red Shirts, 
who would have been the only organised mass movement capable of mounting 
immediate pressure on the junta. A retired army general who became a cabinet 
minister under Prayuth remarked that compared to the events of 2006, the 2014 
coup was more necessary because the 2014 crisis was more serious, showed no signs 
of abating and was pushing Thailand towards becoming a failed state. He 
maintained that the 2014 coup was required due to the extremely difficult 
circumstances and that as a believer in democracy, he normally disapproved of 
military coups, including the one in 2006.66 Thus, despite the coup taking place in 
2014, the behaviour of the Thai junta still resembled what Nordlinger wrote four 
decades ago: 
The praetorians portray themselves as responsible and patriotic 
officers, these public-spirited qualities leaving them little choice but to 
protect the constitution and the nation from the unhappy 
consequences of continued civilian rule. Foremost responsibility is not 
due to the men who happen to be occupying the seat of government. 
Their overriding responsibility is to constitution and nation. The 
military take it upon themselves to decide if the constitution has been 
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violated or the national interest subverted, and thus whether or not 
intervention is warranted. (Nordlinger 1977: 19) 
 By emphasising the severity of the pre-coup mayhem, the NCPO also 
distanced itself from PDRC protesters who had reasons to assume that, by kicking 
out the loathed Yingluck government, the military was on their side. In a gathering 
with PDRC supporters around one month after the coup, Suthep Thaugsuban 
claimed that he and Prayuth had been planning an anti-Thaksin coup together since 
2010. Prayuth, he added, told him shortly before the coup that the army would step 
in to finish what the protesters had started (Bangkok Post 23 June 2014). In 
response, Prayuth issued a strongly-worded denial and admonished the PDRC for 
holding the event while the military-dictated ban on political gatherings was in force 
(Wassana 2014: 236-237). The NCPO tried to blame all sides for causing the conflict 
and refusing to compromise, triggering the need for the military to seize power 
(International Crisis Group 2014: 16). 
 In the early weeks of NCPO rule, the military issued orders summoning 
hundreds of people to report to army camps (Human Rights Watch 2015). These 
orders were read out on television, and those who refused to obey them would face 
prosecution. Included in the list of people summoned were politicians and 
individuals associated with the Red Shirts, but scholars, writers and activists who 
had never had clear links with Thaksin or the Red Shirts were wanted as well 
(Haberkorn 2014). A junta-issued ban on political activities meant that political 
parties were not allowed to hold party meetings. Prominent politicians, especially 
those in Pheu Thai, were put under heavy restrictions. A PTP keyman revealed that 
the NCPO consistently required him to make burdensome preparations before 
travelling abroad. Prior to each trip, he would have to submit to the military a 
detailed travel plan along with supporting documents, all of which must be 
translated into Thai. His travel application each time had to be approved by General 
Prayuth himself. Prayuth alone could authorise his trips, and there was no 
guarantee that the permission would always be granted. On certain occasions, the 
permission did not come until a few hours before the trip.67 
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It quickly became clear that the military was taking a hardline stance and 
would not tolerate public expressions of dissent. As the Red Shirts stayed quiet, 
most of the early criticisms and resistance toward the junta came from other actors. 
Academics, university students and civil society activists began voicing their anti-
military views soon after the coup. Small-scale activities, some of which were 
organised in such a way as to sidestep the military’s ban on political gatherings of 
more than five people, became one of the main methods of expressing symbolic 
opposition to the coup. The NCPO responded by detaining and in some cases filing 
charges against them (Haberkorn 2014). Activists detained were often freed after 
less than a week in custody, but the military would slap them with additional 
restrictions on their rights such as by not allowing them to engage in further 
political activities and requiring them to seek the military’s permission before 
travelling abroad.68 Even academic activities taking place inside university areas 
could be forcefully cancelled if they touched on human rights, democracy or other 
topics that the junta deemed inappropriate, though such events would have a higher 
chance of going ahead if the organisers had a good relationship with the military.69 
The clampdown on anti-coup activities reflected the military’s inability or 
unwillingness to understand that opposition to military rule could come from 
people not aligned with Thaksin, and the military has showed a remarkable 
tendency to conflate anti-military activism with republicanism. Student activists 
were accused of being linked to Thaksin and anti-monarchy groups, while some 
academics were targeted because the junta regarded them as being “intellectually 
influential” among Red-Shirt citizens.70 71  Alongside the detention and arrests, the 
military has also implemented a softer scheme based on the notion of reconciliation. 
Local leaders of the Red Shirts and the yellow shirts around the country have been 
asked to report to the military and refrain from engaging in political activities. 
While many of these leaders have cooperated, a minority still show some 
resistance.72 A retired general sitting on Prayuth’s cabinet openly admitted that for 
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the duration of NCPO rule, human rights had to be sacrificed for the sake of peace 
and reconciliation.73 
 
Co-optation 
Gerschewski defines co-optation as “the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors 
(or a group of actors) to the regime elite” so that those actors do not pose a threat to 
the regime (2013: 22). The focus of co-optation tactics is not ordinary citizens but 
actors within the realms of the social, economic and political elites. Like the notion 
of legitimacy discussed earlier, co-optation strategies are a sign of potential limits 
on the power of an authoritarian regime or at least a sign of the regime leaders’ 
awareness of those limits. Presumably, there would be no need for co-optation if a 
ruler had total confidence in the regime’s ability to crush any opposition. A military 
regime that relies on co-optation in addition to purely repressive measures also 
tends to last longer than one that only or strongly depends on repression (Prajak 
and Veerayooth 2018: 288).  
 Perhaps some of the most important co-optation strategies took place at the 
top level of the NCPO itself. After assuming premiership in August 2014, Prayuth 
simultaneously occupied the positions of NCPO leader, Prime Minister and army 
commander-in-chief. Sopranzetti (2016: 9) sees such formal concentration of power 
as an indication of Prayuth’s unrivalled supremacy in the junta. However, the fact 
that Prayuth agreed to retire from the army in September 2014 was significant. 
Thanom Kittikachorn, a military dictator who was overthrown by Thailand’s 1973 
popular uprising, refused to end his army career despite reaching the mandatory 
retirement age. Prayuth too could have followed that precedent and extended his 
tenure as army chief. The fact that he did not do so is a notable sign that his vast 
powers still have some limits. In contrast to Sopranzetti’s view (2016: 9), I argue 
that Prayuth is not a military strongman who enjoys absolute authority over the 
country. His retirement from the army was likely to be because he knew that his 
prolonged tenure as army chief would have threatened the army’s harmony. Every 
                                                             
73 Interview, Anonymous retired army general now serving in Prayuth Chan-ocha’s 
cabinet, Bangkok, 25 November 2015 
 
 
 
180 
reshuffle in the Thai army is a tense affair, and senior officers can generally predict 
their career trajectories based on their current positions. Had Prayuth stayed on as 
army chief for longer, this system would have been seriously disrupted as some 
officers would have found themselves unable to rise to the top as expected. It was 
therefore likely to be Prayuth’s own choice in opting not to risk fuelling resentment 
within the powerful army. In Thailand a countercoup always remains a possibility, 
and it was in Prayuth’s best interest not to unnecessarily disrupt the army’s internal 
tradition. In this sense, Prayuth used co-optation tactics to ensure that the army 
would not become a threat to the NCPO regime. 
 Another instance of co-optation, as well as another sign of the limits to 
Prayuth’s power, is the need to maintain harmony within the government itself. 
Prawit Wongsuwan is widely acknowledged as one of the most powerful figures in 
the NCPO setup and his influence can be detected throughout the regime (McCargo 
2015b: 344). According to a businessman with inside knowledge of the NCPO, the 
failure of Prayuth’s younger brother, Preecha Chan-ocha, to become army chief 
during the 2015 reshuffle season was down to the Prayuth-Prawit power play.74 If 
Prayuth really could have things his way, his brother would have ended up as army 
chief without much trouble. At the same time, Prayuth had also wanted to sack the 
unpopular Deputy Prime Minister Pridiyathorn Devakula from his cabinet. 
Pridiyathorn, however, had been Prawit’s friend since high school and had been 
appointed to the cabinet largely due to Prawit’s wish. Preecha himself was not well-
respected within the army75 and had a career background in the Third Army Region 
in northern Thailand, which traditionally has not been where most of Thailand’s 
army chiefs came from (Montornkit 2010: 57-59). Due to his brother’s obvious 
shortcomings, Prayuth decided that pushing for Preecha’s appointment as army 
chief was not worth the trouble. He thus offered to allow Prawit to have an officer of 
his choice become army chief in exchange for Prawit not obstructing the sacking of 
Pridiyathorn. In the end, Pridiyathorn was ousted and Theerachai Nakwanich, 
Prawit’s preferred choice, became army chief in October 2015. 
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 Under the NCPO, a degree of co-optation regarding elite business actors has 
also taken place. A scheme called Pracharath was unveiled ostensibly to replace 
Thaksin-era populist policies, which Prayuth has frequently criticised for their 
short-termism and unsustainability. Pracharath, a brainchild of royally-connected 
public intellectual Prawase Wasi and Prayuth’s Deputy Prime Minister Somkid 
Jatusripitak (Prajak and Veerayooth 2018: 293), is meant to be a project bringing 
together the public and private sectors for the purpose of providing help and 
guidance for the grassroots population (The Nation 19 October 2015). While it is 
portrayed as a pro-poor scheme, Pracharath reflects the junta’s attempt to build a 
close relationship with a number of major business groups such as Charoen 
Pokapand and Siam Cement Group, the latter of which is a major part of the Crown 
Property Bureau (Sarinee 2016). Companies joining the scheme would also earn 
certain privileges from the state (Prajak and Veerayooth 2018: 294). Prawase, 
however, later made a strong criticism of the junta after it had revealed plans to 
make radical changes to the National Health Security Office and the Office of the 
Thai Health Fund, two of the country’s most prominent public health bodies which 
are under Prawase’s patronage (Post Today 30 May 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to explain the events leading to the 2014 coup and the 
endurance of the authoritarian NCPO regime. Thailand’s 2014 military junta has 
undoubtedly been more repressive and anti-democratic than the 2006 regime, 
attracting allegations that it is seeking to turn back the clock and revive the era of 
military dominance from the 1980s. The 2014 coup took place when anti-
democratic discourse associated with the PDRC protesters was gaining strength. 
The military benefited from people’s exhaustion with the PDRC turmoil and the 
perceived poor performance of the preceding democratically elected government. 
There may also have been a deal involving Thaksin that allows the military to 
govern without facing large-scale protests from the Red Shirts. Once in power, the 
NCPO has employed various strategies of legitimation, repression and co-optation. 
The regime acknowledges its lack of democratic mandate but argues that it delivers 
results, brings reconciliation and fights tirelessly against threats to the monarchy. 
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The NCPO leadership keeps tight control of the country and has not been reluctant 
to crack down even on mild displays of dissent. It has long been clear for opponents 
of Thaksin that the 2006 coup failed to do much to stop him. The 2014 military 
regime’s response has not been to favour any political party in the hope that it may 
stand a chance against Thaksin’s electoral machine, but to establish a political 
system in which unelected institutions have enough power to constrain democratic 
politics. Despite some important setbacks, the endurance of the NCPO regime can 
be attributed to the relative success of its legitimation, repression and co-optation 
strategies as well as the alleged secret deal with Thaksin which has created an 
uneasy truce between him and the military. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis analyses the political role of the Thai military and focuses specifically on 
its involvement in Thailand’s democratic backsliding over the last two decades, 
including but not limited to the two military coups in 2006 and 2014. As this thesis 
has made clear, the military’s actions should be understood in relation to significant 
political developments in Thailand in recent times, particularly the emergence of 
Thaksin Shinawatra, an elected civilian leader who directly and indirectly 
transformed Thai politics in several important ways. With an unprecedentedly 
powerful electoral machine, Thaksin and, subsequently, his proxy parties won 
general elections in 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2011, not including the two contentious 
ones in 2006 and 2014 which were later annulled. At the same time, he presided 
over a government that eroded the system of checks and balances and other crucial 
democratic mechanisms, however imperfect they may have been in the first place. 
His premiership also precipitated an era of highly disruptive mass protests by both 
his supporters and opponents, a phenomenon that characterised much of the 
country’s political turmoil from 2005 to 2014. These protests became a factor in the 
2006 and 2014 coups and other interventions carried out by the military. 
 While Thaksin was clearly responsible for undermining democracy during 
his period in office, it is the Thai military that has left a stronger impact on the 
country’s democratic backsliding in the last two decades, pushing Thailand away 
from a democratic path and towards becoming a permanently authoritarian or, at 
best, a hybrid regime with a heavily authoritarian character. Throughout the thesis, 
I adopted a perspective based on democratic principles and a normative 
understanding of the military’s expected role in a democratic society. In this 
chapter, I provide a concluding assessment of what this thesis offers in terms of 
findings, originality and contributions to the existing body of knowledge.  
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The Military and the Non-Linearity of Thailand’s Democratic 
Backsliding 
The military has been a major political actor throughout much of Thailand’s post-
1932 history. Its political influence was most obvious when it directly governed the 
country, but there were also times when it provided backing to civilian-led 
governments or manoeuvred in other ways to ensure certain political outcomes. 
Although the events of May 1992 initially appeared to put an end to the military’s 
political ambition, the electoral victory of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 eventually 
led to the resurgence of the military in politics in the form of the 2006 coup. 
 One important point that this thesis has sought to highlight, however, is that 
we should avoid the pitfall of portraying the developments in Thai politics since the 
2006 coup as one linear, continuous instance of democratic backsliding. On the one 
hand, it is possible to see the country’s political trajectory from the 1997 
constitution to the current 2017 constitution as a case of democracy clearly losing 
out to authoritarianism. This thesis, on the other hand, brings in the notion of 
‘democratic resilience’ and contends that the rise of the Red Shirt mass movement 
and the persistent efforts by pro-Thaksin parties to fight elections represented the 
determination of democratic-minded political actors to resist the military’s political 
moves. What this means is that a simplistic, straightforward notion of democratic 
backsliding would fail to capture the complexities within Thailand’s political 
situation over the past two decades. 
 Thaksin, unlike previous civilian Prime Ministers, has not been one who 
would give up easily. Even when confronted by such traditionally powerful actors as 
the military and figures in the elite circle, he persisted in trying to win power 
through electoral means and through sponsoring the Red Shirt mass movement. 
The leaders of the 1991 coup did not face such problems. They easily toppled the 
elected government and, before their downfall in May 1992, followed up by 
appointing a largely technocratic government that generally satisfied the emerging 
middle class. However, Thaksin, with his personal wealth, popularity and 
connections, has been able to remain a formidable electoral force despite being on 
the receiving end of military coups, unfavourable court rulings, mass 
demonstrations and party dissolutions. 
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The case of the Red Shirts involved the emergence of a radical political 
discourse that profoundly challenged what the protesters viewed as the core power 
structure of Thailand, one that was centred on the military and the monarchy. As 
such, the anti-democratic role of the military since 2006 ironically provoked a pro-
democratic response that threatened to erode the authority of the monarchy, the 
military and other unelected actors and institutions in the Thai political scene. 
Without the 2006 coup and the military’s subsequent political efforts, there would 
not have been such a strong desire among the grassroots to challenge the status 
quo. 
 It should be noted, still, that there are obvious problems with referring to the 
Red Shirts and pro-Thaksin parties as unequivocally pro-democratic actors. This 
thesis has argued that the Red Shirts and many pro-Thaksin figures often fail to 
appreciate that liberal democracy is not the same as majoritarianism but also 
requires liberal constraints on the elected government. The political arguments 
made by these actors tended to be based on the majoritarian aspect while 
downplaying the liberal aspect of liberal democracy. Nonetheless, it is important to 
stress that the Thai political system since the promulgation of the military-
sponsored 2007 constitution has increasingly favoured unelected institutions at the 
expense of the elected government. The formerly all-elected Senate became a half-
appointed body, and independent agencies such as the Election Commission and 
the Constitution Court came to have a politicised role in determining the fate of the 
elected government. In the eyes of the Red Shirts, these developments were a sign of 
creeping authoritarianism that had to be resisted. As stated earlier in this thesis, the 
Red Shirts’ relentless emphasis on electoral rule should be understood not simply as 
a demand for majoritarianism but rather as a necessary first step for a proper liberal 
democratic system. 
 The implication, overall, is that the military certainly has a key role in 
Thailand’s democratic backsliding since 2006, but this backsliding has not been 
linear. The account offered in this thesis recognises the anti-democratic effects of 
the military’s role while also acknowledging the resilience of pro-democratic forces 
during the same period. 
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The Value of Empirical Data 
This thesis draws on materials from first-hand interviews conducted in Thailand 
from July 2015 to January 2016. The interviewees included a number of figures who 
have, at various times, played a leading role or been involved in the highest level of 
the political and military spheres. All interviewees were granted anonymity in order 
to allow them to discuss sensitive issues with as much freedom as possible under 
the repressive political climate. 
 The perspectives and information gained from these elite interviews are 
highly beneficial and can help us to challenge certain prevalent assumptions in Thai 
politics. One example is the assumption that anyone who supports the military coup 
against Yingluck’s government in 2014 is also automatically a supporter of the 2006 
coup against Thaksin. This assumption is based on the many similarities between 
the two coups. The elected governments overthrown in both cases were from the 
same political group, and both coups were preceded by lengthy, intense and 
disruptive street protests. In both cases, the governments called snap general 
elections to try to assert their democratic legitimacy, but both times the elections 
could not be held properly and were later annulled by court rulings. 
This thesis has revealed, however, that two military officers who support and 
work closely with the NCPO regime endorsed the 2014 coup but sharply criticised 
the 2006 one. This is not simply the case of criticising the 2006 coup for its 
perceived ineffectiveness; these two interviewees do not think it should have been 
staged at all in the first place. This revelation introduces complexities into the 
commonly heard narrative that opponents of Thaksin are consistently in favour of 
every anti-Thaksin move carried out by the military. This is particularly interesting 
in light of the fact that the 2006 coup appeared to be more closely associated with 
the monarchy compared to the 2014 coup. Thus, even when considering the fact 
that the two coups in 2006 in 2014 were both carried out against pro-Thaksin 
governments, opinions among supporters of the military can vary in unexpected 
ways. It would have been difficult for researchers to uncover such nuances without 
conducting first-hand interviews and gathering empirical data from fieldwork. 
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Legitimacy and Military Rule  
Another main contribution of this thesis is its focus on how the Thai military has 
relied not only on repressive measures but also on non-coercive means in order to 
preserve and expand its political power. Although the CNS and particularly the 
NCPO regimes have forcefully suppressed dissent, this thesis engages with other 
important ways in which the Thai military has maintained power and undermined 
the country’s democratic prospects, such as the reliance on non-democratic sources 
of legitimacy and the co-optation of important political and economic actors.  
On the one hand, studies of authoritarian regimes in other countries have 
revealed how authoritarian governments can bolster their legitimacy by pointing to 
economic performances, national security issues and other performance-related 
indicators. In this aspect, the Thai case shows several similarities to what happened 
in other military and non-democratic regimes. The leaders of the 2006 and 2014 
coups claimed they had to step in to restore public order and punish corrupt 
politicians. It is notable how both of these coups were preceded by months of street 
protests and a prevalent sense of chaos and lawlessness. The NCPO regime actually 
went further, claiming that it had to hold on to power in order to initiate a long-
term ‘reform’ of the country. On the other hand, this thesis also argues that there 
are distinctive aspects of legitimacy in the Thai case, such as the legitimacy derived 
from the monarchy, that can eclipse the democratic legitimacy of an elected 
government. 
Thus, as anti-democratic forces continue to make gains around the world, it 
is important to realise that authoritarian governments often do not govern using 
brute force alone. Authoritarian leaders, especially those who are in power for long 
periods, frequently base their claims to power on non-democratic sources of 
legitimacy. This thesis offers an analysis of how Thai military leaders, in addition to 
using repressive measures, tried to justify their actions by similarly referring to non-
democratic sources of legitimacy. The durability of the NCPO regime, the longest 
period of military rule in Thailand since the 1970s, suggests that such a strategy has 
at least brought some success. 
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Suggestion for Further Research 
While this thesis has covered several aspects related to the role of the military in 
Thailand’s democratic backsliding in recent times, there are opportunities for 
further research in areas not deeply analysed in this thesis. One such area is the 
international context. This thesis engages exclusively with domestic factors, but the 
literature on democratisation makes clear that international factors can contribute 
immensely to the spread of democracy and authoritarianism. More research could 
be done on, for example, the relationship between the rise of China and the 
entrenchment of military-led authoritarianism in Thailand. 
 Another possible area of further research is the issue of national security. At 
least since 2004, Thailand has suffered from a violent insurgency in the country’s 
three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. Guerrillas have 
carried out shootings and bombings against state officials and ordinary citizens, and 
the military has assumed the task of fighting the insurgents. Considering that 
countries afflicted by national security issues, such as Israel, tend to have a strong 
military with large budgets, there is an opportunity to analyse possible links 
between Thailand’s southern insurgency problems and the role of the military in 
relation to the country’s democratic prospects. 
  Lastly, future researchers will be particularly interested in the role of the 
military under the reign of the new king, Maha Vachiralongkorn, also known as 
Rama X. The passing of King Bhumibol in October 2016 was the beginning of a new, 
unpredictable chapter in Thai politics. At the time of writing, the new king has 
reorganised a number of military units traditionally associated with the monarchy. 
As the king is known to be personally interested in military matters, it remains to be 
seen how the political role of the Thai military will be shaped by future 
circumstances and changes. 
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